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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the nationalist expressions of Algerians under French colonization 
from 1919 to 1954, and black Americans in the United States of America in the late 1950's 
and 1960's. The formation of political organizations within both the Algerian and black Amer- 
ican communities was a response to unbearable political, economic and social conditions borne 
for a long time. This study focuses on the aims of these nationalist organizations, and also the 
means and ways by which they challenged the political, economic and social domination. 
Algerians and black Americans experienced two systems of domination: colonialism and 
capitalism. These generated racism as an ideology that enforced the power and privilege of 
French settlers and white Americans. The similarities of the political response of Algerians 
and black Americans are the gist of this thesis. Where differences exist these are also analysed. 
Political organizations within both communities expressed solutions which reflected different 
ideological trends. Some advocated a form of assimilation and a desire to be part or closely 
allied to France or the United States. Others thought that'restructuring the political, economic 
and social frameworks and respecting the national and ethnic characteristics would improve the 
condition and the quality of life of each community. A third political expression believed that 
separation from the French and American nations as the best outcome for a true emancipation. 
The different manifestations of nationalism exposed the inadequacy and injustice of the then 
prevailing systems and fought for human dignity, better life and equality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
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The organizations and movements that emerged within the Algerian community under 
French colonization after World War I, and within the black community of America in the late 
1950's and 1960's were expressions of a political consciousness that gradually permeated 
both communities. This new awareness was the result of unacceptable levels of political domi- 
nation, economic exploitation and social inequity in each country. The refusal to accept a 
subordinate status was translated into political organizations and movements which would take 
their fundamental characteristics from the communities in which they originated. Each had 
particular characteristics that were unique and these emerged through their different aims, 
modes of action, strategy and methods of action. These organizations and movements were 
primarily concerned with gaining political and human rights, alongside mitigating economic 
disparity and social discord. 
The existence of these organizations and movements was a reaction against two distinct 
systems within which these communities lived: colonialism for the Algerians and capitalism for 
black Americans. However, notwithstanding the variations in political and social structures, 
both systems reflected a common economic environment which, through the use of technologi- 
cal superiority and military power, succeeded in exploiting and controlling non-western and 
non-white peoples. The two systems were closely linked and had fed on each other through 
their respective natures. Colonialism could be seen as the mighty extension of domestic capi- 
tal. European powers had managed to secure territories and had built empires at the expense 
of non-western peoples for the search of raw materials, cheap manpower and the creation of 
new markets. This expansion ensured and strengthened home economic growth and worldwide 
capital circulation. It enabled countries like the newly independent United States of America to 
develop not only through enterprise but also the emulation of European powers. The political 
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rupture between the new state and the ex-mother country, Great Britain, did not sever the emo- 
tional and economic bonds. The United States could not benefit fully from trade with a strong 
British economy because of an inadequate workforce. As settlers could not tame the American 
natives in large enough numbers, they turned to the merchants who traded in skin to provide 
them with cheap manpower. These adventurers profiting from the momentum created by the 
European colonialist drive in Africa, managed through ruthlessness and deceit to capture black 
Africans and ship them to America where they provided slave labour for white profit. 
Different stages in the respective histories of each community raised hopes that an 
improvement in their downtrodden condition might occur, but aspirations were consistently 
thwarted by inadequate legislation or were deceived by political compromises that did not 
affect the future of either community in any positive way. The end of slavery in 1865, Recon- 
struction, the move northward of black Americans and the period between the world wars, 
heralded the prospects of an effective freedom and an acceptance of black Americans as part of 
the nation. But those expectations were soon dashed as attitudes and events proved them 
overly optimistic. Similarly in Algeria, neither the law of February 4,1919 which created a 
small intermediary category that could vote between French citizens and Algerian subjects, nor 
the law of September 20,1947, which created an Algerian assembly of 120 members elected 
through the universal sufferage by two electoral colleges (French and Algerian) that would 
elect 60 members each for a three year term, brought about genuine political representation or 
responded to the gradual urge for self-determination. This was especially galling after the 
defeat of fascism in Europe in which Algerians as well as black Americans participated. All 
these did not fundamentally change the condition of either community. They both lacked 
effective political and economic powers, and inequality still prevailed in favour of French 
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settlers and white Americans. Moreover, the supremacy of French settlers and white people 
buttressed a sense of cultural domination which had racism as its foundation and justification. 
The exclusion of black people and Algerians not only permeated any political decision, it 
became an important element in the perpetuation of the two systems in Algeria and in the 
United States of America. 
In each community and each country, political groupings using different ways and 
different means, would transform their 'exclusion' into a positive asset, into a dynamic of auto- 
nomous actions. They would challenge the supremacy of the prevailing systems. They would 
not only be inspired by the unbearable conditions of their respective communities but also by a 
variety and diversity of sources. They would have distinguishable ideological references by 
which the disparate political organizations and movements defined or sought to define their 
frameworks, their actions and their ultimate objectives. The divisions of opinion among 
Algerians and black Americans were reflected through the formulations of their plans, ideologi- 
cal aims and approaches. Some significant trends emerged from the polarisation of convic- 
tions. 
A faction of each community believed that integration would be the solution to the miser- 
able condition of their community. Led by individuals who had been nurtured by French and 
white minds, this trend founded its claims on principles that were inherent in France and the 
United States of America; liberty, equality, fraternity and pursuit of happiness for Mankind. 
Their main objectives were defeating French and white supremacy, creating equality of oppor- 
tunity, promoting human dignity and altering the balance of power. 
These political aims were challenged by those who emphasized the restructuring of the 
internal societies. Their goal was to reform both Algerians and black Americans as individuals 
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and communities. They wanted to focus on developing pride in Algerian and black heritages, 
ethnic characters and consciousness as means to fight French and white supremacy. They 
claimed that the restructuring of the overall society, and even the prevailing political and 
economic systems, had to be attempted in order to achieve a fairer, more egalitarian, less 
alienating and less exploitative way of life. 
There was also another very different trend. It was based on the belief that separation 
from France and the United States was the best solution to the plight of the Algerian and black 
American communities. Relationships between conflicting communities would be severed. The 
right for self-determination would be adopted because it re-enforced the belief that the future of 
either community (Algerian and black American) ought to be decided by Algerians and black 
Americans themselves. It implied the creation of new institutions but more importantly the 
assertion that these distinct human entities were to be recognized as equal to other human 
groups. 
The concerns of all organizations, of either community and each country, were set around 
the claim that members of the Algerian and black communities, were entitled to certain rights 
(political representation, economic and social equality, and justice). The divisions of opinion 
among Algerians and black Americans were merely indications of the diversity of objectives, 
means, actions and strategies of the different political groupings but all rejected the unaccept- 
able political, economic and social status quo. They were all committed to advancing the con- 
dition of each community. They came to defend the communities from which they sprang 
from political coercion, economic pauperisation and racialism. Some simply fought for self- 
preservation. In either case, the emphasis was on improving the lot of the specific community 
to which they belonged. They both voiced different manifestations of nationalism. 
-5- 
Nationalism has been described as "a modern emotional fusion of two very old 
phenomena - nationality and patriotism" (1) and "the paramount devotion of human beings to 
fairly large nationalities and the conscious founding of a political 'nation' on linguistic and cul- 
tural nationality" (2). It has also been seen as "a consciousness, on the part of individuals or 
groups of membership in a nation, or a desire to forward the strength, liberty or prosperity of a 
nation" (3). For Hans Kohn nationalism is "a state of mind", "an act of consciousness" of a 
"large majority of people" which "recognized" the nation state as the "ideal form of political 
organization" and the nationalist as the source of "all creative cultural energy and of economic 
well-being" (4). Louis Snyder thought it "a condition of mind, feeling or sentiment of a group 
of people living in a well-defined geographical area, speaking a common language, possessing 
a literature in which the aspirations of the nation have been expressed, attached to common 
traditions and common customs, venerating its own heroes, and, in some cases, having a com- 
mon religion" (5). 
These definitions do not account for the multiple variations, do not cover all the changing 
realities and myths that nationalism includes and do not consider the nationalism of the 
developing countries in the twentieth century Asia and Africa. They just show some agree- 
ment on basic conceptualisation, and reveal the shortcomings inherent to any brief description. 
However, some definitions do emerge to correct these deficiencies. Thus, for James Cole- 
man, nationalism is "broadly a consciousness of belonging to a nation ( existent or in the realm 
of aspirations) or a nationality and a desire, as manifest, in sentiment and activity, to secure or 
maintain its welfare, prosperity and integrity, and to maximize its political autonomy" (6). It 
has also been described as "a belief on the part of a large group of people that they comprom- 
ise a political community, a nation that is entitled to independent statehood, and a willingness 
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of this group to grant their community a primary and terminal loyalty" (7). 
These new analyses mirror the understanding arising out of recent historical develop- 
ments, but they scarcely cover all the manifestations of the concept. It is impossible to fit the 
meaning of nationalism into any short span of words. For instance all these definitions omit 
the cultural and social aspects of nationalism. 
A similar objection can be raised to Marxist interpretations which mainly focus on and 
emphasize the capitalist and imperialist grounds of nationalism. Marx, Engels and Lenin 
believed that nationalist thinking reflected bourgeois ideology in the capitalist stage of human 
history, the stage in which, the bourgeoisie wanting to become richer at home and expanding 
its trade abroad, tried to impose itself on other 'bourgeoisies' of other nations for a greater 
profit. This interpretation may well oversimplify a complex set of beliefs and conditions (8). 
Every time scholars have embarked upon specific studies of nationalism, they have 
sought to define it. But their abstractions are based on the subjective critera involved in their 
particular area of research and have limited value as the same human experience can not repeat 
itself. It is subject to changes and variations. Just as the realities of nationalism reflected 
human experience, so have the definitions. The study of nationalism of any time and any place 
is not valid as a study of the nationalism of all times and places. 
The nature and intensity of group loyalties depend on the particular environment out of 
which these loyalties arise and the culture of which they are a part. Members of all human 
societies have offered a kind of loyalty to, and felt some kind of unity with a human group or 
groups. Family loyalty and distrust of other human groups have undoubtedly been universal 
among human beings. In ancient societies whether nomadic or sedentary, people gave their 
loyalty to their tribe or clan. The devotion of ancient Greeks went to their community. 
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Romans preferred their place of birth (patria), their city, their republic and later their emperor. 
Muslims gave their allegiance to their religion which was inextricably linked to their nations. 
Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406), the North African historian and philosopher, thought the basis of 
the state to be the assabiya, "the mutual affection and willingness (of a community) to fight 
and die for each other" (9). Nationalism seems to reflect, if not be determined by, the culture 
in which it arises- the total political, economic and social environment. 
Nationalism was very strong in Europe in the nineteenth century and early twentieth cen- 
tury. It was an important element in the European expansionist drive all over the world, espe- 
cially in Asia and Africa. However, after World War II, nationalism spread worldwide. It 
became a practical ideology and a means of strengthening the specific national identity in order 
to respond to unfounded ideological justifications made by colonizers set on domination in 
what is known as the Third World (10). Because nationalism has become worldwide, it might 
seem to be natural. But, while all men at all times have been members of some kind of a 
group and offered their loyalty to it, nationalism is a phenomenon which is not shared by all 
individuals and if it is, is not expressed with the same intensity whether by individuals or by 
peoples everywhere (11). Men are not nationalists by nature, anymore than they are marxists, 
socialists, monarchists or republicans. They become nationalists as they are reared in a partic- 
ular environment. Nationalism appears to be a learned emotion. It is moulded by the political, 
economic and social confines in which it arises. 
Definitions of nationalism and analyses of its manifestations can help to clarify the pro- 
cess through which the destiny of a community is perceived. However, this can only 
illuminate a narrow range of nationalism. Each case has a limited historical significance 
gleaned from the experience of the struggles of communities which have sought and preferably 
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found political independence. Nationalism is seen as retrospective because its national aim is 
to achieve a free community. The unitary vision and the founding political theories through 
which human groups contemplate themselves have to focus on the creation of a free entity. 
The existence of nationalism is subject to the existence of a nation as its end, of an ideology 
encouraging group autonomy and of a rekindled cult of freedom. 
Moreover, the word nationalism is essentially multi-faceted. It is a concept or practical 
ideology that can bring together a large number of people in their search for unity, or integrate, 
regardless of creed or race, different human elements in their desire and will to be one nation, 
one community or one people. It can also enhance the specific national identity in order to 
respond to ideological attacks that serve to justify domination. 
The complexity of nationalism is such that it can be used to contrast a positive national- 
ism, which is meant to be the driving force of a community in formation or in struggle for its 
self-preservation, and a negative nationalism which is thought to be a primordial element for a 
nation in expansion and seeking hegemony (12). This contrast serves to justify the chasm that 
has existed between powers seeking to spread their influence and dominate communities that 
are trying to throw off the yoke of oppression. The negation of domination and exploitation 
appears to have been the most important goal. Emancipation, however, is a long process. It is 
the ultimate goal but also the fruit of a diverse and disparate preparation. 
The struggle has almost never been continuous and harmonious. The action of political 
organizations and movements are usually heterogeneous, uncoordinated, sometimes almost 
rivals to one another, but they all show an awareness in practice and have developed new ways 
of claiming rights. Yet, neither the internal contradictions nor competition between political 
organizations and factions modify the substance of the struggle. This has consistently been the 
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negation and rejection of unacceptable levels of political, economic or social domination. The 
division of a community into social strata precludes the sharing of the same ideal but within 
divided communities, there were political actions that coordinated numerous ways of express- 
ing nationalism. 
The intricacy and sensitivity of nationalism as a concept and as a phenomenon could not 
be encapsulated in straight jacketed definitions. Nationalism can not be limited to the study of 
human experiences that generated the creation of nation-states in Europe and North America 
exclusively. Nor can it be reduced to an analysis that projects nationalism as the means for 
capitalist and imperialist profit. It can not be confined to individuals and movements that seek 
to emulate liberal' models created by Europeans and North American societies; nor can it be 
contracted to a Marxist analysis. The meaning of the term nationalism, because it is so 
difficult to define, could be expanded to include any organization or group that heralds the 
creation of a nation-state, or that denounces expansionism of national bourgeoisies. It can also 
include any organization or group that explicitly asserts the right, claims and aspirations of a 
given society or community in opposition to an authority, whatever its institutional form or 
objective. 
Algerian nationalism found its roots in the conquest and colonization of Algeria by 
France. The French invasion of 1830 was one of the few that spread into the mainland. It 
did not confine itself to seashores of the country so that soon it became an immediate threat to 
the majority of Algerians. Settlers took Algerian land, occupied it, started to fructify and live 
from it. The origins of contemporary Algerian nationalism must be found in the Algerian 
resistance to French invasion, epitomised by the military action of Emir Abdelkader who 
fought till 1847 when he was vanquished. The resistance betrayed the seeds of, later national- 
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ism. "You are merely passing guests" Abdelkader's men told the French. "You may stay 
three hundred years, like the Turks, but in the end you will leave" (13). French colonization 
practiced policies which despite changes, contradictions and delays resulted in the division of 
Algerian society. It drove it to the brink of non-existence forbidding any form of gathering 
and any possibility of unity. That public opinion had, by and large, been opposed and hostile 
to colonization was unquestionable, however it was not strong enough to mobilize until after 
the First World War. 
Hostility and opposition to white domination reached deep into the history and social 
fabric of black America. Black nationalism found its roots there. Like an unsatisfied need or 
relentless conscience emerging to express frustration, black nationalism was an insistent motive 
that pursued its way throughout black history. Black people had been uprooted from their 
home countries, shipped to America then enslaved. The nature of slavery as an institution laid 
the grounds for frustration. It strengthened the collective ethos, it buttressed the need and feel- 
ing of belonging to a group distinguished first by its colour and by its status as a consequence 
of its colour. All this, at first, created a latent anti- white attitude, and an urge to take care and 
protect the immediate familial circle that would later be widened to include the whole black 
community in the United States of America. 
Black nationalism obtained its main compulsions and ideologies essentially in the twen- 
tieth century. Its chief feature was the conflict that had agitated black leadership to work out 
the right policy and strategy to mitigate, alter and improve the conditions in which Afro- 
Americans found themselves. It has had many goals such as civil rights, racial equality, politi- 
cal power or accomodationism. This division over which course to take for true black pro- 
gress, has ever been present. It was a continuous choice that had split many generations as to 
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whether it should be focused on civil rights and equality. This was how the conflict over ten- 
dencies began and this was how the conflict had been fought out on one level or another. 
Both in Algeria under French colonization from 1919 till 1954 and within the black com- 
munity in the late 1950's and the 1960's, political organizations or movements explicitly 
claimed the rights and voiced the aspirations of their particular communities. They challenged 
in different and diverse ways, the institutional, political, economic and social supremacy of the 
French and white Americans, though the radical wing of black nationalism in the United States 
was not as cooperative, conciliatory and resourceful as the integrationist one. However, the 
discord over the aims, ways and means between the disparate political groupings did not con- 
ceal the common goal which was sought by all: the gaining of political rights, the mitigation of 
economic inequity and putting an end to racialism. The ultimate driving force and unifying 
factor was the determination to establish fairer systems for both communities. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE SYSTEMS OF DOMINATION 
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AN INTRODUCTORY CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS. 
In the middle of the sixteenth century Algeria was integrated into the Ottoman empire. 
In 1827 the Turkish ruler of Algeria, the Dey of Algiers, struck the French consul Pierre Deval 
several times with his fly whisk. The Dey was infuriated that the French government did not 
answer his request to send to Algeria a Jewish merchant, Jacob Bakri, who owed him money. 
Bakri, with another Jew Busnach, supplied Algerian wheat to French armies at high interest 
rates. The Dey became involved when Bakri and Busnach claimed they could not pay him 
their debts unless they collected from France. 
Following the fly whisk incident, French authorities demanded a humiliating public apol- 
ogy. When the Dey refused, they began a blockade of the port of Algiers which lasted three 
years. The cost of the blockade and Algerian attempts to break it forced a change in French 
policy. The French Government took a decision to send a military expedition to Algeria in 
January 1830. It was hoped that it would settle the issue with the Dey. 
French forces landed near Sidi Fredj, twenty five kilometres west of Algiers, on June 14, 
1830. Algiers fell on July 5 as Hussein Dey capitulated. He signed a convention with General 
Bourmont giving France sovereignty over the Ottoman pashilik of Algeria. On July 10, the 
Dey was shipped to Naples (Italy) with his family. The success of the expedition did not 
prevent the fall of Charles X in France. His domestic policies were unpopular and he was 
swept away by the July Revolution led by Louis Philippe. 
The first reaction of Algerians when faced with French invasion was to seek the help of 
their traditional Muslim protectors. Meantime in the east of the country Ahmed Bey, the Turk- 
ish district ruler, held out and became the symbol of Muslim defiance to the French army. The 
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Muslim leaders in the west turned towards Morocco for help. The king of Morocco, though 
wary about facing the French, got involved by rousing the Algerians to resist. But French 
pressure forced him to withdraw his agents and troops from Algeria in March 1832. Immedi- 
ately after the Moroccan withdrawal, Muhiaddin of the Quadiria tribe was recognized leader of 
the tribal Jihad (holy war) against the French. From May 1832, he was leading attacks on the 
western city of Oran. But as he was weak and old, his son Abdelkader took over and later in 
the same year he became Emir (prince and leader) of the resistance. 
The Emir's struggle was successful enough to force the commander of the French forces 
in Oran, General Desmichels, to sign an agreement on February 26,1834, which acknowledged 
Abdelkader's authority over a sizable territory in the west. Desmichels acted according to the 
spirit of the so called limited occupation policy, which meant that the French would occupy the 
main towns of the Algerian hinterland, and exercise sovereignty over the rest of the country 
through native or Turkish rulers. However, the general was not instructed by his government 
to do so. 
The French government accepted the Desmichels agreement, and the official French pol- 
icy for Algeria remained that of a limited occupation until the appointment of Marshal Clauzel 
as Governor General in July 1835. Clauzel tried to undermine the agreement by his attacks 
both on the Emir and Ahmed Bey in Constantine, capital of the east of Algeria. After many 
attacks, General Bugeaud defeated Abdelkader in 1837, and negotiated a peace treaty with him. 
In May, 1837, the Treaty of Tafna was signed. It redefined the boundaries of the territory held 
by the Emir. On October 13,1837, Constantine fell but Ahmed Bey fled to the south of 
Algeria. 
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Abdelkader used the two and half years which followed the signing of the Treaty of 
Tafna to penetrate the province of Constantine and enforce his authority over the tribes of the 
west and south of Algeria. However, the fall of Constantine, and the French attempts to estab- 
lish a land route between this town and Algiers led to a conflict which ended the co-existence 
between Abdelkader and the French. 
Since 1837 the new Governor General Valee tried to persuade Abdelkader to revise the 
terms of the Treaty of Tafna, especially with regard to the limit of French territory east of 
Algiers, defined in the treaty as being Wadi Kaddara (40 kilometres east of Algiers) or beyond. 
The French thought that by inserting 'or beyond' in the text of the treaty, they could reserve 
the right of further expansion eastwards. Abdelkader argued that the term was meaningless in 
a context where a definite boundary was specified. As Valee went ahead with his plans of a 
route, Abdelkader resumed war on November 13,1839. The Emir's attacks led him to the 
suburbs of Algiers. Consequently the French government toughened its stance. It abandoned 
the policy of limited occupation and launched a policy of total occupation in 1840. The execu- 
tion of the new plan of action was assigned to General (later Marshal) Bugeaud. 
Bugeaud was Governor General from February 1841 to June 1847. This period was 
decisive in Algerian history. He destroyed Abdelkader's authority and compelled him to 
surrender on December 23,1847. Abdelkader was confined in France until 1852 when he left 
to Syria. Bugeaud, also, favoured the acquisition of more Algerian lands. A decree on October 
1,1844 brought an end to the inalienable character of Habus lands which were either trusts or 
privately owned lands, or collective tribal lands. The decree made it possible for the settlers to 
take possession of them. Henceforth the settlers ambition was directed towards the extensive 
tribal lands which were used by tribesmmen but whose ownership was not transferable. A 
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decree issued on July 21,1846 defined lands not in use as vacant, grazing lands as being not 
in use and enabled the Domaine (land department) to acquire 200.000 hectares. 
Bugeaud believed that the colonization of Algeria ought to be by ex-servicemen who as 
farmers would remain under the control of the army. His opposition to civilian colonization 
which he considered unprofitable, led the settlers to believe that integration of Algeria into 
metropolitan France was the only means to fulfill their economic ambition and to guarantee 
their civil rights. Their aspirations had been encouraged by the statute of April 15,1845 which 
re-organized the administration of Algeria. It recognized the existence of distinct civil terri- 
tories which, on account of the large European communities living in them, merited the estab- 
lishment of public services and the exercise of French civil rights. The mixed territories, 
where only few Europeans lived, could be absorbed into civil territories with the extension of 
colonization. The great hope of the settlers was that the whole of Algeria would be absorbed 
into the administrative structure of France. 
The advent of the Second Republic in 1848 was welcomed by settlers since it soon 
satisfied some of their demands. Decrees published in April and August 1848 granted them 
the right to elect their representatives to the Chamber of Deputies and placed Algerian adminis- 
trative offices under the direct control of ministries in Paris. The French constitution of 
November 1848 further declared Algeria, unlike other colonies, a French territory. It meant 
that the Governor and the military governed solely the Muslim population. Both had no jurisd- 
iction over the civil territories. Thus emerged an administrative duality. 
Starting to feel the burden of French taxation and resenting the loss of their lands, 
Muslims carried out sporadic but unsuccessful uprisings from 1848 onwards. The inhabitants 
of the Zaatsha oasis rose in 1848 because of taxation on their palm trees. They were defeated 
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in November 1849. In 1851, Bu Baghla a religious chief rebelled in Great Kabylia but was 
killed in 1854. In the south, a tribe, Awlad Sidi Al-Sheikh, started the fight but was defeated 
in 1854. 
During the governorship of Randon (December 1851 to June 1858) the acquisition of tri- 
bal lands was carried out within the framework of the policy of cantonment. This policy 
meant that the lands which in the governor's judgement were needed for the use of a tribe 
were taken away for the purpose of colonization. 
The following twenty years saw a flurry of legislative activity. On April 22,1863, a 
senatus consulte was issued. It recognized the tribal usufruct of land as equivalent to owner- 
ship as an effort to reverse the policy of cantonment. It also provided that most of that land 
should be taken out of communal ownership and turned to private Muslim speculators. This 
opened the door to European speculators or settlers who might buy it up easily and cheaply by 
resorting to dishonest persuasion, the whip of debt or indirect coercion. 
On July 14,1865, another senatus consulte gave all Arabs and Berbers the status of 
French subjects and allowed them to apply for French citizenship if they would accept French 
civil law. On October 24,1870, the Cremieux decree granted Algerian Jews French citizen- 
ship. On July 26,1873, the Warnier law made the Muslim land subject to the French civil 
law, especially article 815 which forbade indivision. This law meant to establish individual 
property. It was revised and strengthened on April 22,1887 by a law whose aim was to 
favour the ending of indivision and the easy transfer of estates from natives to Europeans. 
A Muslim uprising in February 1871 was to come as a result of years of famine and epi- 
demics prior to French-Prussian war. Like many this rebellion was crushed in June 1872. But 
unlike many it was going to generate the economic triumph of the settlers. A war indemnity 
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of 36.5 million francs was imposed and 574,000 hectares were sequestered. 
As a consequence of this uprising, the Code de 1'Indigenat was created. It was outlined 
between 1871 and 1873. Under this civil code, administrators could impose severe penalties 
on the Muslims for any of forty one specified offences without any legal procedure. Civil 
administrators could detain Muslims without trial, place them under surveillance, order collec- 
tive penalties and the sequestration of property. Muslims, furthermore, could no longer leave 
their district without obtaining special permission from the authorities. 
On August 23,1898, the Delegations Financieres, an elected assembly, was created to 
advise generally and to consider the budget of Algeria in particular. It was controlled by the 
European voters. The law of December 19,1900, strengthened its powers by granting financial 
autonomy to Algeria. 
In the years immediately before World War 1, Algerian Muslims were divided by a con- 
troversy over conscription in the French army between conservatives or 'old turbans' as they 
were called and the French educated progressives. In 1911, an indication of Muslim hostility 
had been the emigration of about 800 Algerians to Syria. This epitomized the negative reac- 
tion of the conservatives to conscription. The progressives organized since 1912 in a group, 
the Party of Young Algeria, stated openly their objective of assimilation into the French com- 
munity, but on terms of equality. They demanded the abolition of the Code de ! 'Indigent, 
and requested political, fiscal, and educational equality with the French. In return, they were 
willing to accept the principle of military service in the French army. 
But generally Algeria was co-operative, some 173,000 Muslims were in the French army 
and about 25,000 lost their lives during the war. In gratitude for Algerian loyalty, the law of 
February 4,1919 was meant to make French citizenship more accessible. It granted Algerians, 
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who were classed as subjects because they retained their personal status as Muslims, greater 
participation in local governments. In reality, it created an intermediary category of citizens 
between the French citizens and the simply subjects; and also two distinct electoral colleges, 
one French and one made for this new category of citizens. This law allowed all Muslims to 
apply for jobs as the only positive provision of the law. 
In Paris, in March 1926, a party called the North African Star (NAS) was created to 
coordinate the political activities of the North African workers who were in the majority 
Algerians. In Algiers, on September 11,1927, the Federation of Muslim Algerians was 
created to promote assimilation and cooperation with France. They were moderate in their pol- 
itical and social claims. Among its leaders were Ferhat Abbas and Dr Ben Jelloul. In Algiers, 
on May 5,1931, the Association of the Ulemas was created. Its main goals were reforming 
Islam and serving Algerians through education. The same year, Abbas published a volume of 
articles under the title: De La Colonie Vers La Province: Le Jeune Algerien. As the title indi- 
cated the aim was to have Algeria develop into a full province of France with Muslims treated 
as equal. Also, the same year Maurice Violette published a book, L'Algerie Vivra-T-Elle?. In 
his book he warned that if the Algerian elite's aspirations were not satisfied, Algeria would be 
lost to France within twenty years. 
On May 10,1936, a left wing coalition called the Front Populaire came to power in 
France. It aroused a new hope in Algeria. On June 7,1936, an Algerian Congress was con- 
vened. It was dominated by the Ulemas and the Federation of the Elected. It demanded 
assimilation on the basis of complete equality. In December of the same year, the so called 
Blum-Violette Bill was introduced to French Parliament. It provided for the extension of full 
citizenship rights to certain categories of Algerians such as former servicemen for instance. 
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Following 1936 many Algerian political organizations were created. On March 11,1937, 
the Party of the Algerian People was launched in Nanterre (France), as an offspring of NAS. 
On July 28,1938, Ferhat Abbas' L'Union Populaire Algerienne saw the day light. But this 
period was saddened by the death of Ben Badis on April 16,1940. Bachir El-Ibrahimi took 
over as leader of the Association of the Ulemas in May. On February 10,1943, a Manifesto 
of the Algerian People was sent to the United Nations and to the General Government in 
Algeria. Soon a supplement to the text was addressed to the Governor General Peyrouton on 
March 31,1943. The text, with the supplement, demanded equality, agricultural reforms and 
free compulsory education. It requested the condemnation and abolition of colonization. It 
also highly claimed an Algerian nationality and citizenship, and demanded an Algerian state. 
" The answer of France was the ordinance of March 7,1944 which only granted French citizen- 
ship to 16 categories of persons without a loss of their personal status. And it gave Algerians 
2/5 of the seats in local governments, Delegations FinancTeres and general councils. 
Disappointed, Ferhat Abbas launched a new organization on March 17,1944, Les Amis 
Du Manifeste Et De La Liberte. The main aim of this organization was to make familiar the 
idea of an Algerian nation and to make desirable the constitution in Algeria of an autonomous 
republic federated to a French republic which would be anti-imperialistic and anti-colonialist. 
However, on May 8,1945, Victory Day, victory parades of Algerians in the east of the coutry 
especially in the cities of Setif, Guelma and Kherrata got out of hand as Algerians carried 
national flags and between 6,000 and 45,000 were killed. As a consequence all political 
activity was suspended. 
On May 5,1946, Ferhat Abbas launched a new organization L' Union Democratique du 
Manifeste Algerien whose main aims remained the autonomy of Algeria within the framework 
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of a federation with France, an Algerian Parliament and an Algerian citizenship. In October 
1946, the Party of the Algerian people became the Movement for the Triumph of the Demo- 
cratic Liberties, and on February 15,1947 a paramilitary organization was created called Secret 
Organization within this new party. 
On September 20,1947, the first National Assembly of the Fourth Republic passed the 
'Algerian statute'. It introduced five important reforms which Algerian Muslims had been 
demanding for many years: the suppression of the 'communes mixtes' and their replacement by 
democratically elected councils, the suppression of the military government of the Sahara terri- 
tories and its replacement by civil departments, the recognition of Arabic as an official 
language alongside French, the separation of church and state for the Muslims as for the other 
religions, and finally the electoral enfranchisement of Muslim women. At the same time it 
abolished the system of the government by decree replacing it with an elected assembly com- 
posed of 120 members (60 from each college). Thus the statute retained the inequitable double 
college principle. 
During the Spring of 1948, elections for the first Algerian Assembly were held and 
turned to be fraudulent in order to favour the administration or 'independent' candidates who 
obtained 41 seats out of 60 delegated to the Muslim college. On June 17,1951, the elections 
for the second Algerian Assembly and the National Assembly took place. Abbas UDMA got 9 
percent of the vote, MTDL 8 percent, once again the winner was the administration. 
From March 1950 to June-July 1954, MTDL underwent a crisis that split the party into 
two factions. One led by Messali Hadj who wanted absolute power as a leader, the other by 
the central committee of the party which wanted to curb Messali's power. A third force 
emerged within the party under the name of the Comite Revolutionnaire pour L'Unite et 
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L'Action (CRUA) in order to maintain the unity of the party by being an instrument for speed- 
ing up the elimination of colonialism. As the feud within the party continued, twenty two 
members of CRUA meeting on July 22,1954, at Clos Salembier in Algiers drew up the plans 
for a revolution. In a second meeting on October 10,1954, the date for a revolution was 
agreed upon, and the name of Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) was adopted. November 
1,1954, All Saint's Day saw the beginning of the Algerian Revolution. 
The war would eventually lead to the independence of Algeria on July 5,1962, one hun- 
dred and thirty two years after the French landed at Sidi Fredj in 1830. African-American his- 
tory spread over nearly four centuries. A statement of a chronology of events in this case is to 
be selective. It will highlight the main facts and decisions related to the work undertaken in 
the following chapters. 
The first African-Americans landed in Jamestown (Virginia) in August 1619. They came 
under duress and pressure. They were originally enslaved alongside those constrained by a 
system of indentured servitude which enabled poor whites to come to America to sell their ser- 
vices for a number of years to planters. Under this system many thousands of whites were 
shipped to colonies and were sold to the highest bidder. Some were sold, like the first 
African-Americans, by the captains of ships. Some were kidnapped on the streets of London, 
or Bristol, as the first African-Americans were kidnapped in the forests of Africa. 
The relative freedom African-Americans enjoyed was soon curtailed when in December 
1641 Massachussetts became the first colony to give statutory recognition to slavery. Other 
colonies followed: Connecticut, 1650; Virginia, 1661; Maryland, 1663; New York and New 
Jersey, 1664; South Carolina, 1682; Rhode Island and Pennsylvania, 1700; North Carolina, 
1715; Georgia, 1750. The establishment of slavery generated racist legislation. Thus, on 
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September 20,1664 Maryland enacted the first anti amalgamation law to prevent widespread 
intermarriage of English women with black men. Other colonies passed similar laws: Virginia, 
1691; Massachussetts, 1705; North Carolina, 1715; South Carolina, 1717; Delaware, 1721; 
Pennsylvania, 1725. 
However at the height of the revolutionary struggle on July 2,1777, Vermont , respond- 
ing to the the Rights of Man ideology, became the first American state to abolish slavery. One 
after another, the northern states followed Vermont's lead. By 1783 slavery was prohibited in 
Massachussetts and New Hampshire. New York in 1779 and Pennsylvania in 1780 passed 
legislation favouring a gradual emancipation process. Connecticut and Rhode Island barred 
slavery in 1784 and New Jersey in 1804. 
On September 17,1787 at Philadelphia, the United States constitution was approved. It 
reflected a compromise of a political elite as the Founding Fathers gave in to southern threats. 
The constitution protected slavery in three clauses successively in article 1 section 2, article 9 
section 1, and in article four section 2. Then, the first Fugitive Law enacted by the Congress 
on February 12,1793 made it a criminal offense to harbour a fugitive slave or prevent his 
arrest. This measure was followed by the passage of the first of a succession of Black Laws by 
the Ohio legislature on January 5,1804. These laws restricted the rights and the movement of 
free blacks in the North. Most northern states passed Black Laws. Constitutions of three states 
- Illinois, Indiana, and Oregon - barred black settlers. Then, Congress, on March 2,1808, 
prohibited the slave trade after January 1,1808. 
African-Americans from 1800 onwards showed their discontent and rebelled many times. 
On August 30,1800 Gabriel Prosser planned to attack Richmond, Virginia with some one 
thousands slaves. He was betrayed by two slaves. Prosser and fifteen of his followers were 
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hanged on October 7. Denmark Vesey, a freedman, was betrayed by a house slave while plan- 
ning to take possession of arsenals, guardhouses, powder magazines and naval stores in 
Charleston, South Carolina. He was tried with five of his aides and hanged on July 2,1822 at 
Blake's Landing in Charleston. On August 21-23, Nat Turner led a rebellion in Southampton 
County, Virginia. Sixty whites were killed. Nat Turner was not captured until October 10 and 
hanged on November 11. 
Other African-Americans chose peaceful means to show their discontent. Sojourner Truth 
was a preacher, seer and teacher. She became free under New York's gradual emancipation 
act. On June 1,1843 she began her career as an anti-slavery activist. For more than forty 
years, she walked the land preaching, teaching and testifying. Harriet Tubman, born slave in 
1820 or 1821, opposed the institution and ran away when she was twenty five going by way of 
the Underground Railroad to the North. She returned to the South nineteen times and brought 
out more than three hundred slaves. Martin Delany, born on May 6,1812, was one of the 
African-Americans to express black nationalism. He urged blacks to identify with Africans. 
On March 20,1852, he published The Condition, Elevation, Emigration and Destiny of the 
Colored People of the United States. In this work he stated the first nationalist stance. He said 
"the claims of no people .... are respected 
by any nation, until they are presented in a national 
capacity". He added "we are a nation within a nation". 
The 1850's saw the enactement of important legislative decisions. In 1849, Benjamin F. 
Roberts filed a suit in Boston on behalf of his daughter Sarah who had been barred from white 
schools near her home. The Massachussetts Supreme Court rejected the argument of school 
integration and delivered the first 'separate but equal' legal decision, creating a precedent. The 
Compromise of 1850 was a national political decision. This compromise provided for the 
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'final settlement' of slavery controvesy on the basis of a trade off between free and unfree 
slave states and the enactement on September 18,1850 of the Fugitive Slave Act which 
threatened the lives and liberties of almost all free blacks. Then, a second final settlement, the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act, followed on May 4,1854. It opened northern territories to settlement 
by slaveholders. Then came the U. S Supreme Court decision on March 6,1857 in the case of 
Dred Scott stating that no black person could be a U. S citizen and that black people had no 
rights in America that white people were bound to respect. 
On November 6,1860 Abraham Lincoln was elected President of the United States. Lin- 
coin thought that slavery was morally reprehensible but was opposed to giving blacks social 
and political equality. On March 11,1861, a Confederate Congress, meeting in Montgomery, 
Alabama, adopted a Constitution which declared that the passage of any law denying or 
impairing the right of property in slaves, was prohibited. A month later on April 12,1861, 
confederate soldiers attacked Fort Sumter in the Charleston, S. C, harbour. The answer of 
President Lincoln was to call for 75,000 troops to put down the rebellion, and thus was 
officially a war proclamation. 
During the civil war pieces of legislation were passed. On August 6,1861, Congress 
through the Confiscation Act, authorized the appropriation of the property, including slaves, of 
rebel slaveholders. Then on January 1,1863, President Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proc- 
lamation which freed slaves in rebel states. As the mood towards African-Americans changed, 
they were allowed to volunteer to join the army, first in Massachussetts on January 26,1863, 
then on May 22, the war department established the recruitment of black soldiers. On January 
31,1865, Congress passed the Thirteenth Amendment which abolished slavery in the United 
States and on March 3, established the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands 
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to aid white refugees and former slaves. 
Six months after the end of the Civil War in April/May 1865, the Mississippi legislature 
on November 22/23 enacted Black Codes which restricted the rights and freedom of movement 
of freedmen. Other southern states followed Mississippi. These codes virtually re-enslaved 
the freedmen under vagrancy and apprenticeship laws. But to counterweight this setback, posi- 
tive legislation was passed. On April 9,1866, the Civil Rights Act conferred citizenship on 
blacks and gave them the same right in every state and territory as enjoyed by white citizens. 
On March 2,1867, the first of a succession of Reconstruction Acts was passed. The Acts 
divided the former confederate states into five military districts under the command of army 
generals. Elections were ordered for constitutional conventions and freedmen were enfran- 
chised, and some were elected to offices. On March 1,1875, a Civil Rights Bill was enacted. 
It gave African-Americans the right to equal treatment in inns, public conveyances, theatres 
and other public places. 
On April 15,1877, Federal troops began their withdrawal from the South. This action 
reflected a national reconciliation. It was going to prompt the enactement of legislations that 
would affect negatively again the rights of African-Americans in the South. On April 14, 
1873, a U. S Supreme Court decision in Slaughterhouses cases started the process of diluting 
the Fourteenth Amendment by recognizing two categories of citizenship, state and federal, and 
that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to protect the rights of federal citizenship. Then 
in December 1881, Tennessee put a legal seal of approval on the segregation movement with 
the Jim Crow railroad car. It was followed by Florida (1887), Mississippi (1888), Texas 
(1889), Louisiana (1890), Alabama, Kentucky, Arkansas and Georgia (1891), South Carolina 
(1898), North Carolina (1899), Virginia (1900), Maryland (1904), Oklahoma (1907). Two 
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years later on October 15,1883, the U. S Supreme Court declared the Civil Rights Act of 1875 
unconstitutional. The gains accomplished during Reconstruction were slowly eroding. On 
August 12,1890, a Mississippi constitutional convention began the systematic exclusion of 
African-Americans from political life. The Mississippi Plan (literacy test, property test, poll 
test, understanding clause and grandfather clause) was the first contribution to legally dis- 
franchising poor blacks without at the same time legally disfranchising poor whites. This plan 
was later adopted by other states; South Carolina in 1895, Louisiana in 1898, North Carolina in 
1900, Alabama in 1901, Virginia in 1901, and Georgia in 1908. As the openings for African- 
Americans seemed remote, black radicalism revived and gained new adherents. The leading 
militant spokesman was Bishop Henry McNeal Turner, who called for a return to Africa and 
the establishment of a nation there. He believed that there would be no future in the United 
States for African-Americans unless they were equal to white Americans. 
This spiral of exclusion and discrimination continued when on May 18,1896, the U. S 
Supreme Court, in the infamous case of Plessy v Ferguson, stated that laws requiring separate 
but equal accommodations for African-Americans were a reasonable use of state police powers. 
Then the same court on April 17,1903, upheld clauses in Alabama Constitution which disfran- 
chised African-Americans. The reaction of Black people was to organize and to found institu- 
tions that could represent and defend them. On February 12,1909, the National Association 
for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was created. In 1914, Marcus Garvey esta- 
blished the Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA). 
World War I which started in 1914 ended in November 1918. African-Americans, who 
participated in the defeat of Germany, were expecting an improvement in their status. They 
were to be met in 1919 by riots in Charleston, Chicago, Washington D. C and many other 
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cities. These anti-black riots were to be known as the Red Summer. 
The post World War I period saw the birth of two prominent personalities who were 
going to play an important role in the advancement of the cause of the African-American. 
Firstly, Malcolm Little, later Malcolm X, was born on May 19,1925 in Omaha, Nebraska. 
Then, on January 15,1929 Martin Luther King, Jr. was born in Atlanta, Georgia. This period 
between the two World Wars witnessed the culmination and quintessence of a nationalist tide 
led by Marcus Garvey. Shrewdly exploiting the pessimism and despair of the flood of black 
migrants, Garvey built the first mass movement among American blacks. Garvey preached a 
new kind of gospel of a united Africa under the rule of black men. He used the slogan 
"Africa for the Africans at home and abroad". In the process he recruited hundreds of 
thousands of blacks and stirred Black America as it had never been stirred before. He 
managed to capture the imagination of African-Americans with a version of Pan-African 
nationalism. He made nationhood the highest ideal of all peoples. However the nation he pro- 
posed was in Africa while its constituency was in the United States. Arrested in 1925 on a 
charge of using the mails to defraud, Garvey was convicted and shipped to the federal peniten- 
tiary in Atlanta, where he continued to maintain his innocence. In December 1927, he was 
deported to his native Jamaica. In 1940 his dreams shattered, he died in London, England. 
Around 1930 an organization called the Nation of Islam emerged. Its founder Wallace D. 
Fard disappeared mysteriously to be replaced around 1933-34 by Elijah Poole, later Elijah 
Muhammed. 
The 1940's were a more progressive era. On June 25,1941 President Roosevelt, who 
was elected in 1932, issued Executive Order 8802 which forbade racial and religious discrimi- 
nation in war industries, government training programmes and government industries. While 
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World War II, which started in 1939, was ending a U. S Supreme Court decision in Smith v 
Allright made white primaries that exclude African-American unconstitutional on April 3, 
1944. Two years later, the same court in Irene Morgan v Commonwealth of Virginia barred 
segregation in interstate bus travel on June 3,1946. This was followed by another positive 
action from the President of the United States. On July 26,1948 President Truman issued 
Executive Order 9981 which integrated the armed forces. 
The trend started in the 1940's continued during the 1950's. The U. S Supreme Court 
was leading again. It first barred segregation in Washington, D. C's restaurants on June 8, 
1953. Then it issued the landmark Brown v Board of Education decision on May 17,1954. 
But the ones who were going to fight racism and gain rights were African-Americans them- 
selves. 
On December 1,1955 Rosa Parks a seamstress and an activist chose to be arrested rather 
than giving up her seat when ordered according to the prevailing law in Montgomery, Ala- 
bama. This arrest was going to prompt a historical bus boycott which began on December 5, 
1955. At a mass meeting at the Holt Street Church, Martin Luther King, Jr. was elected 
president of the boycott organization, the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA). More 
than a year later on December 20,1956 MIA ended the Montgomery bus boycott. The buses 
were desegregated the following day. 
The momemtum of this action, the solidarity and commitment of African-Americans led 
to the creation of many organizations and the coming to the fore of others. On February 
13/14,1957, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was established in New 
Orleans. It was a non-violent direct action group and had elected Martin Luther King as its 
leader. On February 1,1960 four students from the North Carolina A&T College sat down 
-30- 
at a 'white' lunch counter in a Woolworth store in Greensboro and demanded service. This 
was the start of a student movement protest that shook the South and set the stage for a student 
rebellion of the sixties. By February 10, the movement had spread to fifteen southern cities. 
The movement became an organized force with the creation of the Student Nonviolent Coordi- 
nating Committee (SNCC) on April 15,1960. The sit in movement had involved some 
seventy thousand students in just a year. 
Scarcely had the South got used to the sit ins when a second blow in the form of 
integrated Freedom Rides occurred. The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), which was 
launched in 1943, started on May 4,1961, this campaign in order to test compliance with 
integration orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission and federal courts. The black and 
white riders demanded equal and integrated service on buses in terminals and lunch counters. 
The arrest of twelve Freedom Riders in Georgia triggered the Albany movement, the coordinat- 
ing umbrella for a citywide assault on segregation by SCLC's Martin Luther King, Jr., SNCC, 
CORE and NAACP in July 1962. During this period the Nation of Islam became prominent. 
The resurgence was due to the activity and talent of Malcolm X. It was amid this struggle that 
an abortive attempt was made to prevent the enrolment of James H. Meredith at the University 
of Mississippi. The Governor of this state, Ross R. Barnett attempted in September 1962 to 
place state power between the University and the orders of the federal court. Meredith became 
a student in October 1962 but the action of the Governor precipitated the gravest federal-state 
crisis since the Civil War. 
In 1963 SCLC and Martin Luther King were very active. On April 3, King opened an 
anti-segregation campaign in Birmingham, Alabama. More than two thousand demonstrators, 
including King, were arrested before the campaign ended on May 10. This year was the one 
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hundredth anniversary of black emancipation. The summer saw the completion of an anti- 
segregation consensus not only in the black community but which reached out to liberals; 
Roman Catholics, Jewish and Protestant clergymen. The March on Washington was a visible 
sign of the potential of this coalition. More than two hundred and fifty thousand Americans 
attended the March where King delivered the famous 'I Have A Dream' oration. 
1964 was another eventful year in the history of black America. On March 12, Malcolm 
X formally annouced the break between himself and the Nation of Islam. Later on June 28, 
Malcolm X launched the Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU) and the Muslim 
Mosque Incorporation. The non-violent direct action of the Civil Rights movement was 
rewarded, firstly, when on July 4, the Civil Rights Act became law. The Act guaranteed 
access to public accommodations, and authorized the Federal Government to sue to desegregate 
facilities, including schools. The Act also mandated non-discrimination in federal programmes 
and required equal employment. Secondly, on December 10, Martin Luther King was the reci- 
pient of the Nobel Peace Prize. 
1965 started with the assassination of Malcolm X by black gunmen at the Audubon Ball- 
room in New York on February 21. This loss did not stop the struggle. Later in the year, on 
August 6, the Voting Rights Act became law. The Act suspended the literary tests and pro- 
vided for the sending of federal examiners into the South. 
1966 witnessed the emergence of greater militancy within the black community. On May 
16, Stokely Carmichael became chairman of SNCC. Then on June 6, James Meredith was 
wounded by a sniper as he walked on a 220 mile voter-registration march from Memphis to 
Jackson. The march was continued by King, Carmichael and other civil rights workers on 
June 7. The march ended on June 26. During the three weeks march, Carmichael launched the 
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Black Power slogan and concept. This was followed in October 1966 by the foundation of the 
Black Panther Party in Oakland, California, by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale. 
In 1967, the black community grew impatient. It expressed its discontent through urban 
unrest during the summer of 1967 especially in Newark and Detroit. The leadership moved 
towards a more radical path as a consequence of a lack of tangible economic, social and politi- 
cal gains. This mood was epitomized by the new stance of Martin Luther King. In Louisville, 
Kentucky, on August 2, he denounced fiercely white racism as the great obstacle for integra- 
tion and a source of economic power. On August 16, he assessed the situation in terms of 
socialism and attacked the exploitative feature of the capitalist system. In two speeches dealing 
with the war in Vietnam he, for the first time, spoke publicly against the war on April 2,1967 
then later in the year on November 11,1967 he talked about the social, economic and political 
impact of the war in the United States. However, changes started occuring domestically. On 
November 7,1967, Carl B. Stokes was elected mayor of Cleveland, Ohio, and Richard G. 
Hatcher was elected mayor of Gary, Indiana. Stokes was sworn in on November 13 and 
became the first black to serve as mayor of a major American City. 
On February 29,1968, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders which 
investigated the reasons of the turmoil, concluded that white racism was the fundamental cause 
of the riots of 1967. On March 4,1968 Martin Luther King decided to lauch the Poor 
People's Campaign. Its aims were to put pressure on the government to provide jobs and 
income for all Americans. Unfortunately King was assassinated on April 4,1968 by a white 
sniper in Memphis, Tennessee. His death precipitated a national crisis and rioting occurred in 
more than one hundred cities. Forty six persons were killed in major rebellions in many cities. 
His killing prompted the passage of the Civil Rights Bill on April 10, a day after King's burial, 
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barring racial discrimination in the sale or rental of approximately 80 percent of the nation's 
housing. The Bill made it a crime to interfere with civil right workers and to cross state line 
to incite a riot. 
The great victory of Martin Luther King and SCLC was the Voting Rights Act. It had 
changed the South's political arena. Between 1964 and 1975, the black electorate increased 
from 2 million to 3.8 million. By 1976 black voter registration across the South was 63.1 per- 
cent, only 5 percentage points below the white level. The number of black elected officials 
climbed to 1,913. Some striking changes were witnessed in the Black Belt. The election of a 
black sheriff in Lowndes County and a black mayor in Birmingham, Alabama, showed partial 
success of the civil rights movement. However, the number of elected was still proportionately 
low. 
THE SYSTEMS OF DOMINATION. 
Colonization as a system of domination had enabled European powers to rob native peo- 
pies in a variety of ways. They secured by the sheer might of their weapons cheap land, cheap 
labour and cheap resources. They were free to impose a system of low priced payments for 
peasants' products which were destined for export. They were able to establish a monopoly on 
the economic market especially on the import of manufactured goods needed by the colony 
(the goods were often being manufactured from the raw materials of the colony itself) and thus 
secured a source of extra profit (1). 
The political and social products of the process of expansion were not only reserves of 
gold, raw materials or human capital. They were also the direct or indirect source of the prim- 
itive accumulation of capital, one of the main elements of the genesis of the capitalist system, 
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and which only existed because of the pillage of the natural 'wealth of dominated countries. 
The development of the mercantile capitalism in Europe was based on the "collapse of the 
prices as a consequence of the discovery of gold mines in America" (2). England, Spain, Hol- 
land and France established colonies whereas the young United States accumulated, land and 
labour, from the massacre of natives and the shameless exploitation of Africans who were 
delivered by European merchants who traded in 'human skins'. The process of exploitation 
extended its tentacles in a worldwide scope. If the protagonists belonged to different nationali- 
ties, the yoke of the system remained the same: political domination and economic exploitation. 
Most of the time this thrust of human exploitation is equated with a conquered territory 
usually inhabited by a people of a different race and culture. The natives are broken down 
then subjugated and natural wealth is exploited for the benefit of the settler and the mother 
country. This image reflects the most well known colonial situation or what has been called 
classical colonialism as in the case of French colonization of Algeria in 1830. 
But there can not be only one definitive model which would account for the variations in 
this historical process, for the patterns of colonization differ in so many ways. A people may 
be colonised on the very territory on which they have lived for generations. A people may be 
half- colonised, half-forced to exile when the 'protector' tacitly helped another people to take 
over the territory by granting a right for a homeland, and over which at the end a new state 
was established, as in the case of Palestinians. Or uniquely, different human groups of the 
same race were forcibly uprooted from their traditional territories and subjugated in a geo- 
graphical environment so that the territory itself was alien to them. This was the case of black 
people in the United States of America. 
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Different behaviour by colonizers does not necessarily mean differences in the essential 
nature of colonialism. The main features of this domination were a kind of direct political 
control or administration, an economic exploitation that would lead to pauperisation and unem- 
ployment, a social relegation to an inferior status of the conquered people and a cultural 
preeminence that would create the new "beast of burden" (3). 
Moreover the most decisive elements in the process of domination are the institutional 
mechanisms (4) set up to maintain, legitimate and perpetuate this subordination. These 
mechanisms are the legal foundation for subduing, for justifying pillage and for laying false 
ideology which would cover up the aggression. 
Colonization was the outcome of a planned political and economic action. It was a sys- 
tem which was established in Algeria around 1880. It was harsh and was specifically intented 
to serve the settlers and France. So, at first, Algerians were not mistaken in fighting this system 
politically. For many years the political dimension of the Algerian problem was dismissed and 
overlooked by France. France rejected the idea that there was a need for free elections, a con- 
stitution and independence. The French saw the situation as being laden with economic prob- 
lems : judicious reforms would alter the hardship of 9 million people. There were also social 
difficultties: the creation and development of educational and health infrastructures would 
improve their condition. The psychological element in turn had to be considered: ill-treated, 
badly fed and illiterate Algerians had built up an inferiority complex vis-a-vis the French. 
Solving these problems would improve their condition. If they ate well, got a job and learned 
to read they would not be ashamed of what they were thought to be and soon the old French- 
Muslim 'brotherhood' would be restored. 
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Even if the French might had brought some degree of material comfort Algerians would 
still have fought them. Moreover as Sartre once wrote: under French bayonets people could 
only be unhappy (5). It was true that the majority of the Algerian people were in an unbear- 
able situation, and it was also true that neither the settlers nor France could bring or even for- 
mulate the necessary reforms that would result in a true and real emancipation. 
War was the last resort to which the Algerians turned to in 1954 in order to put an end to 
an unjust, oppressive and self-perpetuating system. They did not rebel without trying to find a 
peaceful solution. Indeed, they tried hard to use the democratic political process and institu- 
tions in order to lighten the plight of their fellowmen and to improve their conditions. But 
every attempt they had made had been neutralized because they were dealing with a system 
whose essence was subjugation, ruthlessness and profit. 
The context is different between the classical experience of Algerians under French 
power and the specific one of black people in the United States of America under a white 
dominated power. It is the process of domination, being powerless to define or shape the pol- 
itical and economic present and future, which is shared by black people with many colonised 
non-white peoples (6). Harold Cruse cogently summed up the situation: 
From the beginning, the American Negro has existed as a colonial being. His enslave- 
ment coincided with the colonial expansion of European powers and was nothing more or 
less than a condition of domestic colonialism. Instead of the United States establishing a 
colonial empire in Africa it brought the colonial system home and installed it in the 
southern states. When the Civil War broke out, the slave system was abolished and the 
Negro was emancipated, he gained only partial freedom. Emancipation elevated him only 
to the position of semi-independent man, not that of an equal or independent being (7). 
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This interpretation of the experience of black people in the United States has been 
rejected and found 'misleading and obscurantist' (8) because there are differences in the socio- 
political and historical contexts. However if the analogy is not perfect, it has some validity 
because what counts the most are the relationships between those who exercise power and 
those who do not, between oppressor and oppressed. 
The analogy is not perfect in another respect. The experience of black people in the 
United States deals with group relations within a society; in other words the umbilical cord 
between the mother country/colony is absent. Even though European whites colonised the ter- 
ritory of the original Americans, their settlement did not involve a land that was 'unequivocally 
black' (9). Moreover, generally, in classical colonial experience the control and exploitation of 
the country is under a minority of outsiders. Whereas in America, oppressed blacks are them- 
selves outsiders and are a numerical minority. In this light black people in America put up 
with a more unbearable domination for they could not separate and break free from their rulers 
(10), they could not seize the power they needed nor drive out the invaders. So, even if the 
analogy does not hold in precise and matching details, the similarities are sufficient to prompt a 
comparison. The raison d'eetre of oppression is its capacity to break up a people and make it 
powerless. 
Before the conquest in 1830, there was a mosaic of peoples in Algeria. The oldest inha- 
bitants were the Berbers of Kabylia and the Aures who were driven to live on the mountains 
by the Roman and Arab invasions. The Kabyles represent the largest group among today's 
Berbers. A third group were the Mzabi who lived in the Sahara. They were,, and still are, 
members of a dissident and puritanical sect, the Kharijites. Jews formed another small group, 
some were descendents of Jews expelled from Spain in 1492 and some had an Arab-Berber 
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origin. Besides these were Turks who settled in Algerian cities as Algiers fell, in 1525, under 
Turkish sovereignity and Moors or Andalusians who fled from Spain. Turks enjoyed a 
privileged position in the state apparatus while Moors in that of trade and business. There 
were also a few Christians. However, the majority group was the Arabs. The bulk included 
Arabs of Middle-Eastern origins and a large number of Arabised Berbers (11). 
Once Algeria was conquered, the monarchy of July and the Second Republic later did not 
know what to do with this land. It had been suggested that it be converted into a colony of 
settlement. The aim would be to pour all over Algeria the European human surplus, the 
poorest peasants of France, Spain and other Mediterranean countries. Some villages around 
Algiers, Constantine and Oran had been created for this amalgamation of the European popula- 
tion. 
Any colonial settlement needs land. In Algeria the double achievement of firstly evicting 
natives from their lands and secondly taking it, was accomplished through a dual process. The 
French state had stressed at times the role of individuals and at other times the collective 
action. It had firstly relied on settlers and had increasingly called upon capitalist companies for 
industrial and commercial expansion. Several big colonial companies were created in rapid 
succession: 1863 saw the creation of La Societe du Credit Foncier Colonial et de Banque; 
1865, La Societe Marseillaise de Credit, La Compagnie des Minerals de Fer de Mokta, La 
Societe Generale des Transports Maritimes a Vapeur (12). So two distinct forms of settlement 
and exploitation were sought, one official the other open. The first was the origin of centres of 
colonization created artificially and which favoured the human European settlement. Its source 
was the land taken from Algerians. The second was based on capitalist expansion. It relied 
upon deals between and purchases by individuals. As the prominent figure of the Third 
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Republic, Jules Ferry, put it "the nature of our industrially orientated countries allows for a 
greater export and therefore the opening of new channels, and new avenues for trade" (13). 
The aim behind the capitalist venture was to make the Algerian market a monopoly for French 
industry whose high prices had left it uncompetitive on the international level (14). 
Industry was not going to sell its products to natives as they had no money to pay for 
them. So the complementary counterpart to this colonial imperialism was the creation of a 
power of purchase in the colonies. Of course settlers would be the sole beneficiaries from all 
these privileges as they would be the only possible buyers. The settler became the artificial 
purchaser created by capitalism in search for new markets. Both individuals and the power of 
money contributed to the success of the system by making its development and expansion a 
reality, and also by creating the conditions for the establishment and diffusion of an ideology. 
The settlers started a defensive policy vis-a-vis France and an offensive one towards 
natives. They claimed values stemming from the metropolitan society: democratic, revolution- 
ary and liberal. The settlers used this basis to support their demands. They did not want the 
application of the law of France on Algerian land but the elaboration and enactment of laws 
that would stress the particular vocation of Algeria as a French land and their situation as 
'Algerians', elements of a new race (15). 
In this white European perspective, the exclusion of natives was essential. Muslim popu- 
lations living in the communes de plein exercise (areas ruled by European settlers) were 
heavily taxed in order to drive them out. The areas ruled by an appointed civil administrator 
must favour the expansion by helping the smooth transfer of land from Algerians to settlers. 
The controls, under which the Muslim community was kept, were strengthened by diverse 
measures: the introduction of French justice, education, and simultaneously the reduction of the 
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Muslim judiciary system and closing down of Koranic and French-Arabic schools. 
Officially, the aim of the administration was to assimilate Algerians. In reality, the 
natives had to be led to a state of non- resistance in order to eliminate any obstacle that might 
hinder the expansion of the system. One of the consequences was the increase of special taxes 
in order to help the development of the country. Furthermore, the administrative apparatus 
wanted to take away from the traditional agents such as cadis (Muslim lawmen) and djemmaa 
(traditional local assemblies) the most essential of their prerogatives and to limit the power of 
the elected natives. On the whole it was a true, complete domination experienced by Algerians 
translated into sanctions, penalties and the ultimate goal exclusion. The new race did not 
include Algerians because their rejection would be the foundation of the system. It became a 
political necessity. 
Ostracism was an element of the mechanisms of domination. In the United States until 
recent partial advances, black people had never been equal to whites of any class in any field 
whether economic, social, cultural or political, and more importantly, perhaps, just a few 
whites of any class had ever considered them as such. Black people were not part of the 
American nation beyond "the formal recognition that he lives within the borders of the United 
States" (16). 
When showing its opposition to European barbarity and civilization, the new American 
nation had to define its internal constituents (17). The 'Founding Fathers' thought that the pol- 
itical structures would be sufficient in consolidating the nation. The state was thought to be 
constitutive of a nation. They implied that there was a communion between the elements of 
the nation. They were part of an ethnically and culturally homogeneous ensemble or entity 
(18). The belonging to a community of British ascendency did not disappear with the political 
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rupture with Great Britain. The bonds that linked the American settlers to their metropolis, 
united them as well to one another and despite the political rupture the organic basis of the 
community remained. The state emanated from this basis which was referred to as having an 
organic communion by American ideologists of the time (19). 
If the founding Fathers emphasized the structural feature of the nation more than its ethn- 
ical or cultural aspects, it was due to the fact that the British tradition from which they ori- 
ginated was deeply impregnated by the thought that the state as a structure had to be laid on a 
natural, organic foundation (20). However as regards the American nation, the national homo- 
geneity was not total. Around the British kernel which represented the majority at that period, 
revolved other nationals of other European countries tied to other religious customs than Pro- 
testantism. Around this circle of white men were men of black skin, unwilling immigrants 
from Africa; and at the other periphery native Americans (21). The unique composition of this 
population created a situation on which the American rulers and ideologists had to take a stand. 
Once they did, the position was two-fold, on the one hand they wanted to provide the nation 
with an image conforming to the model that stressed an organic homogeneity, in other words a 
relative racial identity and a genetic continuity. On the other hand they also wanted the state 
as a structure to emanate from this ethnically homogeneous nation. So, an elite of the popula- 
tion discriminated, by law and by oration (22), against those who differed too much from 
acceptable norms. For the natural homogeneity which was proclaimed and wanted was defined 
according to standards offered by Protestants and the British majority and thus was presented 
as legitimately natural, born not from an arbitrary position but from a long lasting historical 
process which had welded biologically, culturally and socially the community called up to con- 
stitute the State. By excluding from the national collective the 'wilds', 'the blacks' and cultur- 
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ally alien groups, the American nation thought it would match the other nations in being a 
body that resulted from a political and organic osmosis (23). However, the fusion sought by 
rulers and ideologists was not completely natural (24): if it rested on real foundation, that of 
the Anglo Saxon Protestant nucleus, it was perfect only at the cost of rejecting part of the 
population and absorbing those who assimilated the Anglo Saxon culture and who were of 
white skin. The 'natural' blending of the nation was not therefore totally realized but had to 
be the result of a creation that was partially arbitrary. The description of a national unity given 
by George Washington in his farewell address just referred to the outcome of what was essen- 
tally a selective process rather than a natural one. 
The unity of government which constitutes you one people, is also now dear to 
you.... Citizens, by birth or by choice of a common country, that country has a right to 
concentrate your affections.... With slight shades of difference, you have the same religion, 
manners, habits and political principles (25). 
Within the cultural similarities described by Washington were norms some groups did not 
meet. Differences were concealed as well as a racial exclusion which stemmed from cultural 
definitions. The choice of belonging to the American nation was presented as if it had been 
the same for all individuals and that no discrimination by practice or legislation had restrained 
any specific group. He could not, no more than his contemporaries (26), admit that the 
'universal asylum' was not alloted to everybody. This was especially the case as far as black 
people were concerned. They did not cross the ocean on the Mayflower. They did not emi- 
grate to build the 'City on the hill'. Since their arrival, their status was closely linked with 
menial work under the condition of slavery. Thus in the eighteenth century, the servile status 
was well established. That there were some free black people seemed an aberration to some 
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whites. Afro-Americans were the only people, apart from some Indians, to be reduced to ser- 
vitude for life. From this state of affairs, white people drew some conclusions which could be 
summed up in two recurrent themes: firstly, that the hereditary servitude was reserved for black 
people and this condition was ultimately thought to be natural for them, or at least it deter- 
mined in fact and by law their place in the economy. Secondly, it was by this economic func- 
tion that their existence was circumscribed. 
The presence of black people became a sensitive issue. However, there was a doubt over 
the legitimacy of slavery; and it was above all the debate over this institution that created bar- 
riers against cohabiting with people whose alien physical appearance and culture had contri- 
buted for 350 years to maintain them in relative impoverished conditions (27). When the con- 
stitution sanctioned their separate and inferior status, it resolved at the same time the issue of 
black people's position in the civil body and sanctified a de facto situation: they were only 
animated tools of the economic practice. 
By the eighteenth century the slave system was strongly implanted and became in an 
integral element of the economy in the West. In Great Britain and France, the accumulation of 
capital stemming from the slave trade was not an inconsiderable factor in the development of 
capitalism (28). British political life even underwent the determining influence of the seigneurs 
du sucre (29). The slave trade was essentially a double triangular network of the Atlantic 
trade. All the economy of Anglo Saxon America depended on the slave trade and servitude; 
the South lived from the export of rice, tobacco and indigo which were produced by servile 
work. The capital which was generated in New England was in great proportion invested in 
the armed ships destined for the transportation of slaves, the fish industry, wood products, the 
rearing of horses and pigs with which the 'free' agricultural system of the North and Centre of 
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the United States provided the West Indies slave plantations with the necessities required to 
maintain their abundant work force (30). 
For a long time after independence, slavery was, as George Washington suggested in his 
farewell address, inextricably linked to the general economy of the United States. Some states, 
like Virginia at the beginning of the eighteenth century, succeeded in imposing prohibitive 
taxes on the import of slaves, and South Carolina forbade the slave trade in 1787 (31). Still 
the slave system soon reached a new dynamism thanks to an improvement of the international 
trade and an extension and commercialisation of the domestic slave trade. 
Slaves were brought for the benefit of the white traders and masters. As John Hope 
Franklin rightfully noted in From Slavery To Freedom, "When the countries of Europe under- 
took to develop the New World, they were interested primarily in the exploitation of America's 
natural resources. Labor, was obviously necessary and the cheaper the better" (32). The origi- 
nal Americans the so-called 'Indians' could not cope in sufficient number with slavery because 
their way of life was often nomadic and they were familiar enough with the terrain to escape. 
As Franklin wrote; 
Because of their color Negroes could be easily apprehended. Negroes could be pur- 
chased outright and a master's labor supply would not be in a state of constant fluctua- 
tion. Negroes, from a pagan land and without exposure to the ethical ideals of Christian- 
ity could be handled with more rigid methods of discipline and could be morally and 
spiritually degraded for the sake of stability on the plantation. In the long run, Negro 
slaves were actually cheaper. In a period when economic considerations were so vital, 
this was especially important. Negro slavery, then became a fixed institution, a solution 
to one of the most difficult problems that arose in the New World. With the supply of 
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Negroes apparently inexhaustible, they would be no more worries about labor. European 
countries could look back with gratitude to the first of their nationals who explored the 
coast of Africa and brought back gold to Europe. It was the key to the solution of one of 
America's most pressing problems (33). Slavery had a vital importance and impact on 
the subsequent attitudes of both peoples towards each other. Slavery helped to determine 
whites' sense of superior group position. 
Supremacy was highlighted by the relationship that existed between oppressed and 
oppressors. In Algeria, the instruments of domination account for secondary contradictions 
between colonial power and settlers and between the stances within French opinion. However, 
the main opposition remained the conflict between colonizer and colonized. Reading the legis- 
lation enacted for Algeria hastily and superficially could be illusory. This did not help to 
reveal the difference between what was actually written and the real implication of the words, 
between the proclaimed will and practiced policies. But the scrutiny of different codes and 
decrees could no longer conceal a contradiction: the more that the words used heightened 
assimilation the more the procedures they predicted led to the opposite result. 
Firstly, the system of rattachement (of binding) (34) established between 1881 and 1916 
which aimed to make the Algerian administration more efficient by binding the different 
departments no longer to the governor but to ministries in Paris, led only to a multiplication of 
difficulties and delays in decision making. The government of Algeria did not integrate into 
that of France. Once more the settlers were the indirect profiteers in that their representatives 
in Paris could easily intervene and benefit from the fragmentation of the gubernatorial powers. 
Secondly, a communal reform during the same period helped the expansion of the civilian 
territory which doubled between 1879 and 1881 with the creation of new communes ruled by 
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European settlers and new mixed communes (35). In the mixed communes mayors and their 
elected aides, thanks to the law of April 5,1884, made sure that the way of the European elec- 
torate would be felt, a minority in fact but a majority by law. The small number of native 
representatives were allowed to express themselves but they were not heard. As far as the 
communes mutes were concerned they had an appointed administrator whose prerogatives 
reached out to the judiciary too (36). The assimilation eliminated the influence of the native 
element and strengthened the privilege of the French in Algeria (37). 
A judicial reform generated the same results. Implemented in order to spread French 
law, it led to the creation of a special code stressing the differentiation between natives and 
settlers. The code of indigenat (38) established in 1874 consisted of a series of special 
offenses supposed to be perpertrated by the sole members of the Muslim community. The list 
was restrictive but subject to extension according to needs and whims. The perception of the 
offence and the penalty by judges and administrators in the mixed communes gave way to 
excesses that could not be taken as accidental. With more sanctions and less rights, Algerians 
were only half or 1/4 of a French person. 
However, undoubtedly the most effective instruments of constraint were the repressive 
tribunals. A procedure of repression, as quick as it was effective was established. The decrees 
of March 29 and May 28,1902 constituted a take over of the justice by the administration. 
The most elementary guarantees seemed lacking and their implementation led to many resound- 
ing mistakes. The decree of August 9,1903 tried to correct the defects but still remained 
within the same lines. This led to the quick sanctioning of offences exclusively imputable to 
non-naturalised Muslims or to Muslim foreigners on civilian territory of Algeria (39). 
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Another instrument of constraint was the political representation. While the number of 
Algerians was increasing, the percentage and level of representation remained limited in the 
diverse institutions. In the meantime the European political representation was burgeoning. 
Only members of the minority of settlers were elected to the Parisian assemblies. Members of 
parliament and senate were the products of a European electoral college. No Algerian was 
elected, for granting to natives the right to vote was prompting trouble. Either they would vote 
with Europeans who would run the risk of being overwhelmed by. the number or they would 
have a special representation and therefore would run the risk of greatly increasing the anta- 
gonisms between races. Algeria was represented in Paris according to the strength of its Euro- 
peans (40). 
In order to associate the native community with government, the forum - les Delegations 
Financieres - claimed for a long time by assimilationists was set. However, settlers at the time 
of its constitution secured a proportion of seats reserved for Muslim representatives. This body 
(41) was elected by Algerian tax payers to advise the government on the modes of deduction 
and use of resources. Every question had its budgetary implication. Despite the would be apol- 
itical character of this structure, its members could finally debate on every subject. Europeans 
secured 2/3 of the seats, the Algerians the other 1/3. Elected for six years the representatives 
belonged to the privileged of the population: wealthy Algerian and European landowners, local 
prominent figures and so forth. The Delegations Financzeres were supposed to be firstly, a 
place to record administrative decisions for some, secondly, a small scale parliament for the 
European minority for others and thirdly, a school of parliamentary democracy applied for 
Algerians to some. In actual fact they only served as a forum to a minority. 
The Algerians who had some illusions about the allegiance and motivations of this 
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assembly soon lost them. They questioned the will to assimilate claimed by the French. It 
was finally through drafting in the First World War that Algerians gained status. They did not 
become equals to the French but obtained a distinct status in their own country. Muslims 
could elect others to a half assembly or a chamber divided into two. The law of February 4, 
1919 not only came late but did not achieve its initial aim. Instead of promoting integration, it 
did not bring any provision to alter the duality of representation, the difference between com- 
munities, between the native Muslims who were more subjects than citizens and the Europeans. 
It sanctioned the separation and limited any chance of unification for the future, any possibility 
of becoming French for the native element and that every special status had made Muslims 
closer in spirit but more distanced in practical terms (42). 
The French not only stripped the Algerians of any form of power but the laws they 
enacted, and the political forum they created were the instruments by which they wanted to 
give institutional and legal legitimacy to their domination. The real substance of this domina- 
tion remained the complete exclusion of natives. The context in Algeria was different from 
that black Americans found themselves in. As they invaded and occupied a land which 
belonged to another people, France sought to justify legally and politically their occupation by 
attempting to define a framework at the heart of which assimilation of natives seemed essential, 
but which was in reality a consecration of the power the French arrogated to themselves over 
native Algerians. In the United States, black people did not even have any form of power 
because from the moment they arrived most of their rights were taken from them. 
For a long time the fundamental law, the Constitution of the United States of America, 
which had a less conjunctural scope than the diverse local laws, reflected the compromise of a 
political elite. Black people were mentioned three times, in section 2(3) and 9(1) of the article 
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one and the section 2(3) of the article four. In the three cases the term persons was used to 
designate slaves. Impregnated by Locke's thought the constituents had not certainly forgotten 
that the philosopher gave to this word a precise judicial significance, that of an individual 
gifted with reason, capable of a law and able to live according to the law of nature which 
defined obligation and conferred rights (43). Nevertheless, nothing in the constitutional context 
allowed this interpretation. The sole attributes of persons mentioned were those that made sub- 
jects accountable to trade and a property. They were an abstract quantity, a good, a commo- 
dity. This sanction was echoed a few decades later by Chief Justice Taney in the Dred Scott 
decision of 1857 when he stated, "... that they (black people) had no rights which the white 
man was bound to respect; and that the Negro might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery 
for his benefit" (44). 
The definitive Constitutional document had, with all its lacunas, only reinforced a de 
facto situation where black people were racially, politically and culturally excluded from the 
national body and relegated to an inferior status. Moreover the fact that some of them enjoyed 
freedom did not imply a change in the way the whole was perceived. From its cradle, the 
American nation believed that uniformity would be the answer to the issue of racial composi- 
tion. If slavery was not abolished at a time where it was not vital for the economy it was due 
in part to the dilemma caused by the presence of black people. Delaying emancipation or 
introducing it through careful stages was postponing choices that the nation dreaded to face: to 
either create a black separate state which would require beside the financial and economic 
sacrifices an international recognition of this state, or integrate completely black people into the 
American nation which would mean the loss of its white identity. Another final option was to 
maintain black people within the society but prevent them from having any political participa- 
-50- 
tion. This would tarnish the democratic principles of Americans. 
The dual refusal to conceive a society racially hierarchical or to create a composite 
nation, held no solution for posterity. The issue of race was resolved within the new nation as 
it was within the colonial society: the nation was defined by belonging to the white race, since 
black people through servitude were maintained outside the community while playing the role 
of an economic tool (45). 
Slavery had been a major determinant of relations between black and white communities. 
Economically it had been profitable and southern whites believed so firmly in this institution 
that one of the causes over which they entered civil war with the North was its preservation. 
Regardless of its comparative efficiency, slave labour brought the slaveholder class a standard 
of living which was the envy of many. In a very competitive world no business enterprise 
could have lasted from 1619 to 1865, almost 250 years without being profitable. In 1791 the 
United States or more appropriately black people produced 0.4 percent of world cotton -2 mil- 
lion pounds out of 469 million. By 1860 it had grown to 1,650 million pounds or 66 percent 
of the total (46). Not only was it profitable to American industry whose total consumption of 
raw cotton rose from 146 pounds to 255 pounds in the 10 years between 1840 and 1849 
increasing the volume of cotton goods exported by the United States, the output moved up 
from one million dollars in 1830 to eleven million dollars 30 years later (47). The expansion 
affected other economies in other countries. Thus British exports of manufactured goods were 
in 1791 28,706,675 pounds and 1,390,939,000 pounds in 1860 (48). Black people not only 
produced cotton but tobacco, rice and sugar enough to form the foundation for American pros- 
perity before the civil war but helped to generate growth in other countries. Slavery played a 
great part in accelerating the economic and political power of Europe and North America over 
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the rest of the mostly non-white world. 
Black people at the start did not have any possessions because the nature of their condi- 
tion and their role within the American society did not allow it. In contrast, native Algerians 
used to enjoy the profit of natural products which grew on a land which once belonged to 
them. The French government at that time had made for individual European interests 
sacrifices perceptibly greater than it would have consented being in ancient countries where the 
land was completely developed. The second side of the colonial diptych was revealed: in order 
to be purchasers settlers had to be sellers. They were going to sell to the French of the 
metropolis. Without industry they were of course going to sell food products and raw materi- 
als. This time under minister Ferry and theoretician Leroy Beaulieu, the colonial status was 
well framed and constituted. The land taken from natives had to be granted to settlers. 
In some areas which were least crowded and which had non-developed spaces, taking the 
land was less obvious because a military occupation occurred. When the French troops landed 
in Algeria, all the best and profitable lands were cultivated. The so-called idea of developing 
the land rested on spoliation which lasted a century: the history of colonised Algeria was the 
gradual expansion of European landed property at the expense of that of Algerians. 
Many subterfuges were used for taking lands. At the beginning any upheaval or resis- 
tance was sanctioned by a confiscation or sequestration. When in 1871 the Algerians rose 
against colonization, hundreds of thousands of hectares were taken away from them. In the 
area of Constantine 568,817 hectares, most of them rich lands were sequestrated (49). But 
these methods were not sufficient enough. France wanted to civilize and to be generous. It 
offered its civil law. Most of the time, the Algerian tribal property was collective and it had to 
be disintegrated and frittered away to allow speculators to buy it piece by piece. 
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The senatus consulte of April 22,1863 aimed to promote and facilitate the circulation of 
the land therefore to favour transactions that would help colonization. Within tribes, individual 
interests were encouraged (50). However it would be the law of 1873 which would realize the 
physical and economic crumbling planned by but not achieved by the senatus consulte of 1863 
(51). It had the most important effects on the life of the peasants: it ignored categorically the 
distinction between the collective land (land arch) and the land melk (where the propriety was 
individual) and defined only one type of property to which the French law would be applied. 
Thus the traditional joint possession was suppressed. Any co- owner in the land arch could 
ask for the suppression of the parcenary according to article 815 of the French civil law (52). 
Some investigating commissioners were assigned to transform and to turn the undivided 
joint estates into a patchwork of individual properties. In each estate they created shares they 
gave to every heir. Some of these shares were fictitious: in one of the Algerian douar Harrar, 
the investigating commissioner had found 55 allottees for only 8 hectares (53). It was just 
enough to bribe one of the heirs to let him ask for a partition. The French procedure was so 
complicated and obscure, it ruined the co-proprietors. Then, dealers of European goods would 
buy the whole very cheaply. So with premeditation and with cynicism an alien law had been 
imposed and laid on Algerians because it was known it could only have as a consequence the 
distruction of the internal structure of Algerian society, the tribe. 
This process was carried out till the twentieth century and allowed colonization to take 
over between 1871 and 1880 more than 400,000 hectares (this does not mean that only this 
surface had been taken), in 10 years almost as much as from 1830 till 1870 (481,000 hectares) 
(54). The French government had artificially and savagely created the conditions for liberal 
capitalism in an agricultural and feudal-like country. 
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In 1850 the settlers property was 115,000 hectares, in 1900 1,600,000 hectares and in 
1950 2,703,000 hectares. The French state owned 11,000,000 hectares under the name of 
national estates so only 7,000,000 hectares were left to Algerians (55). One century was 
enough to dispossess Algerians of 2/3 of their lands. By the mid 1950's 6,000 owners had an 
income of more than 12,000,000 French francs, some reached 1 milliard (56). The colonial 
system was set: the French state delivered the Algerian land to settlers so that the power of 
purchase was to be created to help French business to sell products: settlers were to sell to the 
fatherland's market the fruits of the stolen land. From this point the system would get stronger 
and more rigorous. 
Firstly, the introduction of the French civil law and the division of Algerian property 
undermined the basis of the old society; the judicial and sociological structure and the funda- 
mental social cell, the tribe, without filling the place with an alternative (57). This destruction 
had systematically been encouraged and promoted because it entangled the ties of solidarity, it 
frittered away the social forces of resistance by making of the collectivity just a sum of indivi- 
duals. The disintegration of the tribe, as a social foundation, combined with the appropriation 
of individual or collective lands by settlers had released cheap manpower that would be soon 
used. It would help to balance the costs of transportation and preserve colonial companies 
profit margins while facing metropolitan companies whose cost of production was declining. 
Thus, colonization had transformed the Algerian population into a huge agricultural proletariat. 
Instead of owning their lands native Algerians became slaves of those who possessed them 
(58). 
Secondly, if the initial larceny was not of a colonial type it would have been hoped that a 
mechanized agricultural production would allow the Algerians to buy themselves the products 
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of their land cheaply. But they were not and could not be customers to settlers who had to 
export to pay for their imports, they were producing for the French market (59). They were 
led by the logic of the system. They had to sacrifice the needs of the natives for the needs of 
the French in France. 
"Colonization vigorously took roots in the fields of viniculture" (60). Between 1927 and 
1932 viniculture gained 173,000 hectares more than half of the land was taken from Muslims 
(61) who did not drink wine. This time it was not the land that had been taken. The expan- 
sion of viniculture deprived the Algerian population of its principal sustenance, grain. Half a 
million hectares cut up within the best lands and devoted totally to viniculture were reduced to 
unproductiveness and were regarded as destroyed by Algerians (62). 
Consequently the grain products retreated towards the sub-Saharian south (63). The 
result was a continuous deterioration of the situation, grain culture stopped improving. Mean- 
time the Algerian population had become three times larger. Children were born in miserable 
conditions and would live at survival level. The official figures were very eloquent, in 1871 
every Algerian was provided with 500 kilograms of grain per year, in 1901 with 400, in 1940 
with 250 and in 1945 with just 200 (64). A steady but continuous pauperisation occurred. 
Moreover, the tightening and narrowing of the individual properties had as a consequence 
the compression of the surface of pasturage. In the sub-Saharian south where Algerian 
stockbreeders were confined, cattle existed with difficulty, however in the North they just 
disappeared with the collapse of so many tribes and the drive southwards of the remaining 
ones. Before 1914, Algeria possessed 9,000,000 heads of cattle. In 1950 only 
4,000,000 remained (65). 
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Thirdly, the concentration of estates led to the mechanization of agriculture. The mother 
country was delighted to sell its tractors to settlers. While the productive capacity of the 
Muslim diminished by 1/5 because it was confined within bad lands, that of the settlers 
increased. Mechanization engendered technological unemployment, agricultural workers were 
replaced by machines. The consequence might not have been of such importance had Algeria 
been industrialised. But the colonial system had forbidden its existence. Unemployed people 
poured into the cities where they hoped they could get a few days of casual labour, then they 
would settle there because there was no other place to go. the number of this desperate under- 
proletariat increased every year. In 1953 there were only 143,000 wage earners officially 
registered as having worked for more than 90 days that was to say 1 day out of 4 per year 
(66). Nothing could have better shown the increasing rigour of the colonial system: it started 
by occupying the country, then it took the land followed by the exploitation of the former lan- 
downers, paying them low wages. Then, mechanization had made cheap manpower more 
expensive so it took away from them the right to work. The Algerian at home in a flourishing 
country had to starve or immigrate to look for jobs that France refused them at home. 
For 90 percent of Algerians the exploitation was methodical and harsh, expelled from 
their lands, confined within others, compelled to work for beggarly salaries and the fear of 
unemployment deterred them from any rebellion. At last the settler was supreme. He did not 
make any concession to his workers: no canteen, no housing, no family allowances, no collec- 
tive wage agreements and no sliding scale. Four walls of dry mud, some bread and figs and 
10 hours of work a day (67), here the salary was really and ostensibly the necessary minimum 
to the recovery of the working forces. 
The system established by France on the one hand had made the condition of native 
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Algerians worse. They were politically powerless. They saw their social structure crumble 
and their economic foundation taken away. The whole aim of the system was to render the 
Algerians impotent so that they would be confined into a passive role, they would be more 
spectators than makers of their destiny. 
On the other hand, the system provided settlers with land. Grain culture did not fulfill 
the hopes the settlers had when they came to Algeria. The majority of settlers wanted to get 
rich and not to subsist, they aimed at a maximum commercialization of their product and 
optimum financial profits. Their expectations were only realized when they developed vinicul- 
ture. This switch was supported and enhanced by credit. The expansion of viniculture became 
important and beneficial when it was adequately funded. At first, the Bank of Algeria was the 
only creditor. Its returns figure shot up from 265 million francs in 1879 to 527 million in 
1885. But as France extended its financial system to Algeria at the end of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, private banks and branches of agricultural banks of France started to lend money. This 
helped the export of wine whose profits reached 592 million francs between 1909-1912. From 
1900 to 1914 wine exports made the third of the total value of all exports of Algeria. Vinicul- 
ture, then, represented 40 percent of the total wealth of Europeans in Algeria. It was also 
profitable for many sub-contractors and employees. It needed a large workforce, four times the 
number required by grain culture. Between 20 and 25 million francs were distributed as 
salaries in 1914. This meant that viniculture was the main economic activity in Algeria. At 
that particular period, most of wage earners were Europeans in this area. Moreover, if salaries 
and profits generated by the trade and transport of wine were added alongside those from the 
making of barrels and the creation of cellars, the figure cited would be easily doubled. The 
majority of the European community gained from the development of viniculture. Its combina- 
-57- 
tion with credit founded the basis of their economic superiority over Muslims (68). 
The Algerian population that lived on poor or remote lands were neither secure from 
administrative processes nor from the proceedings of French legislation. Some areas were 
largely penetrated by colonization, others changed when they came into contact with it. A 
mutation occurred as the Algerian society which nearly faced a near destruction, began to adapt 
to the new context. As regards eradication, for instance, the religious ideology appeared out of 
touch with the reality of the Algerian society. As far as alterations were concerned, the social 
strata were modified. Most of Algerians became landless. Part of the nobility lost its land 
which was also its source of influence. A breed of French allies emerged as they were 
rewarded for their allegiance to France. They became the powerful intermediaries of French 
power. Algerian society, then, started to adapt to changes imposed by the colonial system. 
Algerian society had an eventful history from 1830 to 1919. The French landing had 
broken the deepest belief especially that of the untouchable character of Muslim land and the 
invulnerability of its spiritual weapon, the divine protection. 
The Turkish defeat in 1830 was a religious one too. The collapse of the central govern- 
ment and the manoeuvre of the victor allowed the development of local rivalries and political 
competition. It did not generate any regret vis-a-vis the Turks but led to anarchy. The semi- 
legitimacy of the Turkish regime had amounted to a minimum consensus. Since 1830, the col- 
lapse of the political structure had undermined the whole organization of the social system, in 
areas where the Turkish authority was well spread directly, or where the Turkish power main- 
tained a balance of power more or less stable through rivalries between groups. The Turkish 
retreat led to a vacancy of power. It was followed by an era of competitions and conflicts 
which favoured attempts to regroup from which Abdelkader profited. These divided 
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adversaries were also an easy target for French military strategists. 
A society in jeopardy, unsure of itself, clung to intercessors and sought a Messiah, a 
chief able to drive out 'infidels', to take back Algeria to Muslims, to restore or re-establish a 
state according to the main Islamic principles. This desire was often ambiguous and unex- 
pressed. It remained at the level of expectations and did not affect the entire Algerian popula- 
tion but was fixed and set on the person of Abdelkader (69). The final failure of this man 
drove Algerians towards leaders of lesser charisma who tried to cover and therefore to recap- 
ture his overt and declared goals. Then, the Algerian society followed the 'Messianic' mission 
of the religious orders which were quickly brushed aside as the self-appointed saints (mara- 
bouts) emerged. These became agents of the colonial power. Facing French power, Algeria 
remained deprived of a leadership, fragmented as a community and was compelled to withdraw 
and to keep its hope alive through memories and dreams. 
Religion lost its political power with the arrival of the coloniser. The religious orders 
were once a force that was able to challenge the Turkish central government. The French 
invasion prompted initiatives that wanted to revive this dynamic. Between 1830 and 1850 two 
experiences occurred. Both aimed to maximize dogma and beliefs within a definite political 
framework: that of Abdelkader and that of religious orders. Abdelkader claimed to be the 
advocate of a state free from the French yoke. A state that he would have established and 
shaped according to Koranic principles. Once invested as Imam (religious leader) by the Ule- 
mas (clergy), he had overcome the framework of his own religious order. His vision of a state 
was mainly political in its content. It implied the building of cities, that resources had to be 
exploited and managed, the development of education and administration and so forth. This 
made him the first representative of the Islam of the Koran in Algeria as opposed to that 
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represented by marabouts or saints. 
The other aspect was represented by the sole religious order that had kept its influence in 
tact and its audience, the Taybia (70). Opposed to orthodox reactions, the order resorted to 
messianic formulaes. It relied on mysticism and messianism not so much to regather forces 
against France but to counter Abdelkader's designs. His ultimate goals were a unified govern- 
ment and an undivided sovereignty, they implied the disparition of religious orders. Using pro- 
phecy and multiplying manoeuvres among allies of Abdelkader. Taybia did not want the con- 
stitution of a counterstate rival to that of Abdelkader but aimed to undermine the foundation on 
which he relied. By weakening him, it indirectly strengthened the chances of French occupa- 
tion. 
The consequences of these conflicts between orthodox Islam and mystic Islam, between 
state and religious order, between a constitution of a central power and a perpetuation of local 
power, was first of all the important roles played by messianism in restraining the initial design 
of the state. Moreover, what counted most was that 20 years after the occupation of Algiers in 
1830, the political potentialities of religious elements destroyed one another. The struggle - 
manichean because it was reduced to two simplified anthetical positions - between Islam of the 
Koran and that of saints only benefited France. Religion, as a system of regulating values of 
the present and constructive of the future, lost its offensive capabilities. It became an area of 
withdrawal of considerable dimensions and a zone of shelter. It favoured protection rather than 
intervention. However, it would be clrarer after the First World War that the only element 
which would be able to sharpen and rekindle the opposition to colonization was Algerians 
faith. The ethnic, social and political differences between French and Algerians would come to 
graft onto religion. 
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The establishment from 1830 and especially from 1871 to 1919 of cultural, judicial, 
economic and political systems that were inherent to France did not come out with a quick des- 
truction of the Algerian collectivity. Despite the obtrusion of the French system imposed by 
the colonizers, Algerians kept a real native character. The economic disintegration under the 
thrust of colonial market generated a generalised pauperisation but also multiplied the old 
standing processes such as collective works, exchanges in kind, usury and loans. It did not 
have an immediate effect on values and institutions. The establishement of a mixed commune 
for instance compelled everyone to use channels embodied by the civilian administrator, civil 
status, justice and so forth had partially made of him an intermediary who was forced on 
Algerians. However, the native anastomosis of relations of hierarchies remained and carried on 
meeting the necessary needs. The state structure of France seemed to be patched on the 
ancient order. It did not replace it or at least not yet. Algerians avoided, as much as they 
could, resorting and using French justice even in marital and matters relating to inheritance, 
they preferred the procedures of substitution they understood best (71). 
While Algerians clung as much as they could to the old order, black people, because of 
the very inhuman nature of slavery and the alien environment, could only build a new set of 
relationships. Their actions were circumscribed by slave codes and owners expectations. The 
aim of the obtrusive and violent nature of slavery was to create physical and moral dependence 
and reduce slaves to a docile state (72). The hostile and aggressive environment had buttressed 
a consciousness that led slaves under the harshest conditions to keep their humanity. Though 
they came from different parts of Africa, they developed an awareness of common interest, of 
common hopes for the future and a firm recognition of mutual rights and duties. This recogni- 
tion was a unifying element. So, in adversity both Algerians and black people did not submit. 
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Algerians were humiliated and dispossessed from their land. They were rejected from the 
centre of the decision making process. They were impoverished, but were not totally subdued. 
The collectivity was unbalanced and weakened as the economy was more dislocated every 
year. Lands which were used for grazing, for pasture, for cultivation and fallow fields were 
monopolised by Europeans. Algerians were reduced to using only less rich ones. On lands 
whose dimensions were decreasing, they had to feed an increasing number of people. Forbid- 
den from using forests and shrubby lands, they were driven in order to insure their survival to 
working as farm-hands or to turn to cities where official jobs and small occupations 
represented a salvation. The beginning of the century saw a start of re-urbanisation. It wit- 
nessed also the birth of immigration to France. The recession which hit livestock and the limit 
of grain products on native properties led to increased pauperisation (73). An economy orien- 
tated towards export of big quantities implied the necessity of great investment in order to 
implement a reconversion of markets. A market for internal use included large owners but set 
aside those small producers who remained at the level of elementary commercialisation. The 
Algeria that France wanted to unify through an administrative regime remained economically 
deeply divided (74). 
The effects of the European economic monopoly were disastrous for the Algerian tradi- 
tional way of life. For instance the reduction of livestock had transformed pastoral nomadism. 
The drive to reduce the scope and the frequency of pastoral migration was obvious everywhere 
as the Tell (the richest lands of the country) was increasingly closed up for pasture. The mov- 
ing of flocks continued as the nomadism of men vanished: flocks were entrusted to shepherds. 
This specialisation of work led to the disintegration of the tribal ties or kinship. It put an end 
to tribal life. Henceforth, a temporary and rudimentary shelter called gurbi became, because it 
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was cheap. the normal form of housing of the sedentary producer of grains and ruined pastoral 
people. Its cost was 5 to 6 French francs while the cost of the tent was 50 to 100 French 
francs and required costly restorations. It was the normal habitation for 1,648,700 Algerians 
(75). Its existence confirmed the transition from the pastoral and patriarchial state of the 
Algerian society to the state of an individualistic society within which some became rich and 
prosperous while others were squeezed. It showed the slow decomposition of the indigenous 
society. 
Algerian society tolerated a series of shocks which explained its fragmentation after 
1919. Mainly rustic, it was the direct victim of colonization. At the bottom of the social 
ladder jobless journeymen were the first to turn to cities around which they would form an 
embryo of lumpen-proletariat. Some would find a permanent and stable job and would consti- 
tute the local manpower. They would join the downtrodden of the colonial system, the little 
white people (Italians, Spanish, French) who formed half the commercial and industrial work- 
force. Some started to expatriate and their political awareness would take place in France. 
Their number reached 10,000 at the start of World War I (76). 
However, the majority of Algerian workers still remained in rural areas, mostly as share- 
croppers and wage earners. Sharecroppers grew grains and took 1/5 to 2/5 of the harvest. The 
remainder would go to landlords. The contract of sharecroppers was negotiated every year. 
They belonged to the same social stratum as much as the former small landowners who having 
mortgaged their lands were henceforth at the mercy of peasants who pressurised them to enrol 
as daily wage earners on other properties. A third of the rustic population were mainly wage 
earners and whose conditions and regimes could change dramatically according to individuals 
who hired them and the places and conditions of their work. The standard of living and the 
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number of days of work, which were paid either in nature or cash money, were difficult to 
assess (77). 
After 1900 and as a result of contact with the colonial system, a social middle class 
emerged and took shape. This grew up alongside the traditional urban bourgeoisie of the big 
cities, heir of the Moorish tradesmen and business men of the last century and which still 
clung to a certain cultural and religious past. It was a bourgeoisie of villagers who settled in 
cities. It was formed of landlords, of small tradesmen and civil servants. A class of intellectu- 
als appeared too, formed mostly of Muslim civil servants like servants of the cult, teachers of 
Koranic schools and translators. They were more prepared for the political game than the old 
bourgeoisie because its members relied on the development of capitalist mechanisms and intro- 
duced themselves in social circles within which they thought they might profit. Some fortunes 
were made and coincided with the appearance of the first doctors, judges and teachers who 
were moulded according to the French way of life and values. Most of them were sons of not- 
ables who understood the need to send their children to study in French (78). 
Big landlords and traditional aristocrats formed another social stratum. If the first grew 
and became strong the second lost gradually its illusions and privileges. Big landlords (those 
who owned lands amounting to more than 100 hectares) managed to become prominent 
through the purchase of land either from the communal estate or belonging to bankrupt small 
peasants (79). 
The great segneurie still owned vast properties especially in the southern western part of 
the country on which it had maintained prerogatives and advantages. It was another victim of 
colonization at the top of the social ladder. Lacking an alliance with France and particularly a 
solid implementation, it had lost both its prestige and its power. The tax that France collected 
-64- 
and they failed to acquire from ruined producers marked their loss of control. Some among 
them comforted themselves by accepting such titles as 'cadis', 'agha', 'bachagha', general 
counsellors, financial deleguees or intemediaries, on the whole agents of the colonial power. 
They would profit from the official ceremonies as their children would extract more than 
speeches and medals from France. The others preferred withdrawal. The social stratum was 
divided into these two groups which had made different choices and which were prepared to 
put up with different consequences (80). France pretended to free these Algerians whom it 
then used. When these agents ceased to have any social authority and gained the attributes of 
a support system, they turned to appearances and to memories of a glorious past. The Algerian 
nobility was no longer an aristocracy but merely a social class (81). 
The process of domination had shaken, even destroyed individual destinies and social 
strata within the Algerian community and the black community in the United States of Amer- 
ica. Once the trauma was past, a period of adaptation to the new condition of life under 
oppression started. In response to the belittling and trampling down of human beings value 
would emerge a tenacious will to refuse to be treated as next to nothing. 
Slaves bore the hardships of slavery with a consistent refusal to assimilate the culture of 
the master. Their survival under that system was more a moral triumph than physical resis- 
tance. The area of their lives that the master could not touch was used as a means to 
strengthen the personality, to enrich life and to express hate for the system in which they were 
forced to live. Domestic life took an exaggerated importance in their social life. It offered 
them almost the only space where they could truly experience themselves as human beings 
without being hindered by the obtrusion of slavery. 
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Within this circle they transformed African cultural elements and left the seeds for a 
black culture in America. Folktales for instance served the same functions in slave quarters as 
they had in Africa. They entertained, they inculated morality in the young teaching the value 
of cooperation and explaining animal behaviour. They also had a more specific purpose, they 
were means to teach ways to overcome the strength of the master, to conceal anger in a mask 
of humility, to retain hope, to laugh in the face of adversity and to escape punishment. In mul- 
tiple ways slaves not only kept but also enlarged their African legacy adjusting it to their new 
situation. Music and songs could be the shelter for concealed aspirations such as liberation 
from the hated institution. Proverbs, witchcraft, conjuring, dance and music were all elements 
of this legacy. 
The slaveholder deprived black men of the role of provider, refused to honour their mar- 
riages or legitimize their outcome, compelled them to submit to physical punishment in the 
presence of their kin, made them choose between being silent while their wives and daughters 
were being raped or risking their death, and made sure they understood that he could break the 
family nucleus at any time. Yet, it was within the confines of family life that they showed 
their full humanity. The sexual division of labour between husband and wife was conven- 
tional. Slaves transformed the negative image ascribed to them by a behaviour that 
emphasized both the feminine and masculine roles within the couple but free from any domina- 
tion (82). In this respect, perhaps a substantial majority of women were aware that whenever 
their men were degraded so too were they. "They wanted their boys to grow up to be men 
and knew perfectly well that, to do so, they needed the example of a strong black man in front 
of them", wrote Eugene Genovese (83). 
Many men and women resisted the infantilisation, emasculation and dehumanization (84) 
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inherent in the paternalistic system and the attempts to undermine the black family. This sys- 
tem might have broken the spirit of many and made others less responsible than human beings 
ought to be. However most men and women came out of this ordeal scarred but showing 
powerful inner resources. A "terrible system of human oppression took a heavy toll of its vic- 
tims, but their collective accomplishment in resisting the system constitutes a heroic story" 
(85). That resistance provided black people with solid norms, the sense of communal life 
based on a two parent family, a male centred household and a sense of solidarity. 
Slavery intended to break black people up, to degrade and to make them hate themselves 
in a similar pattern to that self-hatred engendered by colonialist powers within indigenous com- 
munities. Like natives in other countries, black people managed to keep a bit of their human- 
ity which burst from time to time into revolts. Black people did not accept their lot. Resis- 
tance to slavery took different forms from violent ones to subtle and covert ones such as pois- 
oning or damaging properties. Racial patterns of the modem era in the United States have 
their seeds in this past. 
Algerian society was in renewal. The social formation of 1919 was not that of 1830. A 
rural society degraded and impoverished, and an urban society in mutation ignored rather than 
confronted each other. The rustic one had found within itself the instruments to hold on to 
past values and relations. The urban was going to favour a resurgence of a challenge to the 
colonial status and methods of exploitation. Impregnated with Western culture because it was 
dominant, some elements of the urban society were going to draw from the alien source the 
weapons that would prompt them to oppose. The first organized political movement that was 
able to force a confrontation would originate from cities. It was what had come to be known 
as the 'Young Algerians' who were to use new channels of political expression which symbol- 
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ised an adaptation to the conditions imposed by colonization (86). 
The experience of bondage had created within black individuals a sense of identification 
and a feeling of unity with their black brothers and sisters. When they were removed from 
Africa their capture was based on ethnic or tribal lines. At the start these people were as 
different as a Bavarian can be from a Yorkshire man. Their ordeal gave birth to a conscious- 
ness no longer based on ethnic or tribal affiliations but on the basis of both a colour and class- 
like line. Slaves were over exploited because they were black. Their economic condition and 
their status had confined them into a straight jacketed social class. The combination of these 
two factors buttressed a belief in a common future and begot a sharper sense of unity. Black 
people came out from the experience of bondage more resilient but still vulnerable. 
The hardships of black people did not end when slavery was abolished. After the civil 
war, the Reconstruction period failed to meet the hopes of the freedmen for a movement 
towards racial equality. Despite their helplessness black people were aware that land was the 
key element for real freedom. Thus, by the early 1870's Virginia's black people had bought 
80,000 to 100,000 acres, those in Georgia a decade later managed to get hold of approximately 
40,000 acres amounting to $1.3 million. But in most southern states by the mid 1870's a tiny 
minority of white farmers, 5 percent, monopolised 40 percent of the most productive lands. In 
most states "1/10 of the white farmers possessed 1/2 to 2/3 of the farmland" (87). Equality 
could not be achieved because the economic power was concentrated in relatively few hands 
and the majority of black families became sharecroppers on inequitable terms. However the 
reconstruction period brought alterations to black people's social status. The role of the 
Freedmen's Bureau period was important. It provided food and clothing, built hospitals and 
educational institutions. Its action was complemented by that of black churches. From 1865 
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to 1869 they established 257 black schools in North Carolina alone (88). 
The period also brought the opportunity to get involved in politics. The passage of the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments; which successively gave black people their 
freedom from bondage, American citizenship and the right to vote, came just before the 
Federal Government's acceptance of black legislative representation. Between 1869 and 1901, 
816 black men were elected mainly in southern states. South Carolina for instance had 218 
black elected officials, Virginia had 93, North Carolina had 82 and Louisiana had 122 (89). 
During this whole period, across the country black people were trying hard to build new insti- 
tutions in many fields such as commerce, politics, education and media (90). 
Soon the hopes that this period generated were terminated. Radicals lost their impetus 
and some conservatives within the Republican Party discovered affinities with the former 
planter class. Lawrence Goodwin captured the atmosphere when he wrote that, 
The bankers, manufacturers, shippers and merchants soon wearied of their attempt to 
build a post war party in the South based on black suffrage. As elected victories proved 
in the 1860's and 1870's that they (republicans) could rule with a basically northern con- 
stituency, Negroes, their moral declining and white radical abolitionnist, their number 
thinning, lost the intra-party debate over southern policy (91). 
Their white allies in retreat, black people became vulnerable. In the struggle for power, 
the newly won rights of black people were soon being cut back. Of major importance was a 
sequence of three Supreme Court decisions which virtually deprived them of the right con- 
ferred upon them by the Fourteenth amendment. There were the 1873 judgements in the 
Slaughter House cases which curtailed the privileges recognized as being under federal protec- 
tion; the 1883 declaration that the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was inconstitutional, and the 1896 
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affirmation in the case of Plessy V Ferguson. Plessy had objected to being required to ride in 
a separate Jim Crow coach maintaining that this action labelled him as inferior. The Supreme 
Court dismissed his appeal, holding that it was not inconstitutional for black people to be 
offered only separate but equal facilities. So the colour line was legitimized. This precedent 
prompted the passage of a series of disenfranchising amendments in southern states legisla- 
tures. This southern hostility was epitomized by terrorist organizations such as the Ku Klux 
Klan and Knights of White Camelia, whose role was to dissuade black voters and create fear, 
intimidation, hatred, brutality and murder. Between 1883 and 1903 2,060 black people were 
lynched in the United States (92). 
As they became aware of their lost illusions black people began to move northwards. 
Their political survival and economic self-sufficiency seemed to be in migration from the rural 
South to the urban North East and Mid West mainly. However, for the majority who stayed in 
the South the introduction of the rule of Jim Crow eradicated any hope of real emancipation 
and equality. 
The Jim Crow system was racist in nature since its dynamic was the regulation of cul- 
tural and political relations. Its structure was basically capitalist. Its weapons were the 
omnipresence of violence and coercion. Segregation reigned again. As the Federal Govern- 
ment remained blind and mute, State Governments tightened their segregation laws to the point 
of high absurdity sometimes. Historian C. Vann Woodward noted an extreme case: a Birming- 
ham ordinance made it "unlawful for a negro and a white person to play together or in com- 
pany with each other at dominoes or checkers" (93). 
The exclusion of black people from any social and political activity remained undoubt- 
edly unremitting and unrelenting. The proscription was total. As always behind the 
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unwarranted legitimacy loomed the scourge of any unrivalled force and brutality. This period 
did not provide any real economic opportunity nor create the necessary climate to help ex- 
slaves to adjust to a new condition of freedmen but it just left them powerless and helpless. 
On the whole, black people remained at the bottom of the social ladder. Some individuals here 
and there would have improved their lot, but in general the political system and the social 
order were not open yet to equality. Equality was the real issue for black peoples' fate in the 
United States. W. E. B. DuBois summed it up, 
This American black man knows: his fight here is a fight to the finish. Either he dies or 
wins.... Either extermination root and branch or absolute equality. There can be no 
compromise (94). 
Similarly, equality was the main motive behind the reaction of Young Algerians. It was 
an expression of a modem elite. These young were tinged with French intellectual attitudes. 
They made an active laity and they were favourable to assimilation. They wanted extended 
political reforms, reform of the repressive system, a better distribution of taxes, a sufficient and 
serious representation within the assemblies in Algeria and in France. This movement 
stemmed from the Republican school. This generation was torn because the pressure of the 
social milieu compelled it to be a buffer class. Moreover their intellectual development did not 
match their social condition. Their voice reflected the discontent of a frustrated emerging class. 
This elite would, in 1927, create a Federation Des Elus D'Algerie. The bases of their 
programme were equality and assimilation. Their main claims were the respect of th Muslim 
civilization, the rejection of the theory of racial supremacy, equality in political representation 
in the French parliament and at every other level; local, regional, Delegations Financieres. 
They also wanted Algerian society to be transformed into a modem one through their action 
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instead of that of France and requested the right of Algerians to be educated in European 
schools without rejecting their own civilization. The creation of this official organization was 
meant to give birth to a body that would defend the Muslims interests and their main objective 
was to find a consensus with the French within the Delegations Financieres. 
During the 1920's the Federation fought for different issues affecting Algerians. The 
issues were dealt with in a newspaper called Attakadoum (progress). Alongside their main 
claims, they talked about the equality of salaries, the suppression of restrictions imposed on 
Algerian emigration to France, the abolition of the Code de l'Indigenat, the development of 
education, the introduction of French social laws to Algeria and the re-organization of the elec- 
toral system. 
Among this elite were two influential personalities, Dr. Ben Jelloul and Ferhat Abbas. 
Dr. Ben Jelloul was born in 1896 in Constantine of a middle class background. After complet- 
ing his studies in his native city then Algiers, he became a medical doctor in 1924. In 1933 he 
was elected the leader of the Federation and was regarded as the leader of the protest on the 
Algerian soil. However, his influence dwindled when the expectations generated by the elec- 
tion of the Front Populaire, a coalition of French left wings parties, were not fulfilled and as 
the policy he continued to advise seemed outdated. 
Ferhat Abbas was born in 1899 in Taher. In 1933 and after completing his studies, he 
settled in Setif as a pharmacist. Like many Algerians, at that time, he identified with two 
fatherlands, one spiritual the other intellectual. Soon after, he became municipal councillor, 
then general councillor in Constantine and member of the Delegations Financieres in Algiers. 
Thus started the careers of the most prominent personalities of Algeria. 
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Beside this elite, there was also an emergence of a religious group called the Ulemas. 
They were apolitical but worked hard to undermine French domination in Algeria through edu- 
cation in Arabic, the spreading of Islamic thoughts and social reforms of the grassroots. The 
word Ulema usually describes most of the time theologians, experts in religious matters, and 
doctors in Islamic law. However, in Algeria, this word had a significant difference. It 
described those Algerian intellectuals who were familiar with Islam and Arabism but were also 
passionately interested in politics and nationalism. 
Prior to World War 1, a group of the Ulemas left Algeria to go to Tunisia, Morocco and 
the Middle East. Their motive was perhaps the avoidance of the military service that France 
made compulsory for every Algerian. They were also seeking an education in Arabic and an 
Islamic guidance. Among this group were, Abdelhamid Ben Badis and Bachir El-Ibrahimi 
future leaders of the Association of the Ulemas. They spent the whole period of the war 
abroad. When the war ended they came back home having ideas which were unfavourable to 
France. They found their colleagues, in Algeria, lethargic and isolated. The Ulemas who had 
acquired experience and developed a political consciousness, began their reformist efforts 
through the press, schools and social clubs. Thus was born the idea to create an organization 
that would reflect and guide those efforts. 
Ben Badis was born in Constantine in 1899. After following Islamic and Arabic studies, 
he went to Tunisia to continue his education in 1908. He obtained his degree (At-Tahsil) in 
1912. The same year, he went back to his native city. His main goals were to teach Arabic, 
the Koran to Algerians and to fight superstition and social evils. Though, he was later referred 
to as Morshid El Umma (guide of the nation) Ben Badis did not act alone. He was helped by 
a handful of devoted men who shared his opinions, methods of work and pursuing the same 
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goals. Among his friends was Bachir El-Ibrahimi who took over as a leader of their organiza- 
tion when Ben Badis died on April 16,1940. El-Ibrahimi was born also in 1889 in Setif. 
After completing his studies, he went to Saoudi Arabia and Syria. Through his travels he 
acquired an extensive knowledge of Arab literature and Islamic Civilization. Once he came to 
Algeria, he was more a literary person than an active reformist. However, he was slowly drawn 
towards Ben Badis and started to play an important role. 
The main expression of the Ulemas action was the creation of schools that would not be 
controlled by the French administration. The press was used as a means to stress the impor- 
tance of their action. Prior to the official creation of the Association of the Ulemas, there was 
a weekly newspaper El Mountaquid ( the critic) that raised the issues they were interested in. 
When this newspaper was forbidden, the Ulemas launched one of the most influential newspa- 
pers between the world wars in Algeria: El Chihab. Equally important for the Ulemas was the 
creation of social clubs which were used as forums for intellectuals and to discuss their ideas. 
The Ulemas were concerned specifically with issues such as misconception of religion, 
naturalization and political representation. The Ulemas were , firmly opposed to maraboutism. 
They thought that confraternities, which spread a distorted interpretation of Islam, worked 
against religion and progress. They believed that maraboutism was born from the decline of 
Islam and the spreading of mysticism. They charged the chiefs of confraternities of ignoring 
the Koran, of exploiting the population and of serving colonialism. They acted with such 
vigour because mysticism, they understood, does not exist in Islam and because it leads to 
corruption, to a distortion of the religious sentiment, to ignorance, to contempt for life and to 
heresy. These were the main reasons behind their opposition, for instance, to music marking 
superstitious practices, to dancing during religious ceremonies, to visiting graves and to donat- 
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ing cash money to chiefs of confraternities. 
The French scheme to naturalize Algerians was also attacked. The Ulemas regarded it as 
a plan to take away from Algerians, they believed, two of their inherent features Islam and 
Arabism. As far as political representation was concerned, the Ulemas wanted Algerians to be 
sufficiently and properly represented in all assemblies, including the French parliament. This 
meant that the law of 1919 was outdated because, they insisted, the right to vote should be 
granted to all Algerians. 
The Ulemas favoured the existence of an Algerian nation which would eventually 
separate from France. They were ardent defenders of Arabism, the assimilation to the Arab 
world, and panislamism. They were also opposed to the assimilation of Algeria to France. 
The Ulemas did not believe in revolutionary approaches. They were non-violent and preferred 
to convince through explanation rather than agitation. According to article 1 of their constitu- 
tive charter, the Association of the Ulemas did not intend to deal with political issues whatever 
their nature. Moral and ethics were the only bases of their action (95). 
Besides the elitist voices of the Young Algerians and the Ulemas, there was a force that 
could not be denied in the form of the long, peaceful and stubborn effort that the Algerian 
community had deployed at the end of the nineteenth century in order to survive as a society 
(96). Algeria, with its inadequte resources, resisted the colonial system with little success and 
it was obvious by the beginning of the twentieth century that France had won a temporary vic- 
tory. There was fragmentation but not disintegration. Algeria was divided but was becoming 
indestructible. 
Despite exclusion, domination and impoverishment, black people in the United States and 
Algerians found the necessary resources to face the conditions imposed upon them and 
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managed later to define new forms of refusals and withdrawals. They both shared a common 
stand. Neither of them welcolmed the dominant order. Black people did not go to America 
the same way many European social groups did nor were they looking for the same goal. The 
choice to be part of the American order implied a determination to positively identify with 
their order and culture. Algeria was subject to an occupation, and the order established there 
was meant to serve the minority of Europeans. They adapted to the conditions imposed on 
them. The word adaptation covers a determined reality. It implies that both communities were 
getting used to the forms and imperatives of life and economy. The word symbolises the link 
that would be difficult to sever between polarized communities black/white, 
Algerians/Europeans, a link founded not on sharing but on real exploitation. The association 
was one of black people and Algerians as manpower, the dominant system led them into a 
dialectic game which made their elimination impossible. It compelled them to change again in 
order to meet a new society's forms and rules defined by the exploitative conditions them- 
selves. 
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CHAPTER II 
RACISM: AN INSTRUMENT FOR POWER AND PRIVILEGE 
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The economic and political domination of Algerians by the French and black people by 
whites in the United States buttressed an attitude of superiority. Power had prompted French 
and white people to arrogate to themselves the most prominent positions in their social struc- 
tures. French and white communities became exclusive. They rejected the Algerian and black 
elements from their societies, and racial stratification was tolerated. Prejudice was translated 
into effective discrimination because Algerians and black people lacked power. Initially the 
meaning of prejudice was a precedent, "a judgement carved out by previous decisions and 
experiences" (1). However the term became tinged with an emotional note of acceptance or 
exclusion. It was expressed, and still is, through many actions generally negative: anti- 
locution, avoidance, discrimination - exclusion of all members of a disliked group from certain 
types of employment, residential housing and so forth; denial of political rights, educational or 
recreational opportunities or other social privileges, physical attacks and the most extreme step 
of extermination, genocide (2). 
Racial groups typically established contact in one of three major ways: slave transfer, the 
most vivid example was the uprooting of black people from Africa; colonization like that 
imposed by France over Algeria, and voluntary migration to another country either to settle or 
to work. Each situation involved at least one indigenous racial group. The term indigenous 
was not restricted to Aborigines or natives but rather to a population sufficiently established in 
a geographical area so as to possess the institutions and the demographic capacity for maintain- 
ing some minimal form or social order through generations. In the case of colonization the 
migrating population was the dominant social group whereas in slave transfers and voluntary 
migration, the migrating population was the subordinate group. 
Slave transfers presented a situation in which the dominant racial group had the supreme 
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power over the subordinate population, involving continuous coercion from the time of their 
capture to their day-to-day activities after arrival. Historically, slaves had been associated with 
plantation economies. They had been separated from their families and communities. They 
had been forcibly transferred to an alien land and a new environment populated with strange 
people and ways. They found themselves in a more dependent, by necessity, relationship with 
slave masters than indigenous social groups who were compelled to be exploited or enslaved in 
their own territory or country. 
Colonization imposed control of a given territory by a non-indigenous racial group. The 
initial step of colonization involved situations in which the dominant racial group was able to 
seriously undermine the social, economic and political institutions of the indigenous population 
and therefore could disrupt both their social organization and their cultural life. 
The type of racial domination generated from the initial contact situation often led to the 
enlargement, development and institutionalisation of special kinds of racial division that would 
influence and shape the future relationships between racial groups for generations. 
The circumstances that brought about the discovery of America and the colonization of 
Africa were part and parcel of a dynamic which generated the development and expansion of 
European trade and commerce, and transformed feudalism into a capitalist economy. As feudal 
society in Europe was replaced by national monarchical states, an impulse was given to the 
expansion of trade. These new political powers stabilised the internal conditions of their 
respective countries in order that trade and industry would enhance and strengthen their posi- 
tion at home and abroad. They granted monopolies to groups of adventurers willing to take 
the risk and gradually a new class, the merchants, took over and gained prominence over the 
nobility. 
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The era of European commercial expansion included the discovery of America. The 
impact of this discovery, of the fall of kings and nobility gave way to an attempt from aspiring 
landowners and merchants, who sought to be richer, to build empires which were the dream of 
statesmen and a blessing for the common man who suffered under religious, political and 
economic tyrannies and who wanted to escape. 
Political motives played a crucial role in the territorial expansion practised by many 
nations. Also in the age of reformation the work of priests in Africa helped to open up routes. 
This surge to spread the Gospel was one of the first aims the first settlers on the Virginia coast 
had in mind (3). But overriding this crusading spirit was the economic factor. The colonial 
adventure was first of all a matter of economics. It had as a necessary consequence a ruthless 
and methodical exploitation. 
Indeed the European presence was primarily exploitative. It asserted itself through all the 
organs of supremacy: political power, the judiciary, economic and cultural powers, and the mil- 
itary. These became the expression of a new internal reality: constraint, a component of the 
regime. It would stop once the conquest was achieved and any resistance crushed, to act as an 
external force. Henceforth, it would be conceived as a national action that would enhance the 
attributes of sovereignty by ignoring the conquered. This new reality entailed an aspect that 
could not be described with statistics: racism. 
The word had represented to most black people in the United States and Algerians under 
French colonization daily realities for years. It was difficult perhaps to comprehend it because 
it appeared more as a psychological element and therefore less tangible or it had become com- 
monplace so that it was perceived as normal, as part of life. The every day expressions, the 
trivial details and little signs if analysed together might appear insignificant but at the end each 
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contributed to what Jean Cohen called a "spiritual murder" (4). 
Racism appeared under two closely related forms. It was both "overt and covert" (5). 
There was a distinction between individual racist actions and acts of the dominant community. 
The first was therefore expressed by overt acts performed by individuals causing death, injury, 
destruction of property, degradation and mistreatment. The second varied: it might be sharp 
practice like that of the French towards Algerians, or it might be assertive and frequent as in 
the United States prior to the civil rights enactment. In both cases it was extremely harmful 
because it had a greater impact on human lives. Racism appeared more as an enduring struc- 
tural feature of a society, recognisable by social patterns of disadvantage and inequality which 
ran along racial lines. It penetrated the dominant organization and power structure of society, 
resulting in distinctive patterns of social disadvantage. The immediate consequence was a 
sense of superior group position. This superiority generated ideas whose impact was decisive 
upon the perception of other racial groups. It engendered the belief that white people in the 
United States of America and European settlers in Algeria were better than black people and 
Algerians who should therefore be subordinated. If this attitude was very likely on the upris- 
ing among extremists, it also permeated the society on the whole. 
Men of good will and tolerance, respectable individuals who identified racism with preju- 
dice could therefore feel absolved from any responsibility, participation and individual blame 
(6) for any kind of racial injustice and inequality by being comforted in their liberal attitudes 
towards other racial groups. But they helped maintain racism. They would not get involved in 
pogroms but would not denounce it either. They became the silent allies of institutions in 
which it grew and nurtured through processes of domination, control, exclusion and restriction. 
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The distinction was clear between racism as an objective phenomenon found and operat- 
ing within the confines of domination, and racism's subjective existence with other motivations 
and feelings at the individual level. One fed the other, for instance, by creating stereotyped 
images. A stereotype was not necessarily meant to be damaging, however in the context of 
exploitation it was more corrosive for groups already oppressed. It was stronger than reality 
for woe betide the persons who found themselves cast into straight jacket images. It was vain 
fighting against it for it might eventually end a truth. 
The expansion of Europe and European peoples over the world was motivated by 
economic factors and also by deeply held convictions that Christianity and other Western 
values were superior to non-Christian ways of life. In the course of conquest, imperial powers 
attacked and violated the values of the different peoples they came to dominate. Western cul- 
tural arrogance denied any appreciation and coexistence in a non- aggressive way with different 
modes of organising society. 
In America, the first English immigrants showed some kind of white supremacy both as 
an ideology and through institutional arrangements (7). They behaved as if they were cultur- 
ally superior to the natives they encountered. This sense of superiority was promoted and 
encouraged by the religious ideology they carried with them to the new land and found its 
words in the self-proclaimed mission to civilize and Christianise (8) -a mission which echoed 
Rudyard Kipling's renowned poem, The White Man's Burden: 
Take up the White Man's burden 
Send forth the best you breed 
Go bind your sons to exile 
To serve your captive's need 
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To wait in heavy harness 
On fluttered folk and wind (9). 
The early immigrants were deeply religious people. The religious institution, the Church 
was the dominant one of their time. Of course their religious doctrines were at the heart of 
their first contact with the natives. The aims of the first immigrants were clearly stated: 
Principal and Maine Ends (of Virginia colony) were first to preach and baptise into Chris- 
tian religion and by propagation of the Gospell, to recover out of the arms of the Divell, 
a number of poore and miserable soules, wrapt up into unto death in almost invincible 
ignorance... and to add our myte to the treasury of Heaven (10). 
They felt invested by a divine mission and the simple ignorance of the white man's God 
was a sufficient and self-evident proof of the inferiority of the Indian, consequently of the 
superiority of the white civilization. 
A combination of a shortage of missionaries and the resistance from the so-called Indians 
who were sceptical that the white man's way of life was superior, led to the failure of most of 
the programmes aimed at Christianisation, even within more receptive tribes like the 
Cherokees. This nation accepted more mission churches, more schools, more farms and had 
more Christians than any other nation. They were prosperous and economically self-sufficient. 
They had a stable and republican form of government. On the whole they had the potential to 
be part of the American nation, yet they did not escape removal from their Georgian land 
(11). Though the initial policy of the United States government towards the Indians' was 
characterised by the search for a 'rational' way to deal with them. 
Thus started a huge process of genocide engendering such aphorisms as 'the only good 
Indian is a dead Indian'. It was at this stage that the ideology of white supremacy grew 
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stronger. Since Indians were unable to accept the norms of white civilization they should not 
be allowed to stop the march westwards. The Church interpreted as God's will the disappear- 
ance of the non-white race (12). 
In short, what began as a movement to "civilize and Christianize the indigenous native 
populations turned to be a brutal process of oppression, dispossession and even extermination" 
(13) and was converted into a racist force accompanied by an ideological justification. Neither 
the specifity nor the validity and integrity of alien cultures could be acknowledged, for settlers 
took as a credo a premise which had a strong impact on American thought: that the Anglo 
Saxon race was culturally and religiously superior. This belief was enhanced by such theories 
as the Teutonic Theory of Origins which emphasised the superiority of the Anglo Saxons (14). 
The enslavement of black people and its accompanying justification would appear to stem from 
the same mentality. 
However, it was the relationship with black men which had led to the establishment of 
the most powerful process of institutionalising racism within society. The justification of 
Indian extermination might be closely related to that of black slavery. It was the heathenism, 
paganism and savagery, so-called, of the African just as of the Indian which became the early 
fundamental reason for enslavement. 
Black people were ascribed numerous traits that reflected a belief that linked 'black' with 
sin, damnation, death, despair and evil. For instance the Devil was the Black Prince. The 
characteristics ascribed to black people were negative. Africans were described as backward 
and lacking intelligence. This portrayal reflected a misconception about Africa where people 
were believed to have 'strange' cultural customs (15). This portrayal had two forceful implica- 
dons. On one hand it debased African cultural institutions and reduced their importance to a 
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minimum and on the other hand it described black people as a depraved race whose salvation 
relied upon the white man. Christianity was to assume therefore a vital role by way of spread- 
ing education which intented to refine the 'barbarous' and 'crude' nature of the black man. 
In Algeria the Christian divine call was closely linked with the conquest. A French 
traveller, Poujoulat, wrote an account of his trip to Algeria in 1844, at the height of the con- 
quest. He was well introduced in the French military and religious hierarchies. He was close 
to Marshall Bugeaud and Monsignor Dupuch, Bishop of Algiers. He reported a discussion he 
had with Bugeaud, "What are we doing in Africa? ". After talking in length about the "mis- 
sionary country" which was France, Poujoulat summed up the discussion as follows, "Our war 
in Africa is therefore a continuation of the Crusades" (16). The French raised the banner of 
Christianity which fell in Jerusalem to wage a war against Islam in the land of Algeria. It 
covered up their atrocities such as the one perpertrated by Le Duc de Rovigo, a former French 
minister of the police, whose action exterminated a whole tribe, the Auffia of the Mitidja, hav- 
ing 12,000 members at that time (17). The European expansionism was confounded with a 
war of civilizations as it was indicated by the commitment of Catholic militants beside the 
French army in a war for the honour of God and civilization (18). 
In 1843 General Duvivier, a cavalry officer, published a pamphlet in which he wanted to 
stress an aspect of the conquest that according to him had not been emphasised enough. It was 
the religious and moral venture: the civilization of the African population. He wrote "The 
civilization we have in mind is the one which stems completely from the ethics and morals of 
Christ..... to civilize, evangelical ideas must be spread: and to think about it, these ideas will 
ensure our domination" (19). 
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These ideas were taken over nearly a century later during the Algerian war of indepen- 
dence by newspaper men of the periodical Revue who wrote about the fight of the Cross 
against the Crescent, that the supreme goal to fight what the French called rebellion was to 
fulfill their duty as French and as Christians. Madeleine Garrigou-Lagrange in an essay 
described how religious fundamentalism and the national Catholicism had infiltrated the 
Algerian war (20). She noticed that more than the other categories of the nation, the French 
army had faithfully kept its Catholic traditions. Senior members of the staff of the Cinquieme 
Bureau, office of Psychological actions, were also members of a society called La Cite Catho- 
lique (21). 
However, the most original of all was Charles Richard whose theories of regroupment 
were put into practice in 1958. Former student of polytechnique, he had served at both mili- 
tary and administrative levels at the height of the conquest. He highlighted the criminal and 
malicious hypertrophy not as a destructive element but as a creative one (22). He spoke about 
the necessity of Europe conquering the African continent and to be on one's guard against an 
Attila that might rise from this world of "savages" (23). Fortunately the "civilization was then 
stronger because it had the military science. The mission of France was great and heroic 
because it was chosen by providence to defend and propogate human civilization" (24). 
Algerians, like black people, originally did not belong to this civilization. They were to be 
kept in check. 
One consequence of this line of thought was the negation of the humanity of those who 
were Algerian or black. The sentiment of power mixed with this mystic vision which gen- 
erated a rejection of the other in order to cover up the true reason for subjugation, exploitation. 
It was well known that political rights freely practiced even within, the French or American 
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contexts led to an alteration of domination. In order to prevent the use and enjoyment of polit- 
ical rights, theories were enacted to praise the superiority of one civilization, one way of life, 
one ideology over another, different and militarily weaker. The might of Europeans had paved 
the way to an ideological legitimacy of the inferiority that non-Westerns had borne for centu- 
ries. If racism did not stem completely from the colonial past, part of its dynamic nevertheless 
was an influential survival of this past. 
Throughout history of mankind, power, domination and oppression had in their particular 
way begot prejudice (25). The Social Darwinism theory of evolution greatly influenced social 
thought in nineteenth century America. This theory extended the concept of biological evolu- 
tion in the development of man to a concept of evolution in the development of societies and 
civilizations. The nature of a society, a nation or race was supposed to be the product of 
natural evolutionary forces. The process of evolution was distinguished by struggle and 
conflict in which the stronger, more advanced and more civilized would naturally triumph over 
the inferior, weaker, backward and uncivilized peoples. 
The idea of natural selection was translated to a struggle between individual members of 
a society; between members of classes of society, between different nations, and between 
different races. This conflict, far from being an evil thing, was nature's indispensable 
method of producing superior men, superior nations, and superior races (26). 
In Algeria, the insurrection of 1871 was unexpected as far as the majority of the settlers 
were concerned. It rekindled racial hatred and the unchanged feelings of Europeans, with 
regard to the indigenous policy, who for many years harboured a will for revenge. A settler, 
Robiou de la Trehonnais, wrote a brochure in 1871 that captured the new frame of mind. He 
denounced "the savage barbarity of this race of demons" and described natives survival as a 
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protest against French conquest. He continued that the indigenous element "must undergo the 
fate of the conquered: either to assimilate or to vanish because the European civilization ..... is 
merciless" (27). The rule of force was pushing it forward absorbing everything that could be 
assimilated and crushing every obstacle. This attitude did not differ much from the opinion of 
some prominent figures of the time. The first president of Algiers Court reiterated on 
December 14,1871 that the objective of France was the absorption of the natives (28). A 
future senator of Oran, August Pomel, expressed a widely held opinion that Arabs - the Ish- 
maelites - were totally non-assimilable and they had to be compressed in the South (29). 
Many agreed that the Arab element was destined to vanish in the front of civilization. 
Another idea blossomed in the nineteenth century and flourished under the name of mani- 
fest destiny. Briefly stated, it was simply the idea that white Americans were destined, either 
by natural forces or by Divine Right to control at least the North American continent. Many 
churchmen supported the idea that such expansion was the will of God (30), like they did in 
supporting the action of France in Algeria. Racism was never invoked as a justification for 
expansion because the word made people feel uncomfortable. It was replaced by expressions 
such as 'to liberate' and 'to civilize'. Expansionism was or is still by some believed to be a 
natural growth of a superior nation. This imperialistic vision had consequences which affected 
black people in the United States of America, as Ronald Segal pointed out in The Race War. 
Both North and South saw and accepted the implications. What was sauce for the Philip- 
pines, for Hawai and Cuba, was sauce for the southern Negro. If the stronger and clev- 
erer race is free to impose its will upon 'new caught sullen peoples' on the other side of 
the globe, why not in South Carolina and Mississippi? asked the Atlantic Monthly. 'No 
republican leader', proclaimed senator Tillman of South Carolina, '... will now dare to 
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wave the bloody shirt and preach a crusade against the South's treatment of the Negro. 
The Negro had a bloody shirt of its own. Many thousands of them have been made into 
shrouds for murdered Filipinos, done to death because they were fighting for liberty'. 
Throughout the United States doctrines of racial superiority received the assent of 
influential politicians and noted academics. The very nationalisation that had eased the 
conscience of the slave trade now provided the sanction for imperial expansion (30). 
Manifest Destiny as a theory has in a way stimulated the myth that coloured people were 
general incapable of self-government. One might find an explanation to the systematic rejec- 
tion of the Black Power concept to the influence and impact this theory had generated. 
A long lasting diversionary view was that the racial tension was not the fruit of an unbal- 
ance in sharing the political power but a tension stirred up by some lunatics, bigots and 
deprived. Such a view was not true. Racial relations were not apolitical. They could not be 
reduced to the level of just psychological and personal factors. Three hundred years of Ameri- 
can black history and one hundred and thirty years of French Algerian relations could not be 
so easily encapsulated. 
The role of the network of institutional controls should not be ignored. Politics condi- 
tioned every aspect of life. Once a group had been defined as inferior it would be excluded 
from full participation in the political decision making process. In the case of black people in 
the United States, though the decision making process is so fragmented into many centres of 
powers due to the nature of the American political system, this multi-faced regime metamor- 
phosed into a monolithic block when the issue of race was raised. White people whether in 
America or Algeria tended to perceive their interest in a united way when facing claims. 
These were viewed as threats to their vested interests, possessed to the exclusion of those who 
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were for different reasons the rejected group. 
Whenever a group of persons within a society had enjoyed for a considerable period of 
time certain opportunities for getting wealth, for exercising power and authority and for suc- 
cessfully claiming prestige and social deferences, there was a strong tendency for those people 
to feel that these benefits were theirs by right. This advantage came to be thought as normal, 
proper and customary as sanctioned by time, history and precedents. An established system of 
vested interest was a powerful factor, especially when differences in power, wealth and pres- 
tige coincided with relatively obvious characteristics such as shared hereditary roots, a distinc- 
tive religion or culture. The holders of this position would support one another in maintaining 
the status quo (32). Proposals to change the status quo would arouse indignation, exhaustive 
and elaborate doctrines, and a structure of beliefs were developed to prove the righteousness 
and to justify the existing order. 
The institutionalisation of discrimination therefore became a necessary step to be taken in 
order to retain conditions against which black people in America and Algerians were fighting. 
It was a well established and cherished practice that complaints against society in a democracy 
were to be addressed and redressed in the political arena. Unfortunately, an immediate serious 
obstacle faced black people and Algerians in their attempt to use political means to improve 
their conditions. Political institutions, even one as inherent to democracy as the vote, were part 
and parcel of the network of control and domination. Rather than being a tool available for 
their struggle, political democracy had been manipulated to protect racial privilege. A fixed 
line had been drawn below which practices and promises of political democracy had never 
been extended for it was not in the pathology of the ghetto or les communes mixtes but in the 
arrangements which sustained them that the main reason for the challenge must be found. 
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Black people and Algerians had never been represented proportionately to their size at any pol- 
itical level therefore it was not a surprise that the enactment of social and political priorities 
failed to reflect their needs. 
All forms of oppression conferred certain privileges on individuals and groups that 
oppressed or were the direct beneficiaries of these inequalities. It was the creation and defence 
of group privileges that characterised the domination of one human group over another. 
Privilege was the essence of racial oppression for Albert Memmi the colonizer's privilege was 
the basis of the colonial relationships (33). Privilege led to exploitation which in order to be 
performed had to be backed by a direct or indirect control, which was important to a dynamic 
through which one segment of society achieved power and privilege over other groups. It was 
essential and central to the mechanism of oppression. 
Until recently, American black people had been prevented because of racial practices and 
prejudices from using the ballot. The American Civil War which 'freed' slaves did not change 
the white American determination to exclude black people from political life. Neither land, 
education nor even the practical rights of citizenship were granted to the black man. The deci- 
sion of President Rutherford B. Hayes to withdraw federal troops in April 1877, ending thus 
Reconstruction, the growth of the Ku Klux Klan and the Jim Crow laws undermined the newly 
gained rights. State after state formerly disfranchised black people by the discriminatory use of 
'reading and understanding clauses', by writing rigid educational and property tests into their 
constitutions and by enacting 'grandfather clauses' which enfranchised only those whose 
fathers and grandfathers were qualified to vote on January 1,1869 - that is whites only. The 
disfranchisement of black people became a necessity. White Democratic primaries and legal- 
ized racial segregation became the rule. The last black member of congress of the nineteenth 
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century, George H. White of North Carolina, was elected in 1869. 
Race was an insurmountable hurdle to political participation and sharing power. Since 
the founding of the United States, American leaders had refused to recognise black people as 
political beings. They referred to them as persons in the Constitution (34), forgetting that in 
Locke's thought, their inspiration, a person is an individual gifted with reason, capable of a 
law in other words able to live according to the law of nature which defines obligation and 
confers rights (35). It had always been thought and believed that America would be an all 
white nation. Every manoeuvre had been used to deny or to emasculate the fundamental 
power of the vote black people were entitled to. 
Despite the exposure and condemnation of discriminatory practices such as poll taxes, 
literacy tests, the outlawing by the Federal Government of requirements for voter registration 
and the appointment of referees who could interfere into a situation where the local registrars 
showed a clear pattern of discrimination, black people continued to be politically under- 
represented. Black political will did not stop supremacists in the South from slowing the pro- 
cess of registration by pretending inaptitude. In rural areas and small towns, the fear of white 
violence and economic reprisals were deterents in themselves. Outside the South the daily 
hardships, alienation, malnutrition and bad health were not incentives for studying the political 
situation. There was a rampant powerlessness in the ghetto that discouraged optimism about 
determining one's way out of oppression and poverty through the ballot. 
Before real black political participation started in 1966 when Edward Brooke was elected 
to the Senate, in cities where the black vote was important and substantial, different institu- 
tional practices weakened the power of bloc voting. The most familiar practice was known as 
'gerrymandering', that was the redrawing of a district's limits in order to dilute the power base 
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that a black community had because of its vote. Proportionality had never existed between the 
voting black population of a city and the city council responsible for local policies. This prac- 
tice allowed black people to vote but ensured they were a minority within the white commun- 
ity. "New York's 16 percent Negro population elect only one of the city's 19 congressmen 
(Powell), 2 of the 37 city councilmen" (36). The same technique was used in Los Angeles for 
the same purpose according to David Sears "Most elective constituencies are districted in a 
way that dilute Negro and Mexican-American power at the polls" (37). At the national level, 
Congress in the early 1960's had between "one to two percent blacks among its members 
while black population comprises 11 percent of the national population" (38). 
The reforms granting Algerians the right to vote and elect representatives in assemblies 
had to be inscribed in this same policy of domination. The idea of allowing Algerians to parti- 
cipate in the political arena stemmed from the antagonism that existed between settlers and 
French administration. As settlers grew stronger in number and power, they resented more and 
more the administrative guardianship. In 1900 they secured the financial autonomy of Algeria 
through the creation of les Delegations Financieres. Whereas the administration saw in an 
Algerian representation, which was to be carefully chosen and docile, the means to oppose the 
settlers elected officials. 
The institutionalisation of the double electoral college and the guarantee of a majority for 
the European element had transformed Algerians into a minority, they who constituted the 9/10 
of the population. A parity of representation had been granted at the Algerian assembly, gen- 
eral councils and French parliament. A parity that sanctified an inequality and defied the law 
of arithematics since it meant that one European was equal to nine Algerians. Moreover 
French authorities refused to extend this parity to city councils that the European electoral col- 
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lege dominated with 3/5 of the seats. The discrimination became a necessity. It was well 
known that if the elections were free and fair in the European college, they were fraudulent in 
the Algerian college (39). The parity did not present any danger with the 'ready-made' 
Algerian officials whom were imposed to general councils, Algerian assembly and French par- 
liament. But in city councils it would have threatened French preponderance. A constitution 
of a majority of Muslims and Europeans would have led to a paralysis of the system by the 
collision of two equal blocs. 
When European white minorities arrived in America, especially after the civil war, they 
were naturalised and were granted the right to vote after a period of time and certain tests. 
Consequently they were able to organize themselves, first their neighbourhoods and communi- 
ties and subsequently as national groups. Voting as blocs helped immigrant groups to get 
tolerance and patronage from the established centres of power. The nomination and election of 
candidates having the same ethnic roots helped these people to gradually have some control 
over their lives. "They have at least one voice in the city council" (40). But the black popula- 
tion was, with rare exeptions, insufficiently represented in machine politics. 
Even if black politicians managed to get a place in the machine of politics, they had to 
appeal to a large section of white community. This would affect the fulfilment of the needed 
socio-economic changes of the black community. The individual commitment to improving 
black people's situation combined with refraining discontent of the white partisan hierarchy 
would determine the black politician's contribution to the black community. But being part of 
a system, politicians had to abide by rules and adopt compromise in order to survive as 
officials and soon race matters would be subdued. 
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So, even if black officials could use the political system to strive to improve black 
people's condition, they were met with a situation that compelled them to be figurehead leaders 
or officials lacking effective power to push enough for needed legislation. The specific issues 
that confronted them became almost alien. The democratic process accepted only the need of a 
majority, they therefore stopped representing a specific category of people but a political 
machine and the consensus which was pushing them. I 
This powerlessness was commonly found in Algeria under French domination. It was 
less artful and subtle than that faced by black people in the United States. After the invasion 
of Algeria, the issue became acute with the policy that encouraged settlements. An administra- 
tive system had to be set up. It would be flexible and diverse so that it would maintain native 
domination and endow settlers with the same institutions as France. Thus was born the princi- 
ple of the consubstantial discrimination. It was going to affirm itself in a constant form in the 
French administration of Algeria. The native was forgotten and forsaken. 
The royal ordinance of September 9,1847 was the first scheme which divided Algeria 
into civilian and military territories, into zones of citizenship and zones of subjugation (41). 
The civilian territory was identified with the zone of colonization and progressed with it. 
This distinction became gradually unbearable to settlers. For security reasons their 
actions, their undertakings, their settlements were carefully checked by the Arab Bureau like 
the freedmen's bureau, these were perceived as refraining the expansion and being an obstacle. 
So settlers forcefully advocated the extension of the civilian territory so that the administrative 
assimilation of Algeria to France would be complete (42). The decree of October 27,1858 
satisfied them by dividing Algeria into three provinces, each one including a civilian territory 
or department and a military territory (43). Furthermore in order to facilitate the penetration of 
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colonization in the military territories, the senatus consulte of April 22,1863 provided, by 
means of ingenious operations, for the introduction of individual property. In view of these 
new data a gubernatorial order of May 20,1868 softened the municipal organization. It 
created three types of communes (44). 
The first was les communes de plein exercice: a territory where the European population 
was numerous enough to take charge and to manage its own affairs. Les communes mixtes 
was the second type: a territory where the European population was not compact and dense 
enough to form a commune de plein exercice, but was numerous enough to be admitted to take 
charge of the common interests. This type of commune was a novelty. It well deserved its 
name by the juxtaposition of civilian and military institutions. It could be developed into a 
commune de plein exercice with the growth of the European population. Last came les com- 
munes subdivisionaires: territories headed by a commanding officer where the European popu- 
lation was not yet fixed. 
So it was according to the sole profit of the European element that French government 
endeavoured to make flexible the principle of authority and to develop civilian institutions. 
There was no mention of the Algerians future in the administrative organization which did not 
undergo any qualitative change prior to World War II. But since 1947 with the new status of 
Algeria it was anticipating the suppression of les communes mutes and territories of the South 
under military command. If the laws were scrutinized it would have been thought that legisla- 
tors wanted to grant Algeria a civilian regime putting an end to discriminatory institutions. At 
the beginning of the war of independence, these charges were not implemented yet as many 
moderate voices would have liked (45). There was no abolition of les communes mixtes nor of 
the territories of the South. It was true that some douars (native villages) had been 
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transformed into municipal centres, however the achievement of this reform had been delayed. 
These municipal centres had nothing in common with the European communes called de 
plein exercice. Their prerogatives were derisory and their officials were generally picked by 
the authority. They became the auxiliaries of French administrators who withheld power and 
granted credits. The creation of these centres occurred in areas where the density of the popu- 
lation and evolution of minds had been strong obstacles for colonization (46). The fragmenta- 
tion of douars into centres met a double objective. On one hand it allowed the administration 
to delegate subaltern tasks of management to 'elected' Algerians in order to devote its energies 
to more political ones. On the other hand it helped the division of opinions by stirring up clan 
and individual rivalries. It was essentially a weapon meant to nip in the bud nationalist cons- 
ciousness as these rural areas were the basis for gathering opposition forces. Thus, despite its 
democratic appearances, this municipal reform was only the expression of a periodical effort 
that aimed to destroy the collective forms that could be the pillars of nationalism. They were 
part and parcel of an ever recurring policy of domination which tried in this case to adapt itself 
to new circumstances. 
On the political level, French arrogance bestowed French citizenship on the Jewish com- 
munity and all immigrants as soon as they settled in Algeria (47). Algerians were subjects of 
France till 1946. As such French authorities created for them le code d'indigenat which con- 
ferred to judges, administrators of mixed communes and to commanding officers the discretion- 
ary power to fine and to imprison without any appeal. But even as French citizens and well 
after the abolition of le code d'indigenat, Algerians remained more than the other citizens sub- 
ject to discrimination in front of the law. The article 80 of the French penal law filled the 
place of the late code. Algerians were condemned for breaches relating to the old code espe- 
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cially actions and utterances hostile to France and its government (48). The main aim behind 
this substitution was not the end of this harsh regime. As the political scene changed with the 
rise of nationalist parties and the growing political awareness, a new weapon for repressive 
policies more efficient, subtler and less racist in its form had to be supplied without ending 
legal discrimination. 
The efforts of one racial group to subjugate another group were in many cases motivated 
by desires, hopes to control or increase control over the economy. Through the process of 
domination, the subordinate group could be eliminated or at least neutralized as a competitor 
(49). The phenomenon of competition might be an inter-individual or an inter-group one. 
Racial division might also be used by the dominant group to exploit the labour of the subordi- 
nate group in order to increase or maximize rewards and benefits. For example, the use of 
slave labour to increase farm production could not be easily explained by the argument that 
this kind of domination aimed to eliminate the slave as a competitor. Slaves would have 
wanted most material gains, as did poorer whites, but their condition hampered them. On that 
basis alone, they would not be in competition with the dominant group. However, if a group 
gave and attached a status value to some goods it was likely that regardless of the degree of 
competition from other groups an endless struggle for benefits would exist within the group. 
Accordingly, if the individual members of a dominant group felt. that their control over the 
economy could be maximized by exploiting the subordinate group, they would strive to 
develop and maintain racial division and stratification. The different steps and stages by which 
racial segragation and discrimination was and is maintained in the United States had charac- 
teristics that were both unique and universal. 
When slavery was abolished the victorious North stopped short of any radical reform 
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which aimed at bringing a land redistribution in the South that was intended to eliminate the 
plantation system. Land, as an asset, as a means of production generated not only wealth but 
also power and individual independence. Whites secured their land in America by driving out 
native Americans because they were aware as most of them came from Europe, of the power 
landlords held in local and national governments. They were not ready to let any of it slip into 
the hands of black people. Then came the redemption: restoration of the planter class to its 
former powerful status, and the introduction of the Jim Crow laws which expanded and 
strengthened segregation which started during the Reconstruction. Apparently the issue was 
more complex. There was a young nation to be saved from division, and more there was a 
sacred principle to which America was and is still tied to, the respect for individualism. 
Reforming would have meant an encroachment on other peoples' liberties and properties. It 
would have meant breaking its own laws and principles. However with a free independent siz- 
able black community, the political arena would change shape and the balance of power, espe- 
cially in the South, might become subject to a black lobby and influence as America ceased to 
be an all white democracy. 
The same pattern was found in the pre-independence war in Algeria. Before 1863, 
Muslim property was through its familial or collective structures untouched. Facing the impos- 
sibility of private deals, French administration resorted to sequestration and to resettlement to 
feed the official colonization. But these methods were insufficient. A Trancisation' of lands 
had to be operated. A policy characterised by the, formation of individual property by frag- 
menting the undivided familial or collective Muslim property. This was the initial objective of 
the senatus consulte of July 22,1873 (50). The purpose was to split the Algerian property in 
order to facilitate deals which speculators turned into an instrument for expropriation. Between 
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1871 and 1895 17,000 legal sales were recorded. Settlers succeeded in securing 563,000 hec- 
tares. So the Trancisation' of lands was partially a means of spoliation. By 1940 Europeans 
owned 25 percent of the land (2,720,000 hectares) while the total European population was 
only 11 percent, and was only 2 percent of the total agricultural population (51). Land was the 
source of wealth for landlords enjoying power and influence in cities. Furthermore 250,000 
hectares of forests were granted to Europeans for the manufacture of coal and extraction of 
cork (52). 
Oppression and exploitation had long been a human affliction without regard to race or 
national origin. The modem period was distinctive for the emergence of a racial order dom- 
inated by whites. Much of this exploitation and brutality had been chanelled along the dimen- 
sion of colour. Beliefs and ideologies developed as justification and with the institutionalisa- 
tion of racial oppression the irrational in racial thinking had developed. However, the rational 
case remained in the form of social and economic interests that were associated with privilege. 
Unfair advantages and a preferential situation in the pursuit of assets (whether they were 
money, power, position and education and so forth) were found at the heart of privilege. 
Social privilege is a universal feature of all societies with hierarchy and exploitation. These 
assets had been distributed unequally in the struggle for subsistence and social rewards. How- 
ever, there were always obstacles that impeded some groups more than others. Thus, sys- 
tematic inequality and injustice were built into the very nature of stratified societies. But 
where these inequalities and injustices fell heavily upon people who differed in colour or 
national origin because race and ethnicity were primary principles upon which people were 
excluded or stopped in the pursuit of their goals. Such a society was in addition racist. 
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Racial privilege pervaded all institutions, it was expressed most strategically in the labour 
market and structure of occupations. In industrial capitalism, economic institutions were cen- 
tral, and occupational role was the major determinant of social status and life style. If there 
was anyone key to the systematic privilege that strengthened racial capitalist society, it was the 
special advantage of the white population in the labour market. 
The condition of Algerians was defined by the senatus consulte issued on July 14,1865 
which remained the constitutive charter determining the status of Muslim Algerians. Muslims 
according to this law were French subjects, diminished citizens - des Gives minute jure. They 
did not benefit from the law and the freedoms guaranteed to citizens and human beings in gen- 
eral by the different French constitutions. Their quality as subjects had let French administra- 
tions grant them only revocable faculties. The senatus consulte rejected the principle of equal- 
ity between French citizens and Algerians and brought permanent restrictions to Muslims pub- 
lic freedoms (53). 
Thus inequality in employment was a characteristic of the colonial system until 1919. 
The equality of access to public jobs was only valid for French citizens. Inequality in getting a 
job was paralleled with an inequality in remuneration. Muslims who worked in services aimed 
solely at Muslims received an inferior salary to that of Europeans performing analogous jobs. 
More obvious was the inequality in payment between civil servants recruited in the same con- 
ditions, according to the same criteria of education and working in the same department (54). 
France therefore implicitly started to recognise the Algerians as having a separate status which 
the future legislation would confirm. The decree of September 25,1936 which enlarged the 
accession of Algerians to public jobs and confirmed that 'natives of Algeria from now on 
were a specific distinct category (55). 
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This was a characteristic that black people had been enduring in the United States of 
America. Their condition whether social or economic did not benefit much from the economic 
growth of the country. The colour caste system in the United States was the main determinant 
of the rate and direction of economic progress or retardation for black workers. Whites 
readily, willingly, conceded the heaviest, dirtiest and lowest paid unskilled jobs to black peo- 
ple. Consequently, as long as there was a heavy demand for unskilled workers, black people 
were able to gather a disproportionate number of these jobs during times of labour scarcity. 
The much proclaimed shift of black workers from rural-agricultural to industrial labour had 
been blown out of proportion. Although it was true that the percentage of black male farm 
labourers declined from 60 percent in 1860 to 40 percent in 1930 and 11 percent in 1960, 
black workers largely became concentrated in unskilled and service jobs. In 1860 more than 
21 percent of the black males were in domestic service and by 1890 more than 33 percent of 
them were either domestic servants or unskilled workers (56). Transfer to unskilled jobs in 
industry had a detrimental effect on black people because they were the first victims of the 
increasingly high rate of automation. For example in 1964, it was estimated that the introduc- 
tion of new technology wiped out 40,000 unskilled jobs weekly (57). 
The introduction of technological innovations resulted in the reduced employment for 
black people because of the colour caste link with occupations. Traditionally in the United 
States, and even more generally in the South, any job that required a running of a machine and 
which was not dirty, was a white man's job. Since 1954, the black unemployment rate had 
been on a constant and continuous rise and was above the 6 percent recession level which was 
used as a guideline or measure for serious economic difficulties when it dealt with the entire 
workforce (58). More sombre was the nature of many jobs available and accessible to black 
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people. They were concentrated in the lowest skilled lowest paying occupations. These jobs 
were unstable, uncertain and rewarded by substandard wages and were low in status. The 
prospect for meaningful advancement was limited or non-existent and they entailed unfulfilling 
and exhausting duties (59). The example of black railroad firemen epitomized this process. 
As long as the coal burning locomotive was in service in the United States, black firemen were 
alloted the hot and difficult job of stoker by railroad companies in disregard of opposition for- 
mulated by white unions. Moreover, black people were barred from promotion to engineers 
and conductors. The introduction of diesel engines with mechanical stokers in the 1930's led 
to the exclusion of black firemen (60). 
The attitude and policies of management were not the only source of racial discrimina- 
Lion. The labour unions did not defend black rights for decent and better jobs. When black 
people arrived in urban areas, the unions were already strongholds for power groups. Conse- 
quently they were unable to accept and unite with other segments of the labour force as the 
great waves of European immigration had done in previous decades. They were more likely 
agencies which protected their membership, in majority white, from potential workers many of 
whom were black people. They were less a channel by which black people could gain access 
to American affluence. The AFL-CIO and many labour organizations had persistently stated 
their opposition to racial discrimination, and yet the official discourse did not influence the atti- 
tude of union locals (61). In 1962 out of a labour force of 10.5 million black workers only 1.5 
million were members of trade unions (62). The refusal to admit black men to union appren- 
ticeship programmes had done much to create this inequity (63). Labour organizations, indeed, 
removed discriminatory clauses from their constitutions but the non-compliance with directive 
and unmitigated policies were rampant and usual practices at the local level. The Riot Com- 
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mission reported, using 1966 data, that if non-white employment was upgraded proportionately 
to the level of white employment, the impact would be immense and the shift of incomes great 
about $4.8 billion in additional income that would be generated if non-white unemployment 
was to be reduced to the level of white unemployment (64). 
So black people, when working tended to have jobs that were insecure, dirty and at the 
bottom of the hierarchical ladder where there was little room for promotion. The consequence 
was that white workers had a near monopoly on jobs that were secure, clean, highly skilled 
and provided the possibilities for advancement. A study showed that workers tended to be 
concentrated in old industries that were declining in job needs (65). Nobody would assert the 
contribution of racial privilege to white living standards partly because of the multiple variables 
involved, unsatisfactory data and subjective studies and assessments. In a study based on a 
census of 1960 data, Lester Thurow reached a figure of $15.5 billion as the gain in overall 
white income that was generated from live areas of racial discrimination: more steady employ- 
ment, higher wages, more lucrative occupants, greater investment in education and labour 
union monopoly. He calculated that every white member of the labour force benefited by $248 
a year, and a corresponding $2,100 less for each non-white worker or job seeker (66). Furth- 
ermore, the black median family income was only 58 percent of white median income in 1966. 
The black purchasing power had been declining throughout the period between 1947 where it 
was $2,174 lower than the average white income and in 1966 where the gap reached $3,036 
(67). White socio-economic privilege was not inherently vital to the American economic sys- 
tem as it was in colonial Algeria where a numerical minority lived off a majority population 
and yet white Americans resisted tenaciously any threat that might jeopardize such privilege 
whatever its relatively or absoluteness. 
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If black people were complete free American citizens the Supreme Court decision of 
1954, Brown V Board of Education of Topeka, which found segregation in schools unconstitu- 
tional would never have had to be issued. The coercive and exploitative pattern set in motion 
when slavery, was established, was governing the white and black relationship. Black people 
are still regarded as inferior for social reasons for racial privilege is not just economic. It is a 
matter of status also. Folkways are stronger than stateways. Jefferson Davis understood this 
when he said that slavery "raises white men to the same general level, that it dignifies and 
exhaults every white man by the prescence of a lower race" (68). One hundred years later 
James Baldwin put forward the same notion when he analysed the American status order. 
According to him it required black people to be the reference point at the bottom of the system 
below which whites could not sink (69). These ideas could be condemned and could be seen 
as despicable and yet they were and are real in the way whites behave. Whites would seek a 
maximization of their relative prestige by a monopoly of the economy but also by social 
honour. The ability of whites to arrogate to themselves a status in every racially mixed society 
had been a feature in modern history. Thus in 1936 when the Front Populaire came into 
power a bill was introduced to parliament called the Blum-Viollette Bill which would have 
granted citizenship to about 30,000 Muslims (70). '"Those.... who have assimilated French 
thought but who, because of family reasons or religious motives can not abandon their personal 
status (as Muslims)" (71). Europeans nearly revolted to stop its enactment. 
White people's position on the social ladder made them look downward disdainfully and 
arrogantly towards the pariahs who let themselves be subjugated. The creation of a stereotype 
that helped to perpetuate prejudice was an immediate consequence of political and economic 
domination. The nature of this domination and the way it was acquired erased any social con- 
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sideration for black people and Algerians. Both peoples became of no consequence. The 
language used by white people testified to the fact that black people and Algerians were not 
regarded as men. Both are either Arabs or Negroes. They had even been deprived of any 
individuality: each man was called Muhammed, Boy, Sambo; each women Fatma, Jezebel. 
They were all the same kind. 
A prejudice, unlike misconception which might be reversible, is often resistant to all evi- 
dence that would unseat it. An element of antipathy, of hate, contempt and indifference will 
be present in distorting the perception of the racially different others and which will culminate 
in their exclusion and even negation. The most important factor becomes ignorance. Segrega- 
tion began as a one-way practice and long remained so. The servants were ready and willing 
to visit their master's house but masters would only sometimes return the compliment. Conse- 
quently the selection became obvious in the choice of doctors, lawyers, recreative buildings 
and means of transportation like the third class railway coaches for Algerians. Officially they 
were not reserved for natives but it was there where they all went, reminiscent of the Jim 
Crow laws in the United States of America. Friendship and sexual relations were rare but 
mixed marriages did not practically exist because inter-marriage would result in general in a 
breakdown of group boundaries. Family is a crucial institution in society. It also plays a 
major role in the process of socialisation, the way people learn both central values and neces- 
sary instrumental skills to survive in society. Marriage patterns would appear to reflect the 
power structure of American and settlers societies where racial divisions were far more signigi- 
cant in determining life styles and life chances than for instance ethnic or religious barriers. 
But the ones who resisted most this absorption into the white stream were black people and 
Algerians themselves. They felt that racial integration as it happened in the United States in 
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the 1950's and 1960's and as it started to be practiced after 1947 in Algeria, lacked the tangi- 
ble objectives needed to bring about genuine equality. After all,. social and racial equality 
remained intangible goals unless they were related to the seizure and retention of objectives 
which could be used as levers to exert political, social, economic and administrative powers in 
society. 
The inevitable consequence of exclusion of black people and Algerians generated a 
toughening of minds and hearts. Militancy would appear a normal reaction and apply on a 
social and individual level. Individuals who saw themeselves threatened in their essence by 
those around them would react in one of two ways. They would either try to dissolve into the 
mainstream and efface themselves, or alternatively they would enhance their individual charac- 
teristics. They would reject the whole system of makeshift mitigations and gradual legislative 
improvements. If in the past it was difficult for them to achieve equality then the present must 
compensate by providing an end to the traditional treatment they had borne for decades. They 
would demand an upheaval of values and power. The rapid growth of an awareness of indivi- 
dual human value is no more than a reaffirmation of the self and the awakening of a national 
conscience. It is no more than the negation of a negation. 
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CHAPTER III 
CHALLENGE TO DOMINATION AND THE ASSIMILATIONIST TREND 
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The belief that the colonizer in Algeria would willingly depart to France was short-lived. 
It was matched by the illusion that black people in the United States of America would recover 
their 'humanity' (dignity, human rights, civil rights) through a long and peaceful process. The 
idea of an emancipation by voluntary withdrawal and generosity of conquerors and oppressors 
was just elusive. However, it was dismissed by political actions that developed and matured 
especially after World War II. 
Through many diversions and hesitations, challenge to domination occurred at a time 
when its implantation seemed definitive. Settlers, in Algeria, were enjoying political and 
socio-economic supremacy over native Algerians. In the United States, black people were still 
suffering from segregation and lack of effective political power. Consequently, rewards, be it 
economic or social, were unevenly distributed. Powers, that conferred privileges on white 
Americans and settlers in Algeria and caused impoverishment of black Americans and native 
Algerians, were to be questioned. Timid and brutal claims voiced by legalists or radicals 
became manifest. They came to indicate the deep change that was stirring up Algerian and 
black communities. - 
The relationship between antagonists, French/white Americans on one hand and 
Algerians/black people on the other hand, became political. The word political does not cover 
here the decisions and the art of governing but rather the action which leads to forceful 
methods and aggressive actions directed towards taking power. The policy of dominant 
powers was opposed by Algerian and black communities divided into different political 
streams. Some tried to achieve, at first, the much advocated assimilation, others suggested a 
more radical path: a simple and clear break. Policy and politics were going to affect the whole 
socio-political arena as well as Algerian and black communities. 
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The French will to continue a policy of hegemony and the white Americans deliberate 
reluctance to accept black people as their equals engendered a political reaction from Algerians 
and black people to the powers which oppressed them. At first, it was vague, then, slowly 
became formulated in a clearer way within a framework which gradually took shape. How- 
ever, this new kind of opposition was not unified. It had many facets, defended many goals, 
suggested different political schemes. Some were egalitarians and were opposed to separatists. 
They could be sub-divided into factions with variable political trends. To these frameworks 
were added 'unionists' streams symbols of desires and necessary common actions of unity 
especially as far as Algeria was concerned. 
The conditions of political domination were changing. France attempted to bring about 
changes to the institutional framework while the move to the more urbanized North and new 
economic environment had shaken the black community in the United States of America. One 
of the main features was the permanent gap and the constant inequalities between the demands 
of the era and the means provided to meet them. Before 1914, the French had thoroughly 
imposed themselves over the land and expanded their wealth. In the United States of America, 
the post civil war era was one of lost hopes and illusions as far as black people were con- 
cerned because it gave a new legitimacy to white domination, especially in the South. The law 
was the symbol of dispossession then one of consolidation and the maintaining of acquired 
privileges. In Algeria, after 1919, it became restrictive. Land occupation was stopped. 
Algerians and black people appeared on the fore of the political arena, claiming a place that it 
would be impossible to grant them. Under this thrust the political scene and the judicial 
framework expanded. 
While Europe and America still believed or rather wanted to believe in the virtues of the 
- 110 - 
progress of science and the well-being they brought to overseas and domestic peoples, a sud- 
den upheaval opposed its members and left victors and vanquished weakened and weary. 
Colonization inflated with the whole content of a civilization which dominated the world, 
found itself questioned, challenged and criticized. Challenged, by those to whom it had 
brought knowledge, and criticized by the United States, a new power whose influence had been 
crucial in the outcome of World War I. In Algeria, the conquerors of yesterday were aston- 
ished by President Wilson's fourteen points whose consequences could be as ill-fated as the 
change occurred in the ex-ally Russia. Western democracy changed its substance and one of 
the largest countries in the world fell into the Soviets' hands. An Algerian delegation com- 
posed of former fighters came to present to the Peace Conference a petition requesting social 
reforms, the stopping of immigration to France and of the European settlement in Algeria. The 
mood suddenly swung to anxiety at a time when the division of the Ottoman Empire and Ger- 
man colonies tended to give a wider meaning to the words Trench Empire'. 
Paradoxically, the emergence of the United States as an advocate of self-determination 
and freedom in the international arena had had no greater impact on the conditions and status 
of black people in the United States. It was true that black people were no longer slaves but 
as freedmen they lacked power. The Reconstruction Acts, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amend- 
ments, gave them the right to vote among other provisions such as legal protection and educa- 
tional opportunities, but the federal troops which were the symbol and guarantee of the 
enforcement of the law, had left the southern states in 1877. The Acts became ineffective. 
The national political developments, whose aims were the healing of the rift that existed 
between the vanquished South and the victorious North, made it advisable to placate southern 
leaders. There was a brief period of restraint but it soon gave way to violence and terror on a 
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large scale. Threats and violence drove black people away from polls. Racist legislators came 
into office. Segregation laws were passed, buttressed by court decisions and law enforcement 
practices, and were erected into institutions that rivaled slavery in the effectiveness in exclud- 
ing black people from public affairs, business, the labour movement, government and public 
education. 
Worldwide events continued or began to have reverberations within both the Algerian and 
black American communities. After the First World War ideological confrontations and politi- 
cal changes came to the fore. The East was shaken by the Soviet revolution, which affected 
Muslim minorities, and which was going to suggest, as a matter of priority, the freedom of 
peoples under colonial domination. The Rif War made this eventuality possible on North Afri- 
can land (1). The Young Turkish Revolution recreated on the ashes of the Ottoman Empire a 
new state which desired to be modern. The Turkish Republic adopted laity as a form of 
government. It represented, for the Arab world, an alternative to Socialism and generated the 
same liberating effects. The word 'republic' became popular among immigrants and the urban 
proletariat. The religious reformists were claiming, for cultural and religious purposes, the 
principle of the separation of the Church and the State in order to free the Muslim cult from 
the French state control. 
The First World War, promoted as a crusade to preserve democracy against the Kaiser, 
instigated a massive change in the racial pattern of the United States of America. By cutting 
off immigration from industry it produced a huge demand for labour in the cities of the North. 
Lured by the promise of ready employment, better equipped and more accessible jobs, the 
glamour of big city life, and the promise, if mostly hollow yet nevertheless potent, of a greater 
freedom, black people from the 1910's onwards flocked to the North. This great migration had 
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a substantial impact. For many of them, the very act of leaving the South marked a break with 
the past, and in the ghettoes of the North there throbbed a new strength and pain. The ideo- 
logical commitment to the war - about 360,000 blacks did military service, and many of 
these were overseas - (2) combined with the prosperity of war production to raise among black 
people a hope of rapid improvement with the coming peace and the growing resolve to achieve 
eventual equality. However the slogans of war were not serviceable to their wielders in times 
of peace. Democracy abroad was one thing, but democracy at home quite another. As though 
to erase the lessons of patriotic propaganda before they could be properly learned, white Amer- 
ica acted to dispel black aspirations. Twenty six serious race riots took place in what is known 
as the 'Red Summer' of 1919 and though some occurred in the South (Texas, Arkansas and 
Tennessee) most were in the North, with the worst of all in Chicago. White mobs seized con- 
trol of whole cities for days burning, assaulting, looting and killing. Seventy black people 
were lynched including ten soldiers who had fought in the war (3). 
White labour, reacted ruthlessly to break encroachments on the city slums and industrial 
plants, barred black workers from the unions and agitated for their dismissal from the more 
desirable jobs that the labour shortage of the war years had allowed them. The Ku Klux Klan, 
revived in the mid 1910's, spread out of Georgia across the country and gained the allegiance 
of millions by the mid 1920's. The influence of such organized racism was evident. 
The shift in ruling white attitudes was not without its effects on thought within the black 
community. W. E. DuBois assessed, at first, the war as a 'falling out' of imperialist pirates 
over their spoils, the real soul of white culture laid bare. American society was no more than 
the daughter of a dying culture (4). But with the United States entry into the war Dubois 
abandoned this attitude and showed an unrestrained and surprising patriotic fervour: 
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Let us while this war lasts, forget our grievances and close ranks shoulder to shoulder 
with our fellow citizens and the allied nations that are fighting for democracy....... If this is 
our country, then this is our war (5). 
This view was criticized and challenged. It was denounced by The Messenger (a left 
wing newspaper founded in 1917 by Chandler Owen and A. Philip Randolph). The dilemma 
facing DuBois was particular to black America, a dilemma of allegiance. What was the aspira- 
tion of black people to be: political, economic and social integration with the whites, or some 
kind of separate development associated with the liberation and progress of the whole black 
world?. He hesitated between the two alternatives and loyalties, and even he was among the 
most prominent figures in the history of the integration movement, he was a periodic believer 
in the development of a self-sufficient and socialist black community. He was an ardent sup- 
porter of the black American's commitment to the black world and the first exponent of Pan- 
Africanism. 
With many of the ideas that DuBois had already put forward, and with several very 
different ones of his own, it was Jamaican born, Marcus Garvey who in the racist atmosphere 
following the First World War managed what DuBois himself failed to achieve: awakening the 
black masses. Garvey identified, early in his life, the obsequious condition of black people in 
America with the colonial subjugation of Africa. In 1914, he founded the Univeral Negro 
Improvement Association (UNIA) (6). In the first manifesto he advocated 'universal confrater- 
nity' between peoples of black or African heritage. The first branch of his organization was 
established round 1917, and after a slow start, he managed to capture the imagination of the 
black masses with a version of Pan-African nationalism. He made nationhood the highest ideal 
of all peoples. But the nation he proposed was in Africa while its constituency was in the 
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United States of America. Racism permeated Garvey's nationalism. He came out unequivo- 
cally for race purity (his gospel simply inverted the prejudices of white supremacy). World- 
wide black solidarity and an eventual return to Africa: 
Two hundred and fifty years we have been a race of slaves; for fifty years we have been 
a race of parasites. Now we propose to end all that. No more fears, no more cringing, 
no more sycophantic begging and pleading; the Negro must strike straight from the 
shoulder for manhood rights and for full liberty. Destiny leads us to....... that freedom, 
that liberty, that will see us men among men, that will make us great and powerful peo- 
ple (7). 
Garvey's Africanism helps to explain a paradox: his admiration for Booker T. Washing- 
ton. What attracted him in Washington's message was the willingness to stay out of the white 
man's world, not to challenge him on his own ground. This was consistent with his belief to 
make a deal with white America in return for black Africa (8). 
Garveyism was also a parody of black capitalism. The UNIA went into business on a 
large scale; groceries, all the Black Star Steamship Company (a shipping company aiming to 
unite the different parts of the black world). These business enterprises should have made him 
aware that he was operating within the United States economy and not yet in his own domain 
where he could act as he liked. His business practices were dubious and soon he found him- 
self in debt. In 1925, he was imprisoned for having used the United States mail to defraud in 
the sale of stock for his steamship line. After his deportation in 1927, he ceased to be a great 
personal force, and his movement quickly dwindled. He died in London in 1940 but his 
achievement was lasting. It was he, more than anybody else, who gave the mass of blacks in 
the United States a sense of pride, new strength in the association with Africa, a release from 
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the despair of the post civil war period. He grasped the force of the silent conflict between 
dark and light skinned within the black community, and by his attacks on the mulatto middle 
class not only raised the standing of the poor black but began the erosion of white values, and 
negated the lure of mere racial imitation within black America. His message, even if some- 
times unreal, was a discovery that would be a fresh inspiration for many (9). 
The post world war era saw a black awakening which testified to the real awareness and 
spirit of protest. The masses were growing uneasy. Black participation in a movement of 
struggle increased. There was a new mood in the ghettoes that Garveyism had partly excited. 
Yet white America was confident of its place in the world and undismayed by the prospect of 
having to contain black discontent by force. However the emergence of the black middle class 
preoccupied with its relative superiority and its pursuit of the white image of hair straightening 
and white lightening applications as well as concern with a political protest that existed only 
within the intricate processes of constitutional reforms; was the buffer zone between threat and 
reality. The parades and rallies of the black man seemed of little danger to the establishment 
for it was likely to be more occupied with the struggle to survive in the slums of free enter- 
prise. Black people were not in general, despite efforts of men like DuBois and Garvey, even 
making proper use of the ballot. With the two major parties proclaiming policies that were the 
same in that they ignored black people's claim and with minor parties promising almost every- 
thing but the slightest prospect of success, most blacks in the North were able to vote. They 
retained their habitual allegiance to the Republican Party of Lincoln or did not vote at all. 
The Second World War had generated a new orientation of black expectations and atti- 
tudes. The war had increased their confidence and boosted their self-esteem. They had fought 
and defeated the racist ideology of the tyrannical Axis. They celebrated this victory amid fears 
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that there might be another anti-black 'Red Summer' such as that of 1919. There were also 
hopes that the progressive economic changes that had occurred for black people during the war 
time era could be expanded. It was an ambiguous moment in the history of black people. 
Harold Cruse wrote: 
.... people who thought as I did were called upon in 1945 to treat the post war era with 
intellectual and critical tools more applicable to the vanished world of the thirties -a 
world we had never had time to understand as we lived it. I spent the years from 1945 
to about 1952 wrestling with this perplexity... (10). 
However there was a unanimity as regards the blatant contradiction between the country's 
opposition to Fascism and the continued existence of Jim Crow laws in the States after 1945. 
Servicemen were not ready to reaccept and readapt to the South degrading cast system. Injus- 
tices were resented and caused irritation, anger and bitterness which led to frequent clashes 
over the 'colour line' especially in buses and street cars during and after the war. The system 
was questioned by most of the black people and was felt to be obtrusive. There was a mount- 
ing rejection of the status quo. A redistribution of power had to be considered or at least an 
abolition of segregationist laws was required especially when the Federal Government itself 
was beginning to openly oppose them. 
F. D. Roosevelt had taken office as President of the United States in 1932. He had 
quickly shown that he was the most liberal chief executive in American history so far with 
regards to the civil rights of national minorities. The Federal Government increased the 
number of its black employees from 50,000 in 1933 to 200,000 in 1946 (11). Roosevelt had 
appointed a small group of prominent middle class blacks, including lawyers Robert C. Weaver 
and William H. Hastie, journalist Robert L. Vann, and educator Mary McLeod Bethune, to 
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administrative posts (12). However, he resisted black people's demands that the Federal 
Governement should pressurise defence contractors to hire a greater number of minorites. It 
was only under the direct threat of the black workers march on Washington, D. C, co-ordinated 
by black labour leader A. Philip Randolph in 1941, that Roosevelt signed Executive Order 
8802 which outlawed racist hiring policies inside war production plants (13). In the years 
immediately following World War II, President Truman signed Executive Order 9981 on July 
26,1948, by which he decided to integrate the armed forces. Later on, President Eisenhower 
supported desegregation in the District of Columbia. All these decisions led to the conclusion 
that white supremacy in its formal-legal expression, at least, was doomed (14). 
Furthermore, political involvement fostered rising expectation. In Smith V Allright, 
delivered April 3,1944, by an eight to one margin, the Supreme Court ended the use of the all 
white primary elections, a range of rules which had excluded black people from the Demo- 
cratic Party and forbade them from voting in the all important Democratic Party's elections. 
This important decision marked the re-participation of southern black people into political life 
(although it took another quarter of a century to complete the whole process) (15). Throughout 
the whole South, the vast majority of black people were still disfranchised. But in many cities, 
some if not all obstacles to black voting were removed. Taking the South as a whole, the pro- 
portion of black adults who were registered voters increased from five percent in 1944 to 
twenty percent in 1952. By the early 1950's black people were starting to exert a tangible pol- 
itical influence in parts of the South. Black people were elected to city councils in Winston- 
Salem (1947) and Greensboro (1951) in North Carolina. In 1952, a black candidate won a 
public election in Georgia. This political thrust encouraged black people to claim pay parity 
with white teachers, the appointment of black policemen, a more equitable share of municipal 
-118- 
services, and first come first served segregated bus seating. 
In the labour force, a similar picture of change emerged. Philip S. Foner noted that: 
The median income of non-white wage and salary earners had risen from 41 percent of 
the white median in 1939 to 60 percent in 1950; the percentage of male black workers in 
white collar and professional jobs had risen from 5.6 in 1940 to 7.2 in 1950, and that of 
craftesmen and operatives from 16.6 percent of the total in 1940 to 28.8 percent in 1950 
(16). 
Moreover, a substantial number of black workers joined either the American Federation 
of Labour of the more progressive Congress of Industrial organization. An increased number 
of black people confidently looked forward to fairer treatment, better conditions and improved 
opportunites (17), the same concerns and aspirations of Algerians under French domination. 
In Algeria, the threats and tensions of 1919 were linked to the effects of a long, terrible 
war and to changes that occurred in the whole world. The first doubts, arising from the expan- 
sion of Socialism and the trial of colonization after 1919 came only from abroad. But when 
the wave of questions came from home, the system was shaken. The peak of the conquering 
spirit - which was the centenary of French Algeria - was celebrated on unstable ground and 
was to be a positive assessment and a glorification of the French contribution. The voices of 
the liberal criticism were kept well muzzled and the remedies suggested remained superficial. 
This celebration was that of the status quo (18). 
Tensions increased in Europe, anti-colonialism was weakening; and Nationalism, with its 
imperial variant, was going from strength to strength. So when the Front Populaire - all left 
wing political parties but the minority of the socialist revolutionary left - came into power in 
1936 they were not ready to tolerate a native nationalist action in Algeria. The home and 
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foreign policies of France came before the national interests of Algerians. The Front Popu- 
laire would only be interested in a policy of reforms whose main provisions would be the par- 
liamentary representation and gradual assimilation, a potential aim sought in order to stop 
Algerian nationalism. These provisions came in what is known as the Projet Blum-Violette. 
As the debate became passionate, French opinion was quickly mobilized through the 
media and soon a national front -a nest of right wing extremists - was constituted as an 
answer to the Front Populaire. Its permanent pressure finally led to the withdrawal of the pro- 
ject. The opposition gathered its energies to stop this programme. It succeeded through pro- 
paganda, threats and blackmail. The project had generated within the Algerian community and 
especially those 'westernized', hopes undoubtedly disproportionate vis-a-vis what it was sup- 
posed to achieve. The failure of this experience had a great impact on these evolues! 
World War II, the French defeat, the landing of the Allies in North Africa came to 
modify the political situation in Algeria. Algerians were asked to fight next to foreign armies 
which had come to take control of the Algerian territory, but their mind had matured and there 
were chances it would not be a small delegation of fighters who would talk to the Allies once 
the war was over. Moreover, the Government of the main power - United States of America - 
had the reputation of being less favourable to colonization. 
The French were living the end of an era and were feeling that triumphalism would end 
some day. The end of the war marked an obvious rupture. France noticed that it was gradu- 
ally questioned. At the beginning of the century, its imperialism was at its peak. It started 
having doubts about it during the decade 1930 to 1940. The cause was the changes that 
occurred in the political world arena such as the rise of the dictatorships in Europe, the move- 
ments in Turkey, Egypt, colonial changes with the resistance of Abdelkrim, the entrance of 
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African and Asian powers to the Society of Nations, the nationalist thrusts in Tonkin, in Sene- 
gal and Madagascar. France perceived that the West - at the core of which it believed to retain 
a privileged place - had changed without it, and that its supremacy was contested. Even within 
its 'colony'. Algeria, political movements, organizations, unions, and social unrest had grown 
and increased. It had come to believe in conserving, consolidating, protecting more than 
transforming. 
The necessary review of the status of Algeria became secondary during the Second World 
War. During the years 1943 and 1944, in Algeria, it was more questions of Allies, of the 
conflict between De Gaulle and Giraud, of rebuilding France after the war of future institu- 
tions, but little was said about the Algerians (19). When tracts claiming independence were 
distributed, mentioning the Algerian nation in a march towards freedom and independence, 
when the newspaper Egalite suddenly wrote about the Algerian democracy (20), France 
divided, surprised, cut off from overseas positions, was unable to follow from Paris a situation 
which was slipping away and to understand in Algiers a situation, an evolution which it 
resented. Under international pressure from the Allies and internal pressure from Algerians it 
considered a review. The circumstances compelled it to be radical. Ferhat Abbas, the old sup- 
porter of assimilation, was advocating now an association with France. The Algerians noticed 
then to what extent the judicial framework, more or less slightly altered, was no longer 
appropriate or rather how it had never been appropriate. 
A number of laws between 1918 and 1919, attempted to remedy the situation without 
satisfying either the Algerians who found them insubstantial or the settlers who found them 
dangerous for their privileged condition. The main problems at that time were administrative 
and political The law of August 1,1918 reinstated the djemaa (native local assemblies). The 
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law of February 4,1919 and the decree of February 6,1919 facilitated the access of natives to 
political rights (21). Muslims of 25 years old and who met certain conditions (such as being 
impregnated with French culture, way of life...... ) became communal voters. Half the men who 
had reached that age constituted the electorate for the djemaa. The Muslim municipal electoral 
in the communes ruled by settlers (communes de plein exercise) shot up from 50,000 to 90,000 
(22). The number of elected individuals to native municipal and general councillors increased 
too. However, the provisions of the laws did not go any further. They did not mention 
whether they were going to be applied to the southern territories still under military rule, nor 
that there would be a constitution of a consultative council of Algeria. The new law on 
naturalisation still had as a provision and pre-condition the abandonment of the personal status 
- being a Muslim - in order to be a full French citizen. It was of no help and did not have 
either the influence or reach the expectations wanted (23). 
The status of Algerians which was defined in 1919 and which would remain until 1944 
side by side with the indigent in 1920, was just a half measure which had as a main effect, 
besides displeasing and alienating everybody, the creation of a hybrid social category between 
Algerians and French, between Muslims and Europeans. The half a million natives constitut- 
ing the municipal electorate found itself between the mass of the population and the colony 
(24). Their position made them less of a buffer than prisoners of a blocked system. There 
was always the original contradiction, when in Algeria a westernized minority was advocating 
assimilation but settlers refused to hear about it and the French could not grant it for fear of 
destroying the colonial system. That was the reason behind the creation of this electorate no 
longer Algerians and not yet French, no longer subjects but not yet citizens. 
So, France under the excuse of assimilating started to acknowledge to Algerians a partic- 
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ular status that the future legislation would confirm (25). The decree of September 25,1936 
which widened and extended the access to civil servants designated by the Article 14 of the 
law of September 4,1919 confirmed that since the senatus consulte of 1865 the French indi- 
genous of Algeria constituted henceforth a specific category (26). 
The legislation regarding Algeria, till the debate on the Blum- Violette Project in the 
French Parliament seemed guided only by the will to repress any Algerian attempt to get politi- 
cal representation proportional to its numerical importance (27). The most characteristic deci- 
sion was that of March 30,1935. The Regnier decree. which institutionalised the political 
offence, showed that French sovereignty wanted to be respected, therefore any demonstration 
against its representatives had to be punished according to the nature and gravity of the 
demonstration (28). The illusion of becoming a full French citizen seemed remote in the arti- 
cles that designed the political offences and their penalty (29). France protected itself through 
settlers. Masters of the different institutions in Algeria at the local, regional and in the 
Delegations Financf`fres, they knew how to lobby and put pressure on the administration at its 
different levels whether in Algeria or in France. 
A combination of the Front Populaire coming to power, the personality of Senator Mau- 
rice Violette (former Governor of Algeria), and the electoral victory of a faction apparently 
sensitive to native Algerian claims, suggested that the change in status was imminent. The 
project proposed did not present any revolutionary feature. Many saw in it the chance and the 
means to modify the institutional framework obviously driven by a system of domination 
which was becoming less and less adequate (30). 
The aim of the project was to grant political equality to a small faction of the Algerian 
population as a first step and then its progressive extension to a larger number in the future. 
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Without abandoning the Muslim status, a minority would have obtained the same political 
rights as French citizens (31). These promoted would have served as an example to the others. 
The selective criteria was based on the merit system (titles, social postion, education....... ). 
Around 25,000 individuals would have been granted French citizenship but as a personal title 
non-transmissible. The others were only able to elect representatives to the Parisian political 
houses (32). 
The judicial framework remained unchanged till World War H. During the war, the few 
measures taken did not have important consequences. The French Republic reconstituted under 
the leadership of the Comite Francais de Liberation Nationale then the Gouvernement Pro- 
visoire de la Republique Francaise, only dealt with secondary matters. It just constituted a 
commission whose mission was to establish a programme of political, social and economic 
reforms. At the end the result of the report altered the access to the positions of civil servants 
and the forms to gain French citizenship. However, the order of March 7,1944 pretended to 
prepare for the future and announced the realisation of provisions held in Violette's project 
(33). It proclaimed the equality of French and Algerians. It did not put as a condition the 
rejection of the personal status in order to enjoy political rights. It even reserved 2/5 of the 
seats to Algerians in the local assemblies. 
However, it did open a narrow door to real equality between the two communities. 
Citizenship was granted through the merit system already apparent in 1936. It left to the future 
assemblies the power to decide whether or not to extend the measure to the entire native popu- 
lation. The only ones satisfied were those who were westernized. The initiators (34) could 
have thought that they had leapt to an important stage. They had prepared for the integration of 
Algeria to the Western world giving birth again to the principle transmitted by the concept of 
-124- 
assimilation which was well forgotten at the time. They were addressing men and women 
whose vision of the world, of the colonial power and of themselves had been changed by the 
war, men and women more sensitive to a separatist ideology and to the action of the political 
movements representing them. 
The last edict of the era, the Order of August 17,1945 sanctioned the existence of three 
categories of individuals among Algerians: the citizens, the naturalized French and of French 
status, citizens of Muslim status, a status non-transmissible and finally the non-citizens who 
were the majority (35). The political unity of the indigenous society, which was always 
announced and was impossible to realise, could not go through stages leading to the extreme 
inverse: diversification. 
EGALITARIANIST POLICY 
One of the first answers to the policy of domination was not so much assimilation but 
equality in status. In other words, assimilation was a means to achieve a socio-political parity 
between Europeans and Muslims, between white Americans and black Americans. However, it 
was never an end in itself. 
In Algeria, the dominant attitude was not to hold on jealously to one's national identity 
but was rather that of a confident momentum towards the cultural universe of the domineering 
power. Products of the French lay and republican school, the representatives of this stream 
were going to strive tirelessly in order to get access to the dominant status. Teachers nurtured 
with French culture in their turn took care of its diffusion, doctors and pharmacists, barristers 
who aspired to a social promotion in agreement with their academic titles; all were natural chil- 
dren, products of the all encompassing intrusion of the civilization of the conqueror. Their 
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condition as members of the promoted few put them in the centre of a dual loyalty or entice- 
ment and a dual faithfulness but which were exclusive of each other. Indeed they were in a 
more uncomfortable position as compared to the naturalized for they did not opt for becoming 
complete French citizens. Elected to different political arenas (municipal and general councils, 
Delegations Financi8res), they were torn between the call of the personal interest which dic- 
tated a total submission to the established power and the call of the conscience, which dictated 
the defence of those who they were supposed to represent and with whom they shared an indi- 
genous status. 
From this dilemma a framework was to develop, in which their political action was set, 
and which would never radically challenge the dominant power but which, also never failed to 
denounce the inegalitarian characteristics of this power. In order to reconcile these two atti- 
tudes, an unlimited confidence was devoted to the mythical image of the ideal France, that of 
1789, and a condemnation to make out any salvation of Algeria within the confine of the con- 
cern and generosity of this ideal France. The role was limited to insisting but respectful 
claims. The principle of French sovereignty was not questioned. There was an aspiration for 
more justice, more equality, less discrimination under the wing of this eternal France. That 
was the reason for the mainly electoralist and legalist lawful feature of the action of these 
'elected' as they came to be called. 
On September 11,1927 a Federation des Elus d'Algerie was created (Federation of the 
Elected of Algeria). Their programme was essentially assimilationist. It was concerned with 
equality, in other words, with social conditions, jobs, salaries, military service and education. 
They asked for an equality in political representation in the French Parliament and at every 
other level; local, regional, Delegations Financteres, in which the proportion of natives had to 
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be increased (36). However the successive deceptions inflicted by a power fiercely attached to 
the status quo were going to toughen their action without, however, making it radical. During 
the rather humiliating celebration of a centenary of French presence in Algeria in 1930, the 
hostile wing to naturalisation secured the leadership of the Federation. A crisis developed 
when the Blum-Violette Project was rejected and this led to the defection of Ferhat Abbas. He 
was going henceforth to represent the most active and dynamic tendency of the laity. The 
Federation of the Elected, under Ben Jelloul, stagnated in its dream of equality-integration, 
represented by the Blum-Violette Project. 
This project represented an extraordinary turn about for the Elected. They invested all 
their hopes and talents in this bill. They constituted a front of all the Algerian energies in 
order to be a force and obtain from the French power satisfaction on precise points. They par- 
ticipated in the formation of the Muslim Congress (37) which failed and its failure was theirs 
as well. They relied on the liberalism of the Front Populaire. During 1937 the Federation 
perceived its own impotance. The Blum-Violette Bill was postponed. The Muslim Congress 
was in disarray. They were unable to counterweight the pressure of the mighty Federation des 
Maires d'Algerie (Federation of the Mayors of Algeria) which was a lobby organization 
defending European interests. They broke off with the Ulema (clergy) who insisted that Algeri- 
ans had to keep their personal status. All led to a series of defections, of tensions and overt 
conflicts (38). 
A former member of the Federation, Ferhat Abbas, was going to experiment with nation- 
alism through various changes. He tore it up from its first assimilationist dreams and led it 
progressively towards federalist conceptions, even autonomist ones (39). He was the one who 
wrote in 1936: "If I had discovered the Algerian nation, I would be nationalist...... Algeria as a 
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fatherland is a myth....... France is me because I am the number........ the interests of France are 
our interests from the moment our interests become the ones of France" (40). The different 
titles of his official organs of his organizations described his gradual change: De la Colonie 
vers la Province (41) (From the Colony to the Province) Egalite (42), La Republique 
Algerienne (43) (The Algerian Republic). 
In the United States, the origin's of the South Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), 
and the rise of Martin Luther King Jr, were to be found in the Montgomery (Alabama) bus 
boycott. Without this event, SCLC might not have existed. On December 1,1955 Mrs Rosa 
Parks chose to be arrested rather than being humiliated by giving up her seat to a white man 
when ordered by the bus driver, according to the prevailing law. Her action was more than the 
impulsive decision of a seamstress with sore feet for she held strong and articulate views about 
the inequities of segregation (44). Her protest on the Cleveland Avenue bus was the purpose- 
ful act of a politically aware person. The reaction ' was that the black community decided to 
boycott local buses as a protest against their unfair treatment under the segregation laws (45). 
Thus the original dynamic came from the lay people. 
The growth of black people's opposition to segregation became apparent. It had been 
encouraged by the case of Brown V Board of Education. The United States Supreme Court on 
May 17,1954 ruled against the principle of segregation in public. schools. Undoubtedly, on 
the one hand, this decision heightened black aspirations and on the other hand, it was impor- 
tant because it unleashed a wave of racism that peaked sometimes into hysterical proportions 
which shut off many voices of moderation and compromise. Although this decision was 
applied to schools, it generated a political climate in which the defence of segregation in gen- 
eral became sine-qua-non for the survival of most white politicians. Like the French with 
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regard to Algerians, utter opposition to the black people's claim soon dominated the political 
debate. Like the French in Algeria, it was the intransigence of the white authorities that 
modified initially mild demands, for instance, of the Montgomery bus boycott (courteous treat- 
ment of black people on the buses, the seating of all passengers on a first come first served 
basis, with black people starting from the back of the bus and the white people from the front, 
and the hiring of black drivers for predominantly black routes) into an uncompromising insis- 
tance upon desegregation (46). It was in this atmosphere that Martin Luther King Jr and 
SCLC came to the fore. 
Martin Luther King, a newcomer to Montgomery (Alabama), was a highly educated and a 
racially aware clergyman (47). His duty was the concern for the social, political and economic 
problems of the community (48). He set up an organization, ruled and run by black ministers, 
in order to raise consciousness and stimulate voter registration (49). The Montgomery 
Improvement Association (MIA) was a new forum that helped to strengthen bonds among the 
community. As a newcomer, regardless of his cautiousness in action and eloquence in words, 
Martin Luther King was an outsider. As President of MIA, he intended to be a little more 
than a figure-head. When the bus boycott started, King was not identified with any faction of 
black activists (50). 
The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) was created in August, 1957. It 
was a non-violent and non-partisan movement. It was initially confined to the South. It was 
led by black people and mostly by clergymen (2/3 or its governing board were ministers) who 
came from a relatively upper middle class. SCLC might be described as a benevolent auto- 
cracy: Martin Luther King had the last word, however he made his decisions after consulting, 
usually, a large circle of friends, colleagues and advisors. The least important of these was the 
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board of directors. The board had never worked as a true policy making body, its resolution 
might define SCLC's official position but they had little importance. Martin Luther King pro- 
vided the driving force for the organization; its inceptions and growth (51). 
The aim of this organization was to establish city and county voter registration commit- 
tees to be formed from church, civic groups and other local organizations. This programme 
was known as the Crusade for Citizenship. The second major target for the organization was a 
broad assault on desegregation through mass direct actions that sometimes took the form of 
civil disobedience. However, because of the very cautious legalism that tainted the essence of 
the organization it had sometimes failed to take the lead, to take initiative and to dominate the 
headlines as an organization, unlike the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 
when they started the 'sit-ins' in Greensboro (North Carolina) a revolt against segregation and 
cautious lawfulness. SCLC had a less obvious impact than the Congress of Racial Equality 
(CORE) which launched the 'Freedom Riders' campaign, a spectacular campaign against the 
Jim Crow practices in interstate travel (52). 
In Algeria, after the experience of the Muslim Congress, Ferhat Abbas created the Union 
Populaire Algerienne (UPA) in 1938 (53). He tried to overcome the restrictive circle of a few 
notables and to open up his new party to a broader constituency. This change in perspective 
went always in agreement with a certain continuity that characterised his different stances: a 
concern for using the legal political channels offered to Algerians within the French political 
framework and two principal preoccupations of equality and respect of the personal status. 
The perspectives remained conscribed within the framework of French sovereignty. Algeria 
was perceived as a French province. There was not yet the question of independence nor even 
that of autonomy. This moderate tone was a follow-up to the Charter of the Muslim Congress 
-130- 
which was for the binding of Algeria to France (54). In the United States, all King's strategy 
reflected a concern for lawfulness and at the same time a surge of action that could shake the 
status quo without falling into extremism or violence. He was primarily driven by a Gandhian 
non-violent philosophy. He believed that black people could convert their white oppressors 
into friends if they accompanied their protest with redemptive love. 
We will wear you down by our capacity to suffer. And in winning our freedom we will 
so appeal to your heart and conscience that we will win in the process. The lion might 
be persuaded to lie down next to the lamb (55). 
The perception of the non-violent protest as a means of persuasion (a way of convincing 
white southerners of the moral injustice of segregation, of discrimination) failed in Albany 
(Georgia) in 1961/62. So he changed the strategy adopting a non-violent pressure instead of 
trying to persuade the adversaries of the righteousness of the goals. King and SCLC sought to 
put pressure on the Federal Government by staging dramatic confrontations that publicized 
segregationist violence, because they came to believe that non- violent protests had virtually no 
effect on the thinking of white racists: its only value was its utility as a form of pressure. 
For King non-violence was an ethical imperative, a total way of life, and his commitment 
to it was absolute and consistent. However he had never made an unqualified assertion, that 
non-violent protest succeeded through moral persuasion. He admitted that, "when the under- 
privileged demand freedom, the privileged first react with bitterness and resistance", non- 
violence could not change the heart of the oppressor until the social structures that perpetuated 
injustice and false ideology had been destroyed. When King spoke of converting the oppres- 
sors, therefore, he was thinking of a long term historical process rather than immediate per- 
sonal response (56). However, like Abbas with France, his strategy was geared towards 
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forcing the pace of reforms, and thus seeking the intervention of the executive branch of the 
United States of America. When John Kennedy was elected, and worried about the narrow 
margin of his victory as well as the weakness of his political basis, he intended to combat 
discrimination through executive action rather than legislation. This executive action seemed to 
be little more than a mask for inaction. 
The relationship between King and the Kennedys was very ambiguous and ambivalent It 
reflected King's legalism and his inhibition to use any other framework but non-violence in 
order to advance the black people's cause which left him open to criticism as an accommoda- 
tionist. The Kennedys harboured strong reservations about King's leadership and political 
judgement. Their perception of him was that of an irritating problem-creator. Their attitude to 
direct action was wholly negative but their liberal stance as well as their own political fortunes 
in mind led them to cooperate with him (Washington March, finding a truce in Birmingham, 
Alabama) without trusting him completely. This was because he failed to sever completely his 
relationship with Stanley Levison (57) who was thought to be a communist sympathiser. In an 
interview recorded in 1964, Robert Kennedy admitted that: 
we (the Kennedys) never wanted to get very close to him just because of these 
contacts..... which we felt were damaging to the civil rights movement and because...... it 
also damaged us (58). 
But this relationship stemmed from and was shaped by a system that was dominated not 
only by the search for consensus between the Executive and the Legislative branches, but also 
by members of political parties and by Federal and State Governments which made it all the 
more frustrating and neutralizing. It was, and still is, also a system driven by a highly struc- 
tured and a technologically orientated economy dominated by whites, and therefore conditioned 
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black economic success or failure in terms of individualism. Hard work and self-help were the 
qualities through which black people could improve their own conditions and their standards. 
In contrast, Abbas was aware of the limits of self-endeavour which would remain superficial 
without political and legislative action to back it up. King's belief had surely made him 
approach the struggle for racial justice in a non-ideological way hoping to overcome intoler- 
ance and prejudice through pressure and by an appeal to the idealism and Christian principles 
of the white majority. He looked upon racism as a peculiarity which would eventually die. 
Then black people would be integrated into the existing structure of society. 
He failed to grasp, unlike Abbas, that even if racism disappeared black people could 
never reach parity with whites through thrift and self- help. As in Algeria, inequality had such 
deep historical roots that equality of opportunity could never lead to equality of result, for 
poverty seemed to be self-perpetuating. The economic boom of the war time and post war 
years had eliminated the mass poverty of the 1930's but the poverty that had remained was 
intractable and less influenced by the economic growth. If poverty existed it was begot by a 
system; to erase it, the system had to change to be more caring and forsake the laissez-faire 
policies that had shaped the American home economic policies, and thus be more intervention- 
ist. 
Ferhat Abbas stuck to using a purely political action with political parties as a means to 
attempt to find a peaceful political solution to the plight of Algerians. Simultaneously Martin 
Luther King kept pressurizing the American establishment through his mass non-violent action. 
In Algeria, the Second World War would put an end to the existence of the Algerian 
Popular Union (APU). It would allow Abbas to look for new horizons. The spectacle of the 
French defeat did not tempt him towards an opportunistic rally to the victor of the moment, 
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Germany, but strengthened the confidence entrusted in the Ideal France which was character- 
ised by the struggle for freedom. However the tone was changing. It was no longer that of 
revering claims but rather that of the commrade in arms who was asking for his share of 
liberty and dignity. This new perspective was expressed in a text given not only to the French 
authorities but also representatives of the American, English, Soviet and Egyptian Govern- 
ments, in order to stress the will to internationalize the Algerian problem (59). It was called 
the Manifesto of the Algerian People (Le Manifeste du Peuple Algerien) (60). This text 
expressed clearly the end of the assimilationist illusions and emphasised an autonomist ten- 
dency. This would be further articulated in an additional clause to this text written on May 26, 
1943 which expected especially at the end of the hostilities that Algeria would set up a State 
which would have its own constitution, whose elaboration would be the concern of an Algerian 
assembly elected at the univeral suffrage by all the inhabitants of Algeria (61). The deliberate 
vagueness of the text had a noticeable leaning towards autonomy. The ruthless answer of Gen- 
eral Catroux (62) expressed by the dissolution of the native section of the Delegations 
Financieres and the forced house arrest of Ferhat Abbas (63) would only contribute to the radi- 
calization of his position. Thus he would consider outdated the ordinance of March 7,1944 
which was a new version of the Blum-Violette Bill and which he had once believed to be a 
valid framework for reforms (64). 
In the United States, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act enacted in 
1965, represented great achievements not only for SCLC but the whole civil rights movement 
of the 1960's. It was the culmination of the action that started to be effective with Birming- 
ham, Alabama protests which brought the Chief Executive to speak about it though he did not 
take any executive action (65). The March on Washington and the protest in Selma (county 
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Dallas - Ala) brought national and international outcry which finally eased the passage of both 
bills. By 1965, the victory after Selma gave way to crisis not fulfilment. White domination 
remained a political reality, white prejudice a persisting fact. The movement had no effective 
programme or plan for translating the national equality of the law into the social actuality of 
shared wealth and power. For black people in the North, more than half the nation's black 
population, the reforms of 1964 and 1965 meant little. They could already vote, eat in restau- 
rants and attend integrated schools, yet segregation still circumscribed their lives. Trapped 
within the ghetto, victimized by poverty, discrimination, police brutality and political neglect, 
life often amounted to little more than a daily struggle for survival. Events in the South 
merely highlighted the scope and magnitude of this social crisis, underlining black powerless- 
ness and pushing black frustrations to the boiling point. King became strongly critical of the 
way in which the Voting Rights Act was being enforced. He urged the Federal Government to 
give the adequate federal support (66). He was also worried about the resurgence of white 
violence and intimidation in the period that saw the emergence of the Black Power concept. 
Both Ferhat Abbas and Martin Luther King grew disillusioned. Their efforts to respect 
institutional legalism were met with hostility or hollow implementation. Both grew bitter and 
more radical in their political stances and attitudes towards the dominant power. 
In Algeria, Abbas would contribute to the creation on March 14,1944 of a larger move- 
ment which would give a new impulse and a new impetus to the Algerian national movement. 
The Friends of the Manifesto and of Liberty (FML), which regrouped the Elected, the Ulema 
and the Party of the Algerian People (PAP), having as an inspiration (67) the Manifesto went 
even further because the programme of the FML claimed an autonomist Algerian Republic 
joined in federation with a restored French Republic, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist. This 
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movement would have had an important Muslim audience. The widening of their basis of 
recruitment would make the FML a true mass movement which would soon overcome the ini- 
tially federalist feature of its programme in order to adopt a more nationalist stance under the 
thrust of PAP (68). The FML, carried away by a popular landslide, broke off from the 
muffled practices of the reformists (petitions, delegations.... ) and gave the word to the street, to 
the grassroots by honouring the most spontaneous form of political expression of the masses: 
the demonstration. It was above all May 8,1945, Victory Day, which witnessed the biggest 
demonstration so far held; the Algerian population expressing its will for freedom and liberty. 
The population invaded all the cities but particularly that of Setif and other cities of the Con- 
stantine area brandishing besides the flags of the Allies that of Algeria. The violent reaction of 
the police turned these demonstrations into riots (69) full of anger and anti-French feelings. It 
was characterised by clashes between the two communities and attacks on different symbols of 
the colonial power and presence. The anarchic character of the violent flare up showed that it 
was spontaneous partly caused by the weight of six years of miserable conditions of life and 
recession imposed by the war and especially the will many times expressed of a population in 
need of freedom. The immediate consequence of the reaction of the administration and ultra- 
colonialist groups was a number of dead was between 9,000 and 45,000 (70) and a repression 
directed towards every faction and political stream of the Algerian nationalism, thus putting an 
end to the FML. The main consequence of this reaction was the revolution of 1954 (71). 
Ferhat Abbas grew disillusioned as regards a positive political gesture from the French 
establishment. He showed it by allying himself to the more radical political gathering the 
Party of the Algerian People (PAP) within the framework of a united front, the Friends of the 
Manifesto and of Liberty (FML). He came out at the end of this experience full of bitterness. 
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In this heroic struggle of our people, a gloomy page had just been written. Too much 
suffering, too much blood, too many bereavements, but no reasonable settlement hap- 
pened. The colonial citadel, the Algerian Bastille symbolised by the general government 
of Algeria, remained in tact (72). 
But despite the disenchantement, he still clung to the hope of a peaceful solution to the 
Algerian problem. 
Like Abbas, Martin Luther King grew critical of the government. At the time, the war in 
Vietnam was well under way (73). King from the beginning was opposed to it because, firstly, 
he stood by his pacifist philosophical outlook; secondly, because politically he appraised the 
Vietcong insurgency as a nationalist revolt and denounced the neo- colonialist policy of the 
United States, and thirdly, the war meant more funds going abroad rather than channeled to 
solve home social problems. At the same time the need for a new strategy became necessary 
in order to change, to transform SCLC from a regional organization into a national one. He 
decided to move North to eliminate tacit segregation. He chose Chicago and his aim was 
residential schools desegregation (74). The drive failed, even with marches and protests. It 
did not uproot Chicago's mayor Daley who managed to sign an agreement, with civil rights 
leaders, which amounted to little more than various pledges of non-discrimination. To top it 
all mayor Daley got re-elected for a four year term winning more than 4/5 of the black vote 
(75). 
By 1966, the political arena had changed. The alienation of whites, because of his stance 
on the Vietnam war (76), was reflected in the attitude of the Congress which not only rejected 
new reforms but existing reforms came under attack. It blunted the thrust of school desegrega- 
tion, reduced outlays for the war on poverty and rejected a civil rights bill that would have 
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focused on residential desegregation, jury reforms and federal protection for civil rights work- 
ers. The legislature became more conservative. SCLC found itself progressively more isolated 
as the administration turned its back and as not enough black people joined it and as it came 
under attack upon its principles by Black Power (77). 
Abbas in Algeria and King in the United States chose different strategies to mitigate their 
peoples' plight and to curb white supremacy. Abbas joined a united front with other Algerian 
political parties, among them the Party of the Algerian People, the most nationalist and radical 
party. King still believed in his non-violent, non-ideological action. Though it remained 
premordial for both Abbas and King to use the legal constitutional ways offered to them to get 
their messages across. 
In Algeria, the ordinance of August 17,1945 which granted an equal political representa- 
tion in the French Parliament (78), seemed, though limited, an interesting measure for it came 
to justify the maintaining of Abbas electoralist orientation and the choice of his lawful methods 
of action (79). It was in this perspective that he created in May 1946, the Democratic Union 
of the Algerian Manifesto (DUAM) (80). The programme of this new party claimed an auto- 
nomous republic in federation with France in order to solve the Algerian problem. A divorce 
was not contemplated and the future was carefully preserved from a definitive and radical rup- 
ture. Following this claim, he presented a draft of a constitution for an Algerian Republic in 
which he reassured the European minority by maintaining temporarily the dual electoral college 
(81). 
In this programme, there was a constancy of action of DUAM. A concern to handle with 
tact the stages, to prepare the progressive and harmonious evolutions, to avoid any brutal 
upheaval and clear cut rupture. A 
'revolution through law' must be realised, revolution here 
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meaning evolution. For the dominant concern remained a respectful lawfulness of the esta- 
blished forms and norms. The action was electoralist (82) and the objectives took into con- 
sideration the maintaining of privileged links with France and a partial autonomy; an Algerian 
Republic within the French Union. 
If this new claim marked a progress towards the autonomy, it did not question and chal- 
lenge radically the relations of domination of the colonial system. It was, however, subversive 
enough to be met with hostility by the colonial administration, fiercely attached to the status 
quo. The passing of the status of Algeria on September 20,1947 (83) gave hopes of evolution 
and alteration of the colonial regime. But once more conservatism took over on opening. The 
status would remain hollow and without any scope in practice. The electoral frauds organized 
by the administration, under the Governor Naegelen in 1948 and 1951 (84) would destroy the 
last illusions of the revolution by the law. DUAM then knew a time of crisis and so its ranks 
deserted by an increasing number of militants (85) who, disappointed, no longer expected a 
perspective to their action within an impotent party and were paralysed by its reformist pru. 
dence. 
From now on it would be a time of disillusionment and failure as well as a time for heart 
breaking revisions: 
the machine was completely blocked; legal and progressive ways were barred. The 
enthusiasm and illusions of the youth had dwindled in view of hard realities. The ency- 
clopaedists, the principles of 1789, Diderot, Saint-Just, the Marseillaise, all these had 
been swept away by the rising tide of bankers, industrialists and trust (86). 
He saw colonialism and capitalism as inseparable with a negative outcome as far as 
Algerians were concerned. The lay reformism of the Elected, the answer to the colonial 
-139- 
system of this intermediary social stratum between the bourgeoisie and the social middle class 
highly impregnated with French culture had had little concern for the social struggle and the 
framing of the most impoverished and most numerous social class. A movement of elites, it 
only opened to the masses in the agitated interlude of the FML. What happened in May 1945 
had quickly brought it back to its elitist isolation and to its difficult but respectful dialogue 
with the colonial power. 
Like Ferhat Abbas, Martin Luther King Jr was another believer in lawfulness and prevail- 
ing institutions. Progress would be achieved through dialogue, compromise and tolerance. 
Like Abbas, he stood head and shoulders above everybody else in terms of influence and pres- 
tige. The organization he led never managed to establish a separate identity from the indivi- 
dual, it was not only dominated by him, its very structure seemed to be built around him. Like 
Abbas, he was the essential driving force behind it. 
By 1966, King was going to take his movement on a more radical path in order to 
answer criticism from the Black Power faction and the indifference of the Establishement. It 
reflected a stance he was going to take for the remainder of his life. His experience in Chi- 
cago had really marked him, the white mobs in Bogan and Gage Park contradicted the notion 
that racism was a southern anachronism. He admitted that racism had deep roots in America 
(87). Only a minority of whites were genuinely committed to racial equality. It was also a 
source of economic power. 
you can't talk about ending slums without first seeing that profit must be taken out of 
slums. You are really.... getting on dangerous ground because you are messing with folk 
then. You are messing with Wall Street. You are messing with the captains of industry. 
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This he insisted was the real source of the white backlash. He echoed Abbas's words 
describing the cause of the Algerian plight and French reluctance to produce a political solution 
to the Algerian issue. A restructuring of American society was needed (88). Gross inequali- 
ties required radical solutions. It was not enough for the State to guarantee legal and political 
equality while leaving the elimination of poverty to private enterprise. Automation and tech- 
nology were erasing many jobs in the private sector, and such losses could only be made good 
by the State. The notion of work had to be redefined. The Government ought to care for the 
economic security of its citizens by guaranteeing a decent income for all. The distribution of 
wealth should be more equitable. This brought King to the core of his message, perhaps the 
United States should move towards a kind of Swedish democratic socialism (89). 
His new stance came under a call for black political power, a new strategy away from 
integration towards a moderate reformist version of Black Power. The strength of white 
racism made integration, in the short term at least, a practical impossibility. He told voter 
registration in Louisville (Kentucky): 
Our country is still a racist country ...... I am sorry to have to say to you that the vast 
majority of white Americans are racists, either consciously or unconsciously! If whites 
refuse to accept integration, Blacks had to use their block vote to gain political control of 
the cities (90). 
This was precisely what he set out to do in Cleveland. With the help of SCLC. Carl 
Stokes became the first black mayor of a black city. King as Godfrey Hodgson observed 
"came to understand the need for a degree of black separatism as a means to achieve integra- 
tion" (91). However mayors had little power and need resources, only the Federal Government 
could reconstruct the central cities on the scale required. 
Only the Federal Government could 
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guarantee a univeral living wage. 
By 1967, King was clearly assessing the situation in terms of socialism, without using the 
word itself. At the SCLC Convention in August 1967, he urged his audience to think about 
fundamental reform. 
Why are there 40 million poor people in America? When you begin to ask that question, 
you are raising questions about the economic system, about a broader distribution of 
wealth. When you ask that question, you begin to question the capitalistic economy. 
And I'm simply saying that more and more, we've got to begin to ask questions about 
the whole society. We are called upon to help the discouraged beggars in life's market 
place. But one day we must come to see that an edifice which produces beggars needs 
restructuring...... you see my friends, when you deal with this, you begin to ask questions, 
'Who owns the soil? ' you begin to ask, 'Who owns the iron ore? ' (92). 
He wondered about how capitalism could be challenged (93). After the Newark and 
Detroit riots, King's pessimism deepened. War, poverty and racism were tied together in an 
inseperable and destructive triplet. The United States became less influential abroad because of 
the war, its cities torn by rioting poor and its civilization being corrupted by an ever increasing 
materialism. People were expecting him to have answers but he had none (94). 
He was torn between his old faith in the capacity of liberal democracy for enlightened 
self-reform, and a Marxian view of the state as a regulator of equality. As a prisoner of his 
non-violent philosophy he could not, therefore, lean towards a more radical militancy and 
adopt a policy of confrontation, of direct action perhaps violence. He chose to carry on pres- 
surizing, lobbying, advocating the need for a thoroughgoing distribution of power and wealth. 
He could not forget that the Federal Government had once been his ally; he had dealt with two 
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presidents on a personal basis. Experience had taught him that the state, far from being a rigid 
monolithic structure, was actually a whole of competing forces and institutions which were 
subject to the complex and unpredictable influence of personality, faction, regionalism and 
bureaucratic self-interest. However peace, black unity and presidential favour, the conditions 
that made his victories, no longer existed. 
On April 4,1968 he was killed in Memphis (Tennessee). His death facilitated the pas- 
sage of the 1968 Civil Rights Act which included the fair housing proposal of the failed 1966 
Civil Rights Bill. His death provoked riots in Chicago, Baltimore, Washington and elsewhere 
that left at least 39 people dead. For many black people, his death proved beyond doubt the 
futility of non-violence. 
The great victory of Martin Luther King and SCLC was the Voting Rights Act. They 
had changed the South's political arena. Between 1964 and 1975, the black electorate 
increased from 2 million to 3.8 million. In Alabama black voter registration increased from 
19.3 to 53.1 percent; in Georgia, from 27.4 to 56.3 percent; and in Mississippi from 6.7 to 
67.4 percent. By 1976 black voter registration across the South was 63.1 percent, only 5 per- 
centage points below the white level. The number of black elected officials had climbed to 
1.913. Some striking political changes occurred in cities and parts of the Black Belt. The elec- 
tion of a black sherif in Lowndes County and a black mayor in Birmingham (Ala) testified the 
success of the civil rights movement (95). 
However that success was limited. Black people were still under- represented. The Vot- 
ing Rights Act survived the attempts to weaken its scope. Whites ceaselessly tried to minimize 
the impact of the black vote. Although the barriers to black registration have all but disap- 
peared, new obstacles to fair representation appeared in the form of, at large cities and county 
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elections, multi-member legislative districts, gerrymandered political boundaries. Methods used 
to nullify or dilute the black vote. Only section five of the Voting Rights Act, enforced by a 
federal judiciary, inhibits the widespread adoption of such discriminatory devices. Legislation 
can not however put an end to individual prejudice. White racism continues to restrict black 
representation, by and large, to areas with black majorities or near majorities (96). 
The natural political realignement SCLC was envisaging did not happen. Although the 
racist demagogy that characterised the political discourse during the era of the civil rights 
movement has largely vanished, the egalitarian rhetoric which succeeded, did not imply any 
commitment to radical or even to mildly redistributionist economic policies. The non- segrega- 
tionist Democrats rarely campaigned as liberals, sometimes they made coded gestures to racist 
sentiments, and usually avoided the kind of policies that might alienate their conservative white 
supporters. Whites might have conceded defeat on the segregation issue "but... underlying the 
region's newly found racial moderation was a continuing commitment to social conservatism" 
(97). 
Black advances in the economic sphere have been limited and fragile. Non-white work- 
ers it is true increased their median income from 66 percent of the white average in 1960 to 79 
percent in 1978. But the high rate of irregular and part-time employment meant that the 
overall income of the non-white workers remained on average 64 percent of the white level. 
Black unemployment remained 15 percent of the white level little improvement over the rate 
obtained 20 years earlier. Over a third of all black families were still classified as poor. Rely- 
ing on wage jobs and federal income support programmes most black people remain on the 
margin of the economy (98). Concentrated in the declining central cities black people are ill- 
placed to take advantage of new employment opportunities. The impact of the Civil Rights 
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Act has been negligible. In Chicago, for example, the number of jobs increased by 71 percent 
during the 1960's, on the other hand total employment fell by 12 percent although the city 
diminished by only 5 percent. The high-sounding promise of the Chicago summit agreement 
turned out to be worthless. Faced with 1969 Court Order requiring it to locate new public 
housing outside the ghetto, the Chicago Housing Authority refused any accommodation at all 
until another court compelled it to do so (99). 
Black people destroyed elements of segregation only to discover what black people in the 
North already knew: that laws against discrimination represented an unfulfilled promise, not a 
representation of facts. In abolishing segregated public accommodations, the civil rights move- 
ment affected institutions which were relatively peripheral to the American socio-economic 
order and to the fundamental condition of life of black people (100). Desegregation and the 
right to vote did not put an end to discrimination or eliminate poverty, however they did put 
down two of the main pillars of white supremacy. The destruction of institutionalised white 
supremacy was the essential pre-condition for black advancement. The tenacity with which 
whites defended these symbols of domination suggested that in attacking segregation the civil 
rights movement struck at the heart of the system. 
Martin Luther King, like Abbas, believed that integration would generate assimilation and 
therefore would sanctify black people with their particularity accepted as part of the Nation. 
Like Abbas too he came gradually to understand that legalism was not necessarily a synonym 
of right. The complex web of power and domination does not disentangle easily and quickly. 
Like a hydra, it has many heads. Caught between on the one hand his beliefs, and frustrating 
lethargic institutions and on the other hand a deep rooted racism, he drifted towards a more 
radical stance without believing 
in radical actions. He once said, "if I lose the fight then SCLC 
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would die anyway" (101). SCLC won its battle against white supremacy but lost the stuggle 
for economic justice. Its decline stems from the fact that SCLC did not create the movement 
of the 1960's it just guided it and shaped it. 
Mass non-violent action started in Montgomery. It could have been an isolated event 
with no significant results. But it had a nationwide impact and as a consequence Martin Luther 
King and SCLC grew in stature and fame. But SCLC had actually achieved more than a little 
when on February 1,1960 four students from the North Carolina Agricultural and Technical 
College, sat down at the lunch counter of Woolworth's in Greensboro (North Carolina), and 
asked for a cup of coffee. They were refused it and stayed there. These four paved the way 
for many more who wanted to break down any restriction that surrounded their lives and espe- 
cially the 'sin' to eat together with white people in public. They were the direct instigators of 
the creation of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). They were a genera- 
tion of educated black people aware of the complete contradiction between the ideal and the 
practice of liberal America. They acted by taking initiative aiming mainly at organizing black 
people in order to help them do something for themselves by using the American institutions. 
When on January 2,1965 King arrived in Selma to announce that he was going to lead a voter 
registration there SNCC was annoyed with his choice because they had been operating a voter 
registration project in Selma since early 1963. King was going to pick up the fruits SNCC had 
worked hard for and then walk off with the glory and the fund-raising potential that SNCC 
workers felt they had earned. 
Not only was SNCC active but the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) was too. As 
well as the Freedom Rides or journey of reconciliation, they waged the first 'jail in' in Tal- 
lahassee (Florida) (102). They established chapters in the most segregated counties of the 
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Deep-South. The organization mounted a series of non-violent protests, pickets and activities in 
dozens of rural areas. Consequently, its membership grew (103). 
SCLC lacked the activism that characterised both SNCC and CORE. It was not an elitist 
organization such as SNCC nor a mass one such as CORE. It was an organization with a 
loose membership that did not have the human depth and number that transcended. It failed, 
while facing concrete practice to bring about new theoretical positions as the idealism of the 
early years wore off. 
The equality-identity policy failed to achieve the aim it set: assimilation on equal terms. 
It might have altered the effects of domination, however it did not put an end to it for both in 
Algeria and the United States its instigators, reared by the virtues and principles of France and 
the United Stated, believed that by appealing to the essential ideology inspiring both countries 
(liberty, fraternity, equality, pursuit of happiness, democracy..... ) they would achieve their aim. 
However it is one thing to open up avenues of political advancements it is another to convert 
them into economic parity. Both Abbas and Martin Luther King identified the main source 
that caused the suffering of their people, economic powerlessness, and both failed in tackling 
it. 
Legalism appeared in the constant effort to address claims to French and the United 
States Governments, in the hope for using the structures created by them, in the claim to be 
part of them, and in the request that a greater place through stages should be allocated to 
Algerians and black people. This process of 'gnawing' besides the fact that it did not com- 
pletely question and challenge the essence of the system of exploitation put these legalists in a 
permanent situation of 'beggars' and left them subject to the good will of the oppressor. Their 
ability to take initiative, especially vis-a-vis the prevailing establishment was tamed by a 
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discipline to respect the institutional framework and a belief in rejecting radical means. They 
strived to show that absolute equality represented a worthy ideal. They tried to achieve the 
identity by being faithful to lawfulness. These efforts were valid but in order to be potent 
through dialogue and negotiations they made necessary the need for human material and politi- 
cal power. Parity could not be achieved this way. A reconversion to a tougher action would 
not succeed because political gatherings which held more radical stances were better implanted 
and structured in a more rational way such as the Ulemas, PAP in Algeria, The Nation of 
Islam, Malcolm X's organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU), the Black Panthers in the 
United States. Abbas wrote that the choice of legalism seemed the shortest path (104). The 
path, which was narrow, was closing in and other individuals and organizations were trying to 
open up new ones. The era of equality through assimilation seemed remote. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE RIGHT TO DIFFERENCE AND EQUALITY 
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In order to balance the assimilationist political stream, another alternative was voiced: its 
essence was disparity. The right to be different was the core of a message that would bring 
pride, sense of worth and raised consciousness to both Algerians and Afro-Americans as indi- 
viduals and as peoples. Both the Association of Ulema (clergy) in Algeria and Malcolm X in 
the United States of America represented this political stream. Both threatened the existent 
establishments, and both wanted to reform people from within so that they could be more 
aware, more united and thus less vulnerable while facing the world outside. Their field of 
work, first of all, was the Algerian and Afro-American communities. Their hope was to 
improve the social, political and economic conditions of all. 
However, after the assassination of Malcolm X and the frustration engendered from the 
limited success of the assimilationist policy, Malcolm X legacy was reassessed. This political 
stream took a more distinctive radical shape. It was epitomized by the Black Panther Party 
because they intoduced a programme that not only claimed to be within the confines of Mal- 
colm X's policy but attempted to broaden it by advocating a socialist revolution based on a 
class struggle that would alter every facet of American society and institutions. 
THE ASSOCIATION OF ULEMA AND MALCOLM X 
Both the Association of Ulema in Algeria and Malcolm X in the United States were more 
preoccupied with religious reforms at the beginning. Later, they would overcome their spiri- 
tual preoccupations to turn to more contingent claims and would end joining gatherings of a 
purely political nature in the case of the association of the Ulema or attempting to join and 
establish frameworks for political purposes in the case of Malcolm X. 
The Association of Ulema was created officially on May 5,1931 in Algiers (1). The 
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movement was first of all linked to changes occurring within a Muslim communtiy whose faith 
remained strong and deep. However, this faith at that particular period, did not provide the 
necessary means that would rehabilitate and lift up Algerians in the face of colonization. The 
crisis of Algerian society which clung to its religious values, was leading to suffocation. The 
need for renewal, for hope of transformation remained acute, but did not happen. An external 
catalyst would help the realisation of these diffused desires: the Nahda. This was a large 
movement of cultural renaissance in the Middle East (2). The aim was to relate to this refor- 
mist movement in order not to appear solitary and extremist. It helped broaden the base since 
Algeria would be put in a larger context, bound to the other Muslims to whom the return to 
orthodoxy had always been a major duty. 
However, the creation in 1931 of an Association of Ulema followed a general awakening 
of the entire country. Between 1919 -and 1931, this awakening permeated all aspects of 
Algerian life. In the economic field, the competition was to keep pace with the French; as 
regards intellectual activites, the circles, associations of charities and newspapers were created. 
In education, literature developed in both languages, French and Arabic and Algerians emmi- 
grated with the aim of carrying on their studies; as far as religion was concerned, free mosques 
(in other words non- controlled by the French authorities) were created thanks to public dona- 
tions of cities and villages. These events interpreted by the Ulema, made the creation of their 
association necessary and possible, for the nation was finally ready (3). 
Malcolm was first known in the political arena as a member of a black nationalist organ- 
ization, the Nation of Islam. He was born Malcolm Little in Omaha, Nebraska on May 19, 
1925. His family was large. His father, a Baptist Preacher and a follower of Marcus Garvey, 
was killed by racist whites when Malcolm X was only six years old. The murder of his father, 
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the care of eight children, the harassment of the state welfare department as well as the inabil- 
ity to provide for the family finally led to the confinement of his mother in a mental hospital, 
where she remained for 26 years. The family disintegrated and the children became wards of 
the state. At fifteen he dropped out of school although he ranked third highest in his class, and 
moved to Boston to live with an older half- sister. There he worked at shining shoes, clearing 
tables in restaurants, and as a clerk in hotels. He then moved to New York where he became a 
waiter in a night club in Harlem. There he learned such activities of the underworld as gam- 
bling, dealing in drugs, and burglary (4). 
Later he returned to Boston, continued his activities and was finally arrested for burglary 
and sentenced to 10 years in prison at the age of 20. While there he read a large number of 
books from the prison library. He became acquainted with the Nation of Islam and 
corresponded with its spiritual leader, Elijah Muhammad. Released from prison at the age of 
27 in 1952, Malcolm went to Chicago to meet Elijah. He was accepted into the movement and 
after a brief training period was assigned as assistant minister of a mosque in Detroit. From 
there he was sent to organize a mosque in Philadelphia, and in 1954 he became minister of the 
mosque of Harlem. In this position, Malcolm X was the instigator for the increase in member- 
ship and prominence of the Nation of Islam. 
At the beginning the movement inspired by the Association of Ulemas in Algeria affected 
a small minority of educated youths from a well-off traditional background. It was a kind of a 
Muslim and Arab educated replica of the young Algerians westernized and 'francized', who 
were using another path and affecting another social stratum with other means. The associa- 
tion was the cultural and religious matching piece of these 'elected'. There was an apparent 
rivalry over means between them but a deep unity as regards the aim: raising native Algerian 
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consciousness, activism so that a move next towards indigenous culture and control would be 
generated. 
Between 1930 and 1965 (5) integration was the dominant ethos of the black movement in 
the United States. Throughout the era of civil rights movement, Malcolm X had the courage to 
oppose the powerful coalition of integrationist leaders. He did not command a broadly based 
organization or the respect of poor blacks in the rural South. He wanted on one hand to 
restore pride and worth to individuals and on the other hand he wanted to publicise the idea 
that a new political consensus had to be created within the American institutions in order to set 
a less alienating and a more egalitarian society in which freedom, justice and equality would be 
truly achieved. 
Both Malcolm X and the Association of Ulema dealt with three areas: religion, society 
and politics; politics not overtly asserted. Under the leadership and inspiration of a man who 
would never cease to be the leader, then the symbol, of the movement: Abdulhamid Ben Badis. 
In 1925, two newspapers El Mounta Quid then later Ech-Chihab helped a small team, most of 
them formed in foreign Islamic universities, to get known as well as to spread their ideas. The 
paradox was that it was among a bourgeois and a perfectly 'assimilated' milieu - his brother 
was a barrister, his father Mustapha Ben Badis a delegue financier and both were the direct 
products of the colonial system - that the religious reformism found its leader. Moreover, it 
was the money of a neo-assimilated bourgeoisie which helped to start the crusade. 
The objective of the association was defined as "to draw up and reform the Algerian 
Arab people from the religious, literary, national and scientific point of view" (6). They set 
two main objectives: the first, an immdediate one, was to regroup all Algerian educated forces 
under the banner of social reform. 
The second, a long term one, would focus on revealing 
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again the Algerian ethos to the Algerian people. 
They concentrated on fighting the Islam of marabout, a distorted interpretation of Islam, 
which was the ally of the French administration. They started challenging the influence of 
maraboutism within the Algerian opinion even though the rustic milieu was, at the beginning, 
less sensitive to their ideas because it was tied up to traditional rites and institutions. The nest 
of maraboutism, religious order, lost nearly a third of their membership between the two world 
wars and saw the number of their sympathizers diminishing in great proportion (7). The 
economic difficulties which impoverished the countryside favoured the transfer of the popula- 
tion, around 1920's to 1930's. The scope of the proletarian immigration to France, the contact 
with the western civilization damaged indirectly the prestige of marabouts and chorfa (8) 
whose social and religious function became less and less evident. 
The movement, which waged a war against a Koranic interpretation it judged abusive, 
backwards and conservative, seemed therefore more preoccupied by theology and morale than 
action. Clergymen, more disposed to challenge doctrine, wanted to bring back to texts their 
initial meaning then wanted to make them more profitable to the modem society. They could 
only find a confessional group but not a political force. In reality, the principle of reformism 
itself led to the temporal. The anti-maraboutic struggle, already could not remain at the level 
of a theoretical debate on religion. It implied conflict and conquest of an audience and 
influences on opinions. The preachers could no longer content themselves with the only 
power of the verb. They had to participate actively to the restructuring of a society without 
which the remoulding of spirits could not occur. 
They were aware that they were the example, 
that they had to overcome the religious framework and create a structure able to confer 
effectiveness and power. The shift towards the prosaic and the concrete was not due to the 
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simple mutation of clergymen suddenly turned to the most active proselytism. 
In the logic of the action undertaken, the Ulemas firstly wanted to favour the formation of 
an Arab educated and Muslim elite. The Muslim elite would be helpful if they had to claim 
the independence of the cult and if they commended the freedom of teaching of the Arabic 
language because these were the only fields, ministers of cult, teachers, responsible for the 
Islamic relgion, where the jobs could be available for the educated in Arabic. 
Secondly, there was a need to convert the Algerian population to reformism. There was 
an urge to show that there was a tradition of orthodoxy driven by a fighting spirit and there 
was a desire to present religion as an example of intervention and commitment. People had to 
be convinced not only from the point of view of dogma but also that of reality. If it was a 
question of giving back to Islam its purity, strengthening solidarity between believers, restoring 
a forgotten or tasteless culture and to bring dignity; slogans were insufficient to achieve them. 
The general need to reconsider the question ended up in a general attempt at materialistic reno- 
vation. For the reformist, it seemed that the only possibility for a true change was situated 
more in daily life than in the changes of the religious dogma. The reformation of religious 
precepts or the modification of Islamic legislation, prompted by an adaptation to the present, 
might have generated blame and condemnation from the great defenders of the tradition and 
therefore run the risk of being cut off from the masses which were not ready yet to follow 
extreme paths and which were still close to religious orders (9). But, diffusing the Arab- 
Islamic culture, teaching Arabic, offered less risks and more satisfaction at the same time. The 
Ulemas began to appear as advocates of the incongruity of the western and oriental systems. 
The progress of the Ulemas was confined by not wanting or unable to go beyond a minimal 
reinterpretation of texts. 
They had come to concentrate their efforts on the practical field. The 
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necessity to get involved in politics became logical and it was the power of the French state 
they were going to confront. Between these two barriers their intervention could only find a 
relative freedom in the field of religious practice; condemnation of obscurentism, superstitions, 
heathenism, maraboutic mysticism. The association they constituted, the doctrine they ela- 
borated and the results they obtained were closely linked to this phenomenon. 
The aggressive and pragmatic approach of Islam to white racism originally appealed to 
Malcolm X when he initially became converted whilst in prison. Within the organization he 
sought to achieve freedom, justice and equality by means of separating the Nation of Islam 
from the oppressive white society in which its adherents found themselves. 
Black Muslim dogma not only touched the lives of individual blacks, but placed the 
responsibility for community welfare on them as well. Of course, within Elijah Muhammad's 
system the community was narrowly defined as those within the gates of the Nation. The 
entire Muslim programmme revolved around the goal of separation; blacks should divorce 
themselves from white society because Allah's justice demands the destruction of the irredeem- 
able white man. Recognizing that Allah's judgement presented its adherents with an economic, 
social and political outline to make life a more tolerable experience in the meantime. 
Thus, during his Muslim period Malcolm looked to the inevitable hand of Allah to des- 
troy the present, unjust world and to establish a world of freedom, justice and equality. Speak- 
ing to a group gathered at Adam Clayton Powell's Abyssinian Baptiste church in June 1963, 
Malcolm declared; 
God will not rest until he has used his religion to establish one world -a universal - one 
world brotherhood. But in order to set up his righteous world God must first bring down 
this wicked white world. The black revolution against the injustices of the white is all 
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part of God's divine plan. God must destroy the world of slavery and evil in order to 
establish a world based upon freedom, justice and equality (10). 
Here, he was voicing the eschatological essence of the Black Muslim Credo. 
Black Muslims were vigorously involved in attempting to improve their conditions. Deli- 
berately making his followers conscious of their identity as black men and as followers of a 
black religion. Muhammad laboured to help his adherents regain their dignity as they 
redeemed themselves from the economic deprivation and moral laxity of the larger community. 
Malcolm preached that America'a black men floundered because they have been stripped 
of their sense of dignity and had emerged as a "homemade, handmade, brainwashed race that 
no longer even knew its true family names" (11). Acknowledging a new thinking among 
blacks Malcolm declared what the Black Muslims were teaching was making black people, for 
the first time, proud to be black. Even more important, the so-called Negro wanted to know 
more about black culture and his heritage (12). 
In his last official address as a black Muslim, Malcolm maintained strict Muslim Ortho- 
doxy on this point. "The honorable Elijah Muhammed has restored our cultural roots, our 
racial identity, our racial pride and our racial confidence. He has given us an incentive and 
energy to stand on our own feet and walk for ourselves" (13). Restored dignity was reserved 
for those who could accept the truth of Muhammed's teaching and became citizens of the 
Nation of Islam. 
Like the Association of the Ulemas in Algeria under French colonization, he believed that 
it was necessary to study one's history to create an understanding of one's place in society in 
order to restore dignity and "make the black man cease to be ashamed of himself' (14). Like 
the Ulemas Malcolm X gradually became aware that the solution to the plight of America's 
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blacks could no longer or not only be confined to religious, moral and psychological redemp- 
tion or even just to social and economic actions for by retreating from a larger and hostile 
world into a select and sustaining community, Muslims gained an illusion of being full 
members of society and of being in control of their individual and collective destinies. The 
Muslim way was that of withdrawal, and for Malcolm it became less and less valid and suit- 
able to the era and to the political environment. 
For 12 years Malcolm had surrendered himself to the teaching of Elijah Muhammad, 
however, in 1963, tensions began to mount within the Black Muslim movement. Malcolm 
wanted the Nation to become active in the political realm; Muhammad demanded political 
lethargy and advised patience. Black Muslims political concerns were for the most eschatolog- 
ical in nature. As a result Muhammed commanded political disengagement. Officially, Mal- 
colm X was silenced because he made a political comment as regards the death of President J. 
F. Kennedy, his famous, 'Chickens have come home to roost'. But in fact it was the Muslim 
political impotence and the mounting criticism that they could reprove but not repair which 
gradually led Malcolm to distance himself and became independent. 
In February 1963, Muhammed allowed the movements leaders to announce the possibility 
of Muslim voting (15). Malcolm reporting the announcement with such a precise phraseology 
betokened the tension which certainly existed within the movement at this point. As a result of 
the announcement, talk of registering to vote, running black candidates and voting was briefly 
part of the Muslim modus operandi. However, when a number of politically independent 
black leaders announced the formation of the Freedom Now Party about six months after 
Muhammad's announcement the idea was quickly scrapped. 
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Malcolm was, by now, unwilling to be easily frightened into submission. While still a 
Muslim, Malcolm asked author Louis Lomax; 
"How could there be any difference between the Messenger and Me? I am his slave, his 
servant, his son". 
But the difference was there for Malcolm continued; 
But I will tell you this: The Messenger has seen God. He was with Allah and was given 
divine patience with the devil (white man). He is willing to wait for Allah to deal with 
this devil. Well, sir, the rest of us Black Muslims have not seen God, we don't have this 
gift of divine patience with the devil. The younger Black Muslims want to see some 
action (16). 
While the imprudent remark was unquestionably the occasion for Malcolm's departure, 
the deep disagreement over the Muslim policy of nonengagement was undoubtedly the chief 
factor. Dealing with this issue at a Press Conference in Ghana in May 1964, Malcolm related 
that the disagreement between Elijah Muhammad and himself had been in terms of political 
involvement in the extra-religious struggle for human dignity (17). 
Both Malcolm X and the Association of the Ulema came to see that there would be no 
true rehabilitation and change unless alterations occurred in daily life of both peoples. The fate 
of the latter was held within a political framework that was oppresive, alienating and above all 
exploitative. The religious, theological and moral 
boundaries had to be overcome. 
So Islam represented a solid foundation of support for political views. It provided the 
necessary scriptural endorsement for acts of political nature. The essence of Islam is both tem- 
poral or earthly and mystic or heavenly. 
The pragmatic side of the religion required vigorous 
and assertive political views. Thus, 
in the case of Malcolm X the two dimensions of 
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Malcolm's stance related to each other. When the split occurred Malcolm's Islamic conviction 
remained as strong as before even though the emphasis changed. In the post split period Mal- 
colm reappraised his conviction. The search for a true, orthodox Islamic awareness indicated 
that the role of his religious conviction became even more crucial and dominant as an influence 
in the last year. The true Islamic outlook shaped his entire new political perspectives and 
brought about a new and individual philosophy, one which was neither dogmatic nor neutraliz- 
ing but capable of flexibility and expansion in scope. 
Perhaps the single most radically changed aspect of his message was his rejection of 
inverse racism. This transformation in attitude towards whites was directly the result of the 
embracement of true Islam while in Mecca. The uniform worship of Allah, regardless of skin 
colour, as well as the mutual respect shown among the diverse followers on the pilgrimage had 
a profound impact on his thinking. His past alienated mind gradually found a new awareness 
and a new clarity of vision, as Wolfenstein wrote: 
.. 
in Cairo he was free for the first time from the constant tension of struggling to deter- 
mine himself against an imposed racial identity. Stating the point positively, in the Mid- 
dle East he believed he was free to be a member of a religious community in which race 
had no exchange value, nor currency. The fact that he was black gave him a distinctive 
character but no position of either superiority or inferiority in relation to any other 
Muslim. Islam was for Malcolm already beginning to lose its racial quality to take on a 
human one instead, while at the same time his self-conception was being deracialized 
(18). 
This new experience led to a new perception on how to organize and cultivate black 
consciousness. 
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Thus Malcolm saw the importance of the autonomy of the religious and political spheres 
as regards the organizational structures. He, then, set the Muslim Mosque Incorporated a 
structure which dealt with religion and the organization of Afro-American Unity. On the con- 
trary, the Association of Ulema did not dissociate the religion from politics. The vehicle they 
chose for their message could not be the mosque that the colonial power controlled (19), but an 
outgrowth of their religious policy, the school or medersa that would ensure an education 
where the language and religion, Arabic and Islam, would become the means of a cultural 
reassertion and moral reform of great importance. They were competing with the French 
scheme to develop French and Western culture. In their eyes, this was a threat to the Algerian 
ethos. However, the drive profited from the fact that the need for education was no longer 
satisfied by French schools because at that time the Delegations Financieres refused to allocate 
the necessary funds to build them (20). 
The core of this difference in structure lay in the fact that the message of the orthodox 
Islam preached by the Ulemas was concerned with life on earth and life after death for Islam 
has been and still is one of the cornerstones of the Algerian ethos. Also for circumstancial 
reasons, they wanted to appear a non-political organization in order to avoid any friction with 
the colonial power. They wanted to emphasise more the religious and socio-cultural side. 
Malcolm, however, was aware since a minister in the Nation of Islam that the strict code of the 
Muslims had driven away many people who were interested in much of the message of the 
Black Muslims (21). By creating a political organization separate from that of religion, he set 
up a structure which would allow people to 
join without being hampered or alienated by a reli- 
gious code. It would help him to 
broaden and increase the membership of its organization. 
The announcement of the creation of schools or medersa and the multiplication of 
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speeches in private mosques and meetings by the Ulemas in Algeria, brushed aside any illusion 
the French had. Nationalism could be well hidden behind such enterprise of resurrection of 
Islamic and Arab values, therefore Algerians. It would be better to rely on these defenders of 
the established order, these preachers of Islam; fate philosophy, and defend the passive mara- 
bouts than those keepers or guardians of Islam challenge. The interdiction of their newspapers, 
and an appeal to the state council was rejected however showed to the reformists the limits of 
their action and the de facto fragile barrier between religious and political fields. In the Ule- 
mas point of view, the restoration of the Algerian personality was a cultural work. For the 
administration, the same undertaking appeared as a danger even in the short term. The out- 
come of this first confrontation, in 1933, had undoubtedly shifted the fight on the political field 
itself. It coincided with an attempt made by a delegation of elected Muslims to get a message 
on the Algerian issue to the French Government. It was a complete failure and as a protest 
they resigned from the Delegations Financieres and started to lean towards the Ulemas. 
Unity was of great concern to both'the Ulemas and Malcolm X and a pragmatic end to 
aim for. They were both aware that unity brought strength and could be an important factor in 
dealing with opponents in terms of lobbying, mobilizing the masses, influencing the decision 
making process in central gouvernment. 
In Algeria the collusion between the Federation of the Elected and the Ulemas started in 
1934 and led to the first Algerian Muslim Congress (1936 - 1938). It was on May 15,1936 in 
Constantine that the Sheikh Ben Badis, President of the Ulemas and Doctor Bendjelloul, 
President of the Federation of the Elected of Constantine, created a committee and called upon 
the preparation for an Algerian Muslim Congress (22), which was held in Algiers on June 7, 
1936. The genesis of this Congress knew two successive stages, a long debate between the 
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different movements to reach a common declaration. This long search led to the suggestion 
made by Ben Badis in the newspaper La Defense on January 3,1936 to gather "all the 
representatives of the Muslim opinion in order to determine the political status of the Algerian 
Muslim" (23). However, the suggestion of Ben Badis was not immediately accepted for it 
dealt with an important issue upon which the Muslim forces disagreed. If the Algerian Federa- 
tion of the French Communist Party, responded favourably to the proposal (24), the leaders of 
the Federation of the Muslim Elected of Algeria were overtly opposed to it for a fundamental 
reason; in their opinion, the Algerian Nation did not exist; so the struggle would focus not on 
the political status of the Muslim Algerian, but on the political and economic emancipation 
through assimilation. That was the core of the well known leading article of Ferhat Abbas that 
appeared in L'Entente on February 23,1936 (25). To this declaration, Ben Badis would 
answer a month later in Ech-Chi hab of April 1936: 
We have studied History and the present and we have noticed that the Muslim nation is 
formed and exists as are 'formed all the nations on earth. This nation has its history, it 
has its linguistic and religious unity.... we say that this Algerian nation is not France, can 
not be France and does not want to be France, it is impossible to be France, even if it 
wants assimilation (26). 
This fundamental controversy between Ben Badis and a leader of the Elected was parallel 
to a controversy as fundamental between European political leaders during the elections of 
April and May 1936 on the political status of the Muslim Algerians. The proposal of Viollette 
of July 1931 which wanted to extend French citizenship to different categories of Algerians 
without the loss of their personal status (27), was matched by the proposal of a right-wing per- 
sonality M. P. Guernut, which wanted to create native MP's elected by the electoral college of 
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non-naturalized natives (28). This dispute reached Algeria itself: to the proposal of Viollette, 
the Senator Duroux opposed another which called upon a referendum on the creation of a 
native electoral college formed by Muslims who would have obtained French citizenship 
without the loss of their personal status, this special electoral college would designate three 
senators and ten MP's. They would have the same rights and the same prerogatives enjoyed 
by the three senators and the ten MP's elected by the European electoral college. Thus, the 
fusion in a unique electoral college would be made of Muslims who became French citizens 
without the loss of their personal status and of Europeans. This was Viollette's proposal. 
Duroux opposed the creation of a Muslim second college that would retain its personal status. 
The issue of the political status of the Algerian Muslim became political at the legislative elec- 
tions of the Spring of 1936 which at the end were won by the left-wing coalition, the Front 
Populaire. 
This victory of the Front Populaire produced a good impression on the Ulema and gen- 
erated great hopes for, "the equal repartition of wealth, the introduction of happy reforms...... in 
colonies and to realise the wishes of their inhabitants" (29). This victory of the Front Popu. 
laire and the feelings it generated explained the rally of the Federation of the Elected to the 
proposal of the leader of the Association of the Ulema. The success of the Front Populaire 
meant also that the Duroux proposal was definitively cast aside because of its segregationists 
provisions. Thus the victory of the left and the Duroux project led the different Muslim organ- 
izations to rally round the proposal of Ben Badis which was to hold a congress in order to 
define common claims that would focus on the political status of the Algerian Muslim. 
The entrance of the association into the field of politics was obvious in the way it gath- 
ered an important audience and 
it talked on behalf of the Muslim population as a whole. Ini- 
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tiator to the call on Algerian political figures, head of one of the most important factions, insti- 
gator of the dominant religious inspiration, main driving force behing the creation of the 
Muslim Congress in 1936, Ben Badis seemed to be the true victor of this gathering. As the 
Front Populaire modified the climate of the relationship by appearing to be able to listen, the 
Ulemas participated in the delegation of the Congress that was going to France to present the 
final claims of this kind of Algerian Front. By this they overcame largely the boundaries they 
had originally set. They were active in promoting unity but also in bringing about proposals 
and suggestions to alter the issue of colonial domination faced by Algerians. They were 
prepared to put aside their religious preoccupations in order to lead a process through which 
they gained the respect, credit and hearts of the Algerian people. 
Later in his life Malcolm X pledged to work with anyone seriously wanting to alter the 
miserable conditions that existed for the oppressed of the world. But the Malcolm of the 
1950's and the early 1960's could not have made such a statement. During the Muslim period 
of his life, Malcolm rejected all those who sought solutions outside the Nation of Islam. Black 
people who worked with whites were vehemently assailed as traitors since whites possessed 
neither the ability nor the desire to eliminate injustice and as a matter of course their schemes 
were diabolically contrived to exploit and to oppress all non-whites (30). 
The kind of unity Malcolm sought during his Muslim period was a unity within the struc- 
ture of the Nation of Islam, and under the leadership of Elijah Muhammed. He was convinced 
that there simply was no solution to the race problem that did not include Muhammed. Mal- 
colm recognized Muhammed as America's only black leader who could speak authoritatively 
for the dissatisfied black masses (31). 
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However, soon after the split and before the Mecca trip, Malcolm was advising coopera- 
tion among black leaders. Recognizing the impact of a united front, Malcolm councelled: 
Whether we are Christians or Muslims or nationalists or agnositics or atheists, we must 
first learn to forget our differences. If we have differences, let us differ in the closet; 
when we come out in front let us not have to argue about it until we get finished arguing 
with the man (32). 
Since black people shared common problems Malcolm felt that a bond of black unity was 
already present. All black people had suffered oppression at the hand of the white man (33). 
Yet, even with the shared experience of suffering they too often found themselves opposing 
each other. Malcolm urged blacks to see each other with new eyes. "We have to see each 
other as brothers and sisters. We have to come together with warmth so we can develop unity 
and harmony that is necessary to get this problem solved ourselves" (34). The sincerity of his 
belief was best shown in a letter he wrote on August 29,1964 in Cairo, to leaders who 
differed from him. He reminded his followers that struggle must never be against each other. 
Even though differences over minor issues would develop, the fight must always be geared 
towards the defeat of the common enemy (35). 
However, some black leaders unlike the persuasive uniting action of those who belonged 
to the Ulemas, were unwilling to enter the closet with Malcolm to discuss their differences. 
He felt that they were more concerned about maintaining establishment support than in dealing 
effectively with the immediate plight of all black men. Because of these integrationists, 
Malcolm's stand on black unity did not mean that he would denounce leaders and organiza- 
tions if he felt they were delaying a solution. For instance, he was convinced that the depen- 
dency of many civil rights groups on white finance prohibited their involvement in activities 
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not approved by the power structure. As they did not to alienate their white support, they did 
not want to be compromised by his personality. The power structure only granted tokens that 
would benefit a few selected, trusted Negroes, all the while the problems of the masses 
remained essentially unsolved (36). 
- Malcolm X found himself isolated. Unlike the Ulemas in Algeria, who were not seeking 
a complete social and political transformation as they were hoping for equal representation and 
the maintainance of Algerian identity; Malcolm saw the struggle as much broader than one 
over token achievements. He felt that too many black leaders had been working to integrate 
lunch counters while the issue was complete and immediate recognition of black people as 
human beings (37). When he was advised to be patient, Malcolm responded that, "delayed 
solution is no solution" (38). There was a fundamental ideological division between Malcolm 
X and most leaders; he opposed integration within the prevailing American structure for it 
would not bring about justice, freedom and equality to the black people. The system was too 
rigid, unable to accept change but above all it was racist. 
When someone sticks a knife in my back nine inches and then pulls it out six inches they 
have not done me any favor. And if they pull that knife which they stuck in my back all 
the way out they still have not done any favor. They should not have stabbed me in the 
back in the first place (39). 
Dedicated to the black man's cause, he praised leaders who sincerely sought solutions by 
various means. On the other hand those leaders who compromised black aspirations so that 
they would remain responsible in the eyes of the expoitative power structure deserved to be 
exposed and discredited. The unity that he sought was among those leaders and organizations 
that would secure meaningful results for all the black people (40), and he reserved for himself 
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the prerogative of serving as an interpreter of 'meaningful results'. He was seeking a con- 
sensus that would bring together all leaders of different movements regardless of political or 
religious persuasions, like the Ulemas did in Algeria, but that also could bring political weight 
to the black community in order to be an active protagonist in the political arena and having a 
say on the political agenda so that the social and economic plight of black people could be 
mitigated. But Malcolm died too soon to be able to present a uniting platform. 
Malcolm also became gradually aware that the particular condition of black people as a 
minority required working with white people who were willing to seek a more egalitarian 
society. On the contrary the Ulemas were not concerned at all with the white community in 
Algeria for they were well aware of the majority factor of the Algerian people and therefore 
their emphasis would be on an inter-Algerian relationship to bring about unity. 
Malcolm's approach to the white man was shaped by two experiences: the first in 1948 
when he accepted the teaching of the Nation of Islam's Elijah Muhammed, and the second 
when he discovered true Islam during his 1964 pilgrimage to Mecca. As a Black Muslim Mal. 
colm learned and preached that the white man was a devil who by nature was incapable of 
doing good. Contrasted with the black Muslim doctrine was the insight Malcolm gained at 
Mecca where he learned that a man's skin colour does not dictate attitudes. From this point on 
he made his judgements not on the basis of a man's skin, but on the basis of his action. 
I.... began that white man as commonly used, means complexion only secondarily, pri- 
marily it desribes attitudes and actions towards the black man, and towards all other non- 
white men. But in the Muslim world, I had seen that men with white complexions were 
more genuinely brotherly than any one else had ever been. That.... was the start of a radi- 
cal alteration in my whole outlook about white men (41). 
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He refused to subscribe to racism. He had adjusted his thinking to the point where he 
believed in the humanity of whites. Of course he demanded that their humanity be proved by 
human attitudes and action towards negroes (42). He was convinced that if "white Americans 
could accept the Oneness of God, then perhaps, too, they could accept in reality the oneness of 
Man and cease to measure and hinder and harm others in terms of their difference in colour" 
(43). 
The pragmatic earnestness of Malcolm's new position regarding whites can be tested by 
his attitude towards working with those whites who also sought to correct the injustices and 
inequities in American society. He felt that whites could be more effective working within the 
white community to break down the racial prejudice there (44). He feared that whites who 
worked with black groups too often intimidated blacks by their presence and used their money 
to take organizations down blind alleys (45). Malcolm did not refuse white assistance. But it 
was his intention to use the sincerity of whites in the most effective way. "We will respect 
completely our white co-workers", he said, "They will deserve every credit" (46). 
Not only black militants contested Malcolm's new position, they thought he was temper- 
ing his stand (47), but also many whites and moderate blacks continued to assail him as a 
racist. During the black Muslim period these charges were undeniably true. However, begin- 
ning with the Mecca experience, and throughout the remainder of his life. Malcolm no longer 
categorically denounced the white man, because he was white. True he continued to denounce 
the oppressive actions of some white Americans, and as a result he was mistakenly cast as a 
racist to his death. "I am not a racist. I am not condemning whites for being whites .... I con- 
demn what whites collectively have done to our people collectively" (48). Malcolm died 
believing and practicing the concept that irrespective of colour men should be recognized as 
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human beings. One month before his death he attested that he believed in a society in which 
people can live together in equality as fulfilled human beings (49). Malcolm however did not 
manage to escape the straight jacket label, a racist, an extremist, a trouble-maker. This was 
initiated by his past as a black Muslim and what he then stood for in the political arena. 
Politically, the Association of the Ulemas' reformism and nationalist ideas became 
synonyms for many to the extent that this element took over and that many young fans forgot 
the religious aspect because of the prominence of the political one: the forms of the member- 
ship brought out ambiguities. Those who expected the movement would oppose not only the 
administrative apparatus of the French state but the entire system of colonial domination, were 
expecting too much. In any case their instrument was inadequate. It was not the fact that the 
association was unable to overcome its religious vocation but that it did not want to be 
transformed into a true political party. France would never have let the association develop as 
it did with the active North African Star then the Party of the Algerian People (PAP) which 
found both the reformists and the assimilationists too conservative. 
The members of the Association were partisans of a gradually acquired independence 
therefore they were ready to negotiate. They threatened French interest in Algeria in the long 
run. The last three years which preceded the Second World War illustrated the limits of the 
political doctrine of the movement, it was too close to religion and opposed to extreme solu- 
tions. The death of Ben Badis in 1940, the confinement of his successor El Ibrahimi to house 
arrest between 1940 and 1942, the war in Europe, all these factors did not help the association 
to play the role it was destined to. It was after 1945 especially during the united action of the 
Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty (FML) that the association would intervene again on the 
political scene. 
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The political doctrine incorporated themes linked to nationalism and those dealing with 
spiritual stances. Ben Badis knew how to make of the concept of the Umma, the whole 
Islamic nation, a catalyst for a fatherland, Watan, solely Algerian. In this perception of the 
nation, nationalism was "a language, a relgion, a glory and a memory of those statesmen and 
that of those men of science who were models of perfection" (50). Culture, religion, race, 
language, common past and Algerian fatherland mingled within the mystic body of the Islamic 
Urrang. Their message did not foresee any revolution. The well known answer to Ferhat 
Abbas who a little hastily asserted "France is me" (51) spoke about religious, linguistic, histor- 
ical and cultural unity of the Algerian nation. It went further by asserting that what made 
Algeria was completely opposed to what made France. "The Islamic Algerian nation.... has a 
fatherland of its own, Algeria with its actual well known borders and which is administerd by 
the General Governor appointed by the French Government" (52). This made impossible the 
fusion within the nation of the colonizer. Thus from a conception and interpretation of past 
implication Ben Badis had extracted a political dynamic. 
However, the main political contribution lay in a distinction which seemed fundamental. 
In an article published in 1938, Ben Badis differentiated between what he called the ethnic 
nationality and the political nationality. Drawing the outlines of a basic nationality, Ben Badis 
distinguished between the institutions, or political system (muquawimat), and the socio-cultural 
features (mumaizat). The mother tongue, religion, historical memories and the conscience of 
the community represented the infrastructure on which were grafted the political, social and 
civil rights. These various rights, mobile superstructural elements, could have a temporary 
character to an extent to be controlled or 
imposed by another nation. France could continue to 
rule Algeria. It might lead to a union 
founded on mutual sincerity and confidence. But if 
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France sought to destroy the foundations of the Algerian nation two solutions might be 
envisaged by Algerians, either to disappear of to secede (53). In order to avoid the realisation 
of the first solution the association had to work hard to prop up the foundations of the ethnic 
nationality. 
This plan, which could not be interpreted as a compromise, sought to preserve and build 
on essential Algerian qualities. A minority of people should be allowed to acquire the 
sufficient knowledge in order to spread it. In its turn it would help renovate the practices and 
beliefs of Islam (54). Independence would be at the end of a long road and was understood as 
a distant outcome of a progressive evolution free of violence. The conditions of its realization 
would only emerge after the reactivation of fundamental values. Colonial domination would be 
challenged in the short term only if it opposed or limited the teaching of Arabic, supported the 
guardians of a reactionary Islam and imposed its history as the only possible one. The Algeri- 
ans could love their fatherland without hating that of others, being useful to their country 
without harming other nations (55). They wished to acquire the means to liberate progres- 
sively. The urge to rush things might result in running the risk of being assimilated by the 
French. The programme of the Association of Ulemas consisted in gradually increasing the 
capacities of Algerian resistance therefore reducing French absorbtion. For Ben Badis and his 
friends, it was a matter of giving freedom to a people which did not feel the need to be free 
from maraboutism and colonialism yet needed liberation through being made aware of its reli- 
gion, language and history. 
The Ulemas were resisting any complete integration by providing Algerians with the 
means that would void or neutralize the action of both the assimilationists and the French 
authorities thus setting the foundation for an action that would stress the distinctive characteris- 
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tics of Algerians. Though they were in favour of a gradual political emancipation even within 
a French framework. They were making sure that even within this context Algerians would 
keep their national ethos. 
Like the Ulemas, Malcolm X resisted complete integration. As a black Muslim who 
espoused the Nation of Islam's credo during the twelve years he was aligned with Elijah 
Muhammed, Malcolm ardently advocated complete racial separation as the only solution for 
America's black people. Allah would destroy the deteriorating white society because it was 
overrun with immorality. The only salvation for black people caught up in the white society 
was not to integrate into it but to separate from it by moving to a land where black people 
could reform themselves, lift up their moral standards and try to live godly (56). 
Such a statement often brought charges that the Muslim purpose was the same as that of 
the white supremacist except that its advocates were black. But Malcolm saw a meaningful 
distinction between separation and integration. Answering one critic, Malcolm pointed out 
that; "the honorable Elijah Muhammed teaches us that segregation is done voluntarily by two 
people". To make sure that this point was clear, Malcolm added, "in the so-called Negro com- 
munity everything is controlled by outsiders. We live in a regulated or segregated community. 
We are not for segregation, that is done to you by someone else, when you are separated, you 
do that yourself' (57). 
Marcus Garvey's experience and his own imprisonment had taught Muhammed that the 
line between sedition and religious licence was tenuous at best. As a result of this realization 
the movement left much of the actual procedure for effecting separation to Allah so that the 
immediate Muslim intentions were generally unclear. Presented in less than a concrete form, 
Muslim ideas appeared as a suggested mode by which America " could atone for its racial 
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crimes and not as a specific demand. The last time Malcolm addressed an audience in an 
official black Muslim capacity he dealt with the separation issue in a typical canonical way; 
the race problem can easier be solved just by sending these 22 million ex-slaves back 
to our homeland.... But this government should provide the transportation, plus everything 
else we need to get started again in our country ...... enough to last us for 20 to 25 years 
until we can become independent people in our country. 
If this white government is afraid to let her 22 million ex-slaves go back..... then Amer- 
ica must set aside some separate territory here in the Western hemisphere, where the two 
races can live apart from each other. 
The size of the territory can be judged according to our population. If our people 
population number is 1/7 of America's total population, then give us in of this land. 
We want no integration with this wicked race that enslaved us. We want complete 
separation from this race of devils. 
If the government of America truly repents of its sins against our people, and atones 
by giving us our true share, only then can America saved herself. 
But America waits for Almighty God himself to step in and force her into a just settle- 
ment, God will take this entire continent away from her, and she will cease to exist as a 
nation. Her own Christian scriptures warn her that when God comes he can give the 
"entire kingdom to whomever he will... " which only means that the God of Justice on 
Judgement Day can give this entire continent to whomever he will. 
White America, wake up and take heed, before it is too late! (58). 
George Breituran, Malcolm's most ardent polemist, tried to convince his readers that Mal- 
colm was undergoing a shift in his separationist conception even prior to the December speech 
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from which the above lengthy quotation was taken (59). It was true, by Malcolm's own con- 
fession that from early 1963 he concerned himself less and less with religious or moral 
matters. But this was not, as Breitman would have us believe a result of a seminal concept 
that Malcolm would eventually label as black nationalism. Breitmali does not seem to give full 
weight to Malcolm's statement in the Autobiography when he explained that he did not 
emphasize religious matters because his faith had been shaken in the morality of Elijah 
Muhammed himself (60). Attempting to prove this point, Breitman refers to a November 10 
speech, 1963 which was undeniably political and even contained the term black nationalism, 
but that speech was not devoid of religious overtones (61). 
A few days after announcing his break with Muhammed, Malcolm called a press confer- 
ence to explain fully the new directions he was taking. One of the issues he dealt with in a 
prepared statement was the issue of separation. Malcolm labelled complete separation as "the 
best solution" but also noted that it was "a long range programme" (62). Interviewed the fol- 
lowing week, Malcolm reaffirmed his beliefs in Muhammed's doctrine of separation as 'the 
only' solution. Later in the same interview, however, he indicated the necessity for an 
immediate programme. He stated that his long range political philosophy was to migrate back 
to Africa; but his short range programme involved a plan which would enable black people to 
live a better life immediately (63). "If the (American) government does not let us go back to 
Africa, then we should have a black nation here" (64). 
However, by the beginning of the second week in April a noticeable shift was taking 
place. At a socialist rally in New York city Malcolm downgraded separation as only one of 
many plans used by various groups to obtain freedom. He warned his listeners not to confuse 
methods such as separation with the ultimate objectives of freedom, justice, equality and 
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human dignity (65). 
A month later another marked change had taken place. The return to Africa was no 
longer seen as a physical migration but rather as the development of philosophical and cultural 
bonds within the structure of Pan-Africanism (66). At the second OAAU rally, on July 5, 
1964 Malcolm shared his reasoning with his audience. African leaders who Malcolm had 
visited while on the continent assured him that Afro-Americans would be welcome to return. 
But those who are politically mature over there say that we would be wise to play a role 
at this time right here..... But what we should do should, be for the good of the 
whole.... Any time you restore cultural and spiritual bonds between our people here and 
our people there, then we begin to work together. Right now, someone is needed right 
here to do some work for the whole (67). 
Returning from a second trip to Africa in late November 1964, Malcolm stopped in Paris 
to address a meeting sponsored by La Presence Africaine, an African cultural organization. 
Following his lecture, he answered questions from the audience. One questioner asked if Mal- 
colm could conceive an independent black state within the United States as a solution to the 
black man's struggle. "No", Malcolm said but quickly he added, "I wouldn't say no. No. I 
wouldn't close the door to any solution". 
Concluding his answer Malcolm indicated that he was not returning to his former separa- 
tist position; rather the first part of his answer was simply in keeping with his desire for 
change by any means necessary (a doctrine to be discussed later). So Malcolm concluded, 
"But we are not separationists, nor are we integrationists. We're human beings" (68). 
Malcolm's position on separation was perhaps more clearly stated later in the session 
when he was asked about the possibility of an 
Afro- American migration. He responded in the 
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Garvey tradition by speaking of the potential impact of a spiritual Back to Africa' move- 
ment. Black Americans should first migrate to Africa culturally. He believed that a psycho- 
logical migration would give black people needed bonds with the mother continent. These 
bonds would strengthen the position of black people in America by placing them in a position 
to influence government policies (69). 
Voicing a similar sentiment in the United States, Malcolm told a New York audience 
gathered in Harlem on December 12,1964 that when he spoke of migration he meant it in the 
sense of Afro-American and African reaching out to each other in reciprocal support. "Our 
mutual understanding and our mutual effort towards a mutual objective will bring mutual 
benefit to the African as well as the Afro-American" (70). This concept, baring the slightest 
imprest of the black Muslim dogma of separation, was carried by Malcolm to his grave. 
Like the Ulemas, Malcolm was seeking to focus on the cultural roots so that black people 
in the United States would reassess the political situation and would break the psychological 
alienation through an emphasis on the bonds that existed between black people in the United 
States and black people in Africa thus breaking their isolation and boosting their pride. But, 
he was 
aware of the numerical disadvantage of the black people. The minority factor led him 
to overcome the religious preoccupation and to reassess the condition and status of black peo- 
ple. So he decided to concentrate on a short term solution in any field. Not only was he, like 
the Ulemas, concerned by the socio-cultural area, he was also interested by the economic ele- 
ment. His stance was broader. 
As has been noted following his rift with Muhammed, Malcolm labelled complete separa- 
tion as a remote solution to the struggle of the black man in America. It was, however to the 
short range solution that Malcolm now tirelessly devoted his energies, a solution to which he 
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attached the label 'black nationalism'. 
Almost a month before Muhammed silenced him ostensibly about his remark about 
President Kennedy's assassination, the popular minister addressed a black audience in Detroit. 
The major thrust of his speech dealt with revolutionary resistance against colonial powers by 
oppressed people around the world. In a passing way Malcolm used the words 'nationalism' 
and 'black nationalism' by tying them to the idea of revolution (71). But Malcolm's concept 
as set on November 10,1963 can not be construed as an early reference to the programme of 
black nationalism which Malcolm formerly announced on March 12,1964 when he discussed 
the break between himself and his revered religious leader. 
In his March 12 statement, Malcolm did little more than note that his concerns now 
would involve political, economic and social philosophy which he called black nationalism. 
His only attempts to explain this philosophy was in relation to politics. In the political realm, 
black nationalism meant that black people must control the politics and politicians within their 
own communities. They must no longer follow orders from outside. Black people must 
organize and defeat all politicians who were guided by racist interest (72). This would hardly 
be interpreted as revolutionary dogma; Malcolm said nothing more about black nationalism that 
day. 
A more complete explanation of black nationalism was presented on March 18,1964 
when Malcolm addressed the Leverett House Forum at Harvard. Introducing the topic, he 
affirmed his belief that the religion of Islam combined with black nationalism was all black 
people needed to solve their dilemma. 
Explaining that his concept of black nationalism was sub-divided into three major con- 
cerns, he enumerated these as political, economic and social. '"The political 
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philosophy ...... teaches us that the 
black man should control the politics of his own community", 
he explained, "Once the political control of the so-called Negro community is in the hands of 
the so-called Negroes then it is possible for us to do something towards correcting the evils 
and the ills that exist here" (73). 
Shifting his attention to economic philosophy, Malcolm pointed out that black people 
needed to be aware of the role that the science of economics played in the life of a community. 
The fundamentals of the science of economics were these: 
Whenever you take the money out of the neighbourhood, spend it in another neighbour- 
hood, the neighbourhood in which you spend it gets richer and richer and the neighbour- 
hood from which you take it gets poorer and poorer, this creates a ghetto!. If black peo- 
ple understood the importance of establishing black business, employment opportunities 
would be created. Then, in the spirit of a typical 'shoestring economics' Malcolm pro- 
claimed, "Whenever the majority of our people begin to think along such lines you'll find 
that we ourselves can best solve our problems" (74). 
Malcolm's social philosophy, in the first place, was aimed at the elimination of the "vices 
and evils in (black) society". Its second concern was the restoration of the black man's dignity 
by stressing his cultural roots (75). 
Almost as suddenly as it had appeared, the term black nationalism disappeared from 
Malcolm's description of his programme. Although the press continued to call Malcolm a 
black nationalist he personally rejected the term in May, 1964. In Paris later that same year 
Malcolm told a crowd in the Salle de la Mutualite that he would not even pretend to have pol- 
itical, economic or social solutions to problems as difficult as those facing American blacks. 
Then he asserted his willingness to experiment with any means which would terminate the 
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injustices suffered by his people (76). 
The first circularised statement discussing Malcolm's rejection of the specific terminology 
appeared in a posthumously published interview. On January 18,1965 Malcolm responded to 
Jack Barnes and Barry Sheppard's question, "How do you define black nationalism? ". "I used 
to define black nationalism as the idea that the black man should control the economy of the 
community, the politics of his community and so forth". However, conversation with the 
Algerian ambassador to Ghana in May, 1964 had caused Malcolm to reappraise his position. 
Malcolm accepted the ambassador as a revolutionary in his own right, but he was a white 
revolutionary. The discussion showed that the doctrine of black nationalism "was alienating 
people who were true revolutionaries dedicated to overturning the system of exploitation that 
exists on this earth by any means necessary". Then he pointed out to his interviewers that he 
had not been using the term for some time. "But I still would be hard pressed to give a 
specific definition to the overall philosophy which I think is necessary for the liberation of the 
black people in this country" (77). 
Malcolm's concern for the plight of the American black did not change. Rather he began 
to seek a kind of restructured society which would effectively relieve oppression on an interna- 
tional scale. Identical problems plagued or still plague people all over the world; however 
Malcolm believed that the exploited were becoming aware that to defeat the oppressor they 
must unite, recognising that there was, indeed, only one problem (78). A few days before his 
death Malcolm stated his concern for change this way; "I care about all people, but especially 
about black people" (79). The affirmation indicated Malcolm's ultimate position more accu- 
rately than any succinct current label could possibly do. The dream of separation was remote. 
By reassessing his stance, Malcolm shifted to the system arena and he was prepared, at the end 
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like the Ulemas to work within the lines defined by the oppressor to solve his peoples plight. 
His stance became moderate and reformist rather than separationist. 
The strategy he chose to convey his new stance was; "Any Means Necessary". The 
nebulous nature of the slogan lent itself to many interpretations by both black and white mili- 
tants, supremacists, conservatives and moderates. Among differing people it created diverse 
feelings of sympathy, awe, fear and revulsion. Malcolm was aware of the force of the slogan. 
Like his rhetoric, it was deliberately designed; "Different audiences have different rhythms. 
You have to be able to play them", he admitted late in his life (80). 
In the fall of 1963 when Malcolm, still a black Muslim, was visiting Philadelphia, he told 
a radio' audience that the black people in America must join together to do whatever necessary 
to secure recognition and respect. He then noted that Patrick Henry and the Hungarian Free- 
dom Fighters in 1956 saw issue in terms of liberty or death. "They are respected in American 
society precisely because they took their stands and were willing to die for the causes they 
believed in" (81). 
From this point on Malcolm began telling nearly every audience he met that he believed 
in securing freedom by any means necessary. "I am for freedom, by whatever means neces- 
sary. Any time we know that any unjust conditions exist, and it is illegal and unjust, we will 
strike at it by any means necessary" (82). "Whenever our people are ready to take any kind of 
action necessary to get results they'll get results" (83). 
It was true that one of the methods of securing freedom that Malcolm included in 'any 
means' was that of standing a literal battle against the oppressive forces of injustice. Should 
events require the formation of a 
black nationalist army, he told an audience in Cleveland's 
Cory Methodist Church on April 3,1964, "well do just that" (84). In the post Mecca period 
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of his life Malcolm expressed his feeling that when the government failed to protect black peo- 
ple from attack by whites, those black people should use arms, when necessary, to protect 
themselves (85). Malcolm's response to charges that his statements were in support of 
violence will be discussed later in this chapter. Suffice to say that Malcolm was not advocat- 
ing violence except as a response to the violence of others. Had Malcolm's over zealous cri- 
tics looked more completely at what the black leader had in mind when he used the term 'by 
any means necessary', their fears would have consequently been allayed. 
In April 1964, Malcolm stressed his willingness to become involved with anybody, any. 
where, anytime and in any manner that was designed "to eliminate the political, economic and 
social evils that were affecting the people of our community" (86). Following his return from 
his first 1964 African tour Malcolm addressed a symposium organized by the militant labour 
forum of New York. He affirmed that he would work with anyone or any group whose 
genuine interests were in taking the necessary steps to bring an end to the injustices to which 
black people were subjected (87). Shortly before his death, Malcolm again addressed the 
forum, his position was essentially unchanged. Asserting that he was dedicated to action, Mal- 
colm professed his commitment to any intelligently directed and designed plan to correct the 
unjust conditions in America (88). 
When he advised his supporters to mount their struggle by any means necessary that 
would be helpful, Malcolm had in mind three specific strategies. First he consistently advo- 
cated self-defence as a technique in securing freedom, justice and equality. A second basic 
strategy was a self-improvement plan. A third 'means necessary' included Malcolm's advo- 
cacy of unity among blacks and his reaction to whites. Like the Ulema he wanted to increase 
black people's capacity to resist physically and especially mentally. However his strategies 
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were different from that of the Association of Ulemas which never preached self-defence for 
the simplest reason that though racism existed in Algeria under French colonization, it never 
reached the same scope as in the United States as far as black people were concerned. 
Another reason was that they did not want to alienate the colonial power so that they could act 
without being hampered by it. More importantly their religion and their middle class roots 
prevented them from doing so. 
Once Malcolm reassessed his stance as regards separation, he came to the conclusion that 
collaborative action ought to be taken to solve the immediate plight of black people. Unlike 
the Ulemas who set their priorities on the socio-cultural and covertly political areas in order to 
define the political status of Algerians, thinking that the economic condition would eventually 
improve as an outcome of the change in the political situation. Malcolm thought that some- 
thing should be done to solve the economic problem faced by black people without waiting for 
a political solution. Consequently he was looking for a united front with his other fellow black 
leaders to find a consensus so that in the long run a broader political action would set the 
scene to solve the difficult economic situation of the poor black people. 
Malcolm's approach to self-defence based on his belief that the first law of nature was 
self-preservation (89), was essentially unchanged throughout his life. In April 1957, Malcolm 
assured New York city police officials that the Black Muslims did not seek out trouble. In 
fact, he asserted that Muslims are specifically taught to avoid trouble. But he also indicated 
that Muslim dogma taught that when one found a cause that was worth involvement he should 
be ready to die, then and there, to secure the desired end (90). Three months before his assas- 
sination Malcolm reiterated similar sentiments at an OAAU rally. He admonished his listeners 
to let the oppressor know that they were peaceful and law abiding also letting him be aware 
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that they were ready to respond in kind. 
As an independent, Malcolm was not hesitant to describe some specific strategies. Self- 
defence meant "returning bullet for bullet with racist organizations like the Klan" (91). In fact, 
he declared on numerous occasions, it was criminal to teach a man to accept brutality without 
doing something to defend himself (92), attacking the Civil Rights non-violent philosophy. 
Malcolm's strong position on self-defence allowed him no time for the advocates of non- 
violence. He graphically explained why. "If you think I'll bleed non-violently, you will be 
sticking me the rest of my life. But if I tell you Ill fight back, there will be less blood. I am 
for reciprocal bleeding" (93). Later Malcolm made a significant delineation when he explained 
that such a philosophy did not mean that one must be violent, simply that he refused to be 
non-violent (94). In practical terms, his concept of self-defence meant that he would work 
with everyone who was genuinely interested in tackling the problem head on, non-violently as 
long as the enemy was non-violent, but violent when the enemy got violent (95). He further 
explained his concept, first he supported the right of each man to defend his person and pro- 
perty. Second, he said that his followers should not be initiators of violence. Third, when his 
followers were confronted with violence, they should respond in kind. Summing this up in the 
last days of his life, he said that the ultimate question was not one of violence versus non- 
violence, but one of self- defence versus masochism (96). 
In spite of Malcolm's regular proclamations that he was only the champion of self- 
defence perhaps the most consistent charge hurled at him was that he was advocating violence. 
He was not a partisan of indiscriminate violence. He was so labelled because his critics were 
taking his statements out of context, his penchant for rhetoric and he played games injudi- 
ciously perhaps with the media by granting eagerly sought sensationalism. He was so labelled 
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because he believed that a better world would only be built when men agreed to use extreme 
methods to correct extreme problems (97). 
Perhaps Malcolm's style was more acceptable to white America as long as he was speak- 
ing as a black Muslim where action of any kind prescribed by Elijah Muhammed was prohi- 
bited. Because Muhammed forbade any community involvement, turgid and pretentious chal- 
lenges to the system could not easily get out of hand as well as the fact they did not appear to 
be a large scale threat to the white community. After the break, however, Malcolm's talk of 
refusing to play according to rules laid down by the white power structure was coupled with 
the advantage of a more widely supported black base than he had had as a Muslim. This 
undoubtedly amplified the threat sensed by the establishment. 
Malcolm's interest was in political and social well-being, and he made individual self- 
improvement as one of the ends of his black nationalism. The Black Muslim approach to 
economic rehabilitation was simplistically stated. If the Negro would direct his money into 
black business enterprises, employment opportunities would be created which in turn would 
lead to economic security within his own community (98). In accordance with this teaching, 
Black Muslims were by and large flourishing hard working people who determinedly sought 
economic stability for themselves, their families and the Muslim community. 
As a leader without a party, Malcolm did not outline specifically the details of his 
economic policy. He explained shortly after the split with Muhammed, however, that black 
people should be given an understanding of the role economics plays in any community. 
Speaking to a basically white audience, he said that black people needed to learn where to 
spend their money and spending money 
in black-owned enterprises, new employment oppor- 
tunities would be created without relying on hostile white society to provide jobs. Grasping 
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this truth, black people would sort out their own economic problems (99). This sounded much 
like the Malcolm of Black Muslim days. The main difference was that Black Muslims were 
actively involved in economic problem-solving. The Muslim Mosque and the organization of 
Afro-American Unity (OAAU) provided verbal encouragement but not practical means by 
which people could grasp a solution. Sometimes Malcolm summed up his desire for economic 
change in terms he called "pure and simple", black people should control the economy of their 
own community (100). Was Malcolm leading his movement in the direction of socialism in 
his last year? (101). 
When pressed to state the kind of economic system he sought following his first 1964 
African trip, he admitted that he did not know, adding that he was 'flexible'. He did at the 
same time indicate his feelings that it was not accidental that those countries which were 
emerging from colonial rule were turning toward socialism (102). This can not be taken to 
imply, however, that Malcolm himself was moving toward socialism. If anything, it should be 
viewed as an index to dichotomous manner 
in which Malcolm perceived politics. 
Malcolm's political thought was becoming anti-capitalistic even though, following his 
second 1964 African journey, he professed that he did not have a solution to the complicated 
problem that faced black Americans (103). Certainly, he berated capitalism as a vulturistic, 
bloodsucking system based on racism, and he believed that it could not survive in a world of 
newly emerging nations (104). 
A few days before his assassination, he professed on a Canadian television broadcast on 
January 19,1965; 
I believe that there will ultimately be a clash between the oppressed and those that do the 
oppressing. I believe that there will be a clash between those who want freedom, justice 
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and equality for everyone and those who want to continue the systems of exploitation 
(105). 
Much in the context of these comments indicated that Malcolm was and- capitalist. The 
conflict which he saw on the horizon was chiefly racial in nature. True, Malcolm recognized 
that the oppressed were economically exploited, but he ascribed their condition primarily to 
racial rather than economic causes. The core of Malcolm's final speeches and interviews was 
that he was thinking in more spiritual than material terms. This explained the vagueness with 
which he dealt with the economic problem. If Malcolm found some approaches of socialism 
acceptable, it was because he was searching for any means necessary to secure his goals, but it 
was not because he was a socialist. 
He could only conceive two ways to achieve meaningful change; the ballot or the bullet. 
He was willing to try the ballot. Like the Ulemas, he came to think that the best way to bring 
about change was by using the immediate political system. To assist the black man to be an 
effective voter at the ballot box and a participant in his own political destiny, Malcolm spoke 
consistently of three major approaches: black people, first of all, needed to gain an understand- 
ing of the role of the political power. Secondly, they needed grasp the concept of the balance 
of power which they could hold 
in their hands. Finally, they needed to develop a programme 
designed to secure the greatest advantage from their vote -a programme of positive neutrality 
which was a three-fold programme; register to vote, gain an understanding of politics and 
reserve political action for the situation at 
hand (106). By registering to vote, black people 
were amassing the strength to make themselves a power 
in elections and they would be placed 
in a position to take the kind of action that would be more beneficial to them (107). Black 
people needed to learn what the political system should produce and know how the politician 
-187- 
should serve his constituents. With such an understanding, he was sure his followers would be 
then in a better position to exert pressure on politicians whose methods exploited black people 
perpetuating conditions of poverty and crime. He stressed that a very important part of learn- 
ing the game of politics was learning how to think for one's self. 
Having registered and having gained some understanding of politics, the third step black 
people should take in positive neutrality was reserving political action for the situation at hand. 
He often likened registration to loading a gun. Just because one had loaded a gun did not 
mean, however, that it should be fired indiscriminately, be sure first of the target. "Don't 
waste bullets at a target that's out of reach, you do not throw ballots just to be throwing bal- 
lots" (108). He believed that black people needed to form a collective body of registered 
voters who were committed to no party or to no man until they knew what positive results they 
would receive from that commitment. 
With these steps toward positive neutrality as a guide for effective political action, Mal- 
colm asserted that he was on his way in 1965 to active involvement in making the political 
system produce for black men. Whether black people would create new political machinery or 
take over the existing one, they would be involved in all levels of politics from 1965 onwards 
(109). 
At the same time as Malcolm was trying to alter black man's condition in America by 
using the electoral process, he was also active on the international scene. Both he and the Ule- 
mas used the international arena in different ways for different purposes. The large cultural 
movement in the Middle East; Nahda, was used to make of Islam not only the ultimate moral 
sanctuary but an enterprising and aggressive religion and 
in so doing it assumed a rationalism 
that appeared almost revolutionary. Its desire for a return to its own sources and for purity of 
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dogma concealed an acceptance of the modern world. Admittedly the reformist doctrine 
echoed Pan-Islamic themes and looked towards the East: it was derived nonetheless from a 
North African authenticity. This new Islam, standing for rationality, moderate progress inhesi- 
tantly condemned the old-fashioned, time serving Islam which, while upholding rituals had 
taken to soliciting for stipends. For Imarabouts and leaders of religious orders, once cham- 
pions of resistance, had come to considered as political traitors, social reactionaries and allies 
of the administration. Thus, the Ulemas stood for a certain form of civilization. The spiritual 
and moral reforms they were seeking could not be dissociated from the temporal conditions the 
Algerian people were putting up with. 
Malcolm was, on the contrary, looking for a catalyst at the international level. Half of 
his fifty weeks of independence were spent in Africa and were devoted to internationalising the 
struggle of American black people. Simply stated, internationalising the conflict meant lifting 
the black man's struggle from one of begging for civil rights within the American system to 
one of demanding human rights in the context of world opinion. The difference he saw 
between the civil rights and the human rights was the basis for his platform via intemationali- 
sation. At the basis of the entire concept, of course, was the premise that the civil rights battle 
could never be more than a domestic struggle while the battle for the human rights involved, 
by its very nature, all humanity (110). When one sought civil rights one could do so only 
within the jurisdiction of the United States, but when one sought human rights one had the 
opportunity of involving the entire world. One who demanded civil rights was asking for only 
those rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution; one who demanded human rights 
was asking for those universal rights accorded to Man because he is a Man (111). One who 
sought his civil rights was trying to prove that he was an American; one who sought his 
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human rights was seeking recognition as a human being (112). Not only must human rights 
precede civil rights, but civil rights would automatically follow once human rights were 
guaranteed (113). Of undeniable importance in the struggle for human rights was the recogni- 
tion by the oppressed that taken as a whole they comprised a majority. Numerical odds alone, 
therefore, favoured the successful procurement of their demands. By involving the entire 
world in the struggle for human rights the lie long used by the oppressor that the odds were 
staked against the oppressed was exposed (114). 
Disregarding the complexity of the problem, he believed that the very fact that the 
oppressed of the world shared a common problem in being deprived of their human rights 
could lead to unity (115). By uniting to secure these rights the tyranised would place the 
tyrant in a position where his only course would be to yield to demands. He made it clear 
when a Harvard student suggested to him that the Negro was a numerical disadvantage. Mal- 
colm dismissed the question by pointing out that it was the white man who was at a numerical 
disadvantage on earth as compared to dark people (116). By viewing the problem from a per- 
spective of strength, oppressed people would gain the additional advantage of a new and 
powerful mental attitude. Psychologically, the benefits were great for by realising that black 
people were the majority on earth their confidence would be higher and their resolution 
stronger (117). 
Malcolm was convinced that the United Nations was the most effective channel to lift the 
black people's struggle from the area of civil rights to human rights. Basing charges on the 
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, Malcolm wanted to indict America for continued 
criminal acts against its black citizens. 
Therefore the first order was to work with those leaders 
and organizations that were interested 
in developing a programme to bring the racial issue in 
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front of the United Nations since it was beyond the capacity of the United States government 
to find a solution to it (118). The common racial bond that American black people shared with 
the Africans could serve as a strategic link in bringing the issue to the United Nations (119). 
However, when the organization of African Unity met in July 1964, and despite the fact 
that Malcolm was recognized as an official observer, the conference did pass a moderated reso- 
lution of 'Racial Discrimination in the United States of America'. The resolution did not go 
further than to take cognisance of the recently passed Civil Rights Act while at the same time 
it registered its disturbance caused by the regular manifestation of racial bigotry and oppression 
against American black people (120). Soon after his return to the United States, Malcolm 
spoke of his efforts on the African continent. It was his opinion that the greatest accomplish- 
ment made in 1964 in the struggle of the black man was the linking of the American racial 
problem with the drive for African independence. Thereby the black struggle had been made 
an international issue (121). 
The use of the political arena by the Association of the Ulemas, in other words the cul- 
tural movement Nahda in the Islamic world, crystallised the disparity that existed between the 
roots of Algerians and those of the French. It helped them by the same token to reveal and 
stress the differences especially cultural ones between the two communities in order to fight the 
absorption of Algerians by French culture. It was a disguised struggle against assimilation. 
Malcolm on the other hand used the political scene to break the isolation in which black people 
in America were. The aim was two-fold, psychological and political. It would help black peo- 
ple in America to relate to other peoples in Africa that shared or were still sharing an oppres- 
sive system in order to break off their isolation. He attempted to force the United States 
government to speed up its intervention and be more constructive by trying to find 'true and 
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real' solutions other than battling to accept black people within the political, social, cultural 
and economic mainstreams. Integration was not going to bring true emancipation and equality 
if the political, social, cultural and economic pillars were still in the monopoly of the white 
majority. In real terms, Malcolm was asking for political power. A power that would help 
shape and bring new meanings to many black American lives. The Association of the Ulemas 
used the momentum of the international scene for cultural revival to boost the Algerians capa- 
city to resist either as individuals or as a people. Malcolm used it for survival by trying to 
overcome the alienating American context in order to internationalise the issue of black people 
in America. His aim was to secure at least power that would ensure decent lives for the 
majority of black people. 
So the contributions of these two movements were important. In Algeria and after the 
independence the Algiers Charter acknowledged certain merit and credit to the Association of 
Ulemas, "The Association had led a fierce fight to free the people from religious 
superstitions...... and had exhibited worthy efforts to help cultural renaissance.... its leader Ben 
Badis contributed effectively to the assertion of the national idea" (122). However the Ulemas 
were also criticised for their endorsement of the policy of assimilation. It was a harsh assess- 
ment. The support for the programme of the Muslim Congress lasted only two years from 
1936 to 1938 and the Ulemas were not the only initiators. Ben Badis less than anybody else 
could not be qualified as an integrationist. He who made the Muslim scouts sang that, "those 
who seek assimilation seek an impossible thing" (123). He excommunicated the naturalised 
(124) and waged a war against late assimilationists. Some officials even forgot to mention the 
association among the nationalist movement ranking 
its members among the reformists 
"without any organic consistency" (125). 
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However some others defended the inverse point of view. Jacques Duchemin in his His- 
toire Du Front De Liberation Nationale (FLN) described the association as one of the roots of 
NFL besides the Messalist and Abbasian forms and spoke of Ben Badis and El Madani as 
among the fathers of the Algerian revolution (126). Rene Delisle went further. According to 
him, 
the action of the Ulemas has a considerable historical scope, in the aftermath of the 
Second World War, since it helped the formation of thousands of young who will 
become the essential armour of the nationalist movement. One can write without error 
that the independent Algeria - as a national Arab-Islamic collectivity - is in a way the 
work of these Ulemas who, thirty years ago.... have taught.... this triple assertion..... that 
Algeria was a nation, Islamic and Arab (127). 
Despite these accolades that incorporated some reservations, they did play a vital role in 
the revival of the national consciousness. Since from the concepts of Nahda and Umma Ben 
Badis projected the foundation of a nation and fatherland solely of Algerians. The reformist 
movement symbolised at the end the resurgence of the protest that had religion as a basis. The 
mystic Islam, which had taken by storm the Turkish system then the French occupier, had been 
fought, confined then reduced to impotence during the nineteenth century and finally tamed. 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, religious orders and marabouts were well controlled 
and even served as agents of the colonial power which kept under control the propagandist of 
the Muslim cult in urban areas. The Islam of the Koran had played the role of recipient then 
that of spring-board and it had given back life to the political refusal that was no longer 
ensured by the Islam of the marabouts as well as 
it had been resourceful. Cities had to give 
what countryside could no longer provide, and adapted answer to new conditions to the modes 
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of production of domination. The movement of the Ulemas helped to question and contest the 
European supremacy by borrowing from the West "its technology and its methods of political 
organization while asserting the moral supremacy of the Muslims" (128). It generated a new 
degree of success for religious phenomena within a national context. 
With the singleness of purpose Malcolm dedicated himself from the encounter with 
Muhammed until his assassination to contesting and altering the system which impoverished 
black people in America. Wrongly branded an irresponsible racist and hate peddler by his cri- 
tics, Malcolm must be viewed as one searching for ways to make life worth more than daily 
survival. 
The greatest contribution made by Malcolm X was a clearly stated synthesis which inter- 
related to one source the problem of black people: economic oppression, political domination 
and white/non-white conflict. He prescribed a solution to those problems, which was not 
theoretically complete: his analysis embraced restructuring society on both a racial and social 
class basis but he did not specify what the new society would be except that it would not be 
exploitative and would allow all men to develop their human potential. 
Malcolm created an awareness among black people of their situation. They must hold the 
reins in the drive for their own rehabilitation. Because of the nature of the struggle, white 
leadership possessed the potential to intimidate black aspirations and to financially control 
black goals. However black people must assume the responsibility for their destiny by gaining 
an understanding of both the political process and the techniques required to fully use that sys- 
tem in securing goals. The impatience and vitality of youth could boost black people's self- 
improvement and self-assertion that could only occur through self-respect and self-defence 
against racist attacks. "All I have 
been doing", Malcolm declared in the last days of his life, 
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"is holding up a mirror to reflect, to show the history of the unspeakable crime that (the white 
race) has committed against my race" (129). The reflection which white America saw in that 
mirror was shocking. It portrayed America's history from a black perspective. It stated the 
reality of black existence in daring terms. It exposed ideals that were used as a cover for 
greed and violence. It pictured poverty, malnutrition and ignorance on a scale many Ameri- 
cans had not believed. In that mirror America could see that its collective and historical treat- 
ment of the black mass continued to be outrageous perversion of the democratic precepts it pla- 
titudinally mouthed. 
The limits of the Association of the Ulemas and Malcolm X stemmed not only from the 
political realities but also from the movements themselves. They were both insufficiently 
implanted. The Association of Ulemas was torn between different trends, conceptions and per- 
sonalities. But the limits of these two movements lay also in that behind an attitude firm and 
without ambiguity, a cautious moderation existed. They limited themselves to remain within 
the political structure defined by the prevailing establishments. The Ulemas contemplated 
independence as a remote outcome of a gradual and non-violent evolution. Applying the pol- 
icy of stages, they found of the most pressing urgency to defend and to strengthen the ethnic 
nationality even if it meant giving token of loyalism to the authority that controlled the political 
nationality. Malcolm's programme was moderate: election of independent black candidates for 
public offices, voter registration drives, rent- strikes to promote better housing conditions for 
black people, the building of all black committees for community and neighbourhood self- 
defence (130). These two movements faced a difficult conciliation between an assertion of 
differentiation and an egalitarian claim as regards the dominant community; between a denunci- 
ation of discriminatory measures and a protest of loyalism. But above all these two move- 
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ments brought back pride by stirring up their peoples memory. 
Malcolm was assassinated on 21 February, 1965 in the prime of his evolutionary 
development. He left behind him an incomplete philosophy. Malcolm's legacy was particu- 
larly unfinished in terms of its understanding of the required methodology for establishing a 
situation whose basis would be the organization and achievement of a cross-cultural solidarity. 
Perhaps the incomplete nature of Malcolm's analysis at the time of his death served to provide 
a limited legacy for an ongoing black struggle. If Malcolm had achieved a coherent, unified 
philosophy of change before he died, then arguably his beneficiaries might have led a more 
purposeful and a more united movement. His evolutionary development had perhaps been seen 
as constituting a frame of reference from which American blacks could have drawn insight as 
regards the required formula for their own self- improvement. 
The task of the Ulemas was relatively easier. They just focused on the need to reassert 
the ethnic, cultural and historical bonds. They wanted to rediscover them in order to provide 
Algerians with a sense of belonging and civilization to identify with. The main features of the 
Algerian nation were easily reinstated by Ben Badis (131) in order to strengthen and to define 
clearly the individual identity. But the element that made their take easier was the colonial 
context in which they were operating. Their claim of differentiation was sanctified by the 
downtrodden condition in which the Algerian majority found itself confined to. They had only 
to preach the obvious. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE SEARCH FOR A GENUINE EQUALITY 
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In the United States of America, after the assassination of Malcolm X, many were 
unhappy with the practical outcomes achieved by the civil rights movement led by Martin 
Luther King Jr. The aspirations of the middle class leadership did not genuinely represent 
those of the black poor. Robert L. Allen assessed the situation: 
Hence, in 1966, despite eleven years of intense Civil Rightsactivity and the new anti- 
poverty programs, the median income of a black family was only 58 percent of the 
income of an average white family, black unemployment still ran twice as high as white 
unemployment despite the war - induced prosperity which the country was 
enjoying..... Unemployment among black teenagers ran at 26 percent (1). 
This view was re-enforced by a joint 1967 report by the United States Bureau of Labor 
Statistics and the Bureau of the Census, dealing with social and economic conditions of black 
people in the United States, which concluded that "conditions are stagnant or deteriorating in 
the poorest areas" (2). The plight of black people had not been mitigated. The daily reality 
contradicted the hopes raised by the Civil Rights movement. So, as salvation did not occur, a 
human eruption happened instead. It started in Harlem and the wave of discontent reached 
fourteen other cities. They were spontaneous, unorganized human explosions but which were 
characterised by one logic: the looting and attacks were directed towards the property of white 
merchants. It was a repudiation of the action of the Civil Rights movement. Integration would 
not end the downtrodden condition of the majority of black people who were implicitly looking 
for and asking for a new form of political action that would met eventually their hopes and 
their aspirations. They were setting their eyes on a new leadership that would also be able to 
articulate platforms and programmes that could reflect, by and large, the needs of the majority 
of the black community in the United 
States of America. 
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Many wanted to resume Malcolm X's action, to pick up the threads of his thought in 
order to make them contextual and valid. Among them were Stokely Carmichael of the Stu- 
dent National Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and the Black Panthers. Reformism and overt 
rebellion were both appealing to this new leadership. The determination of the nature of their 
political action - whether it was discontent or an urge for a revolution - would eventually dic- 
tate the kind of struggle they would undertake. Ambivalence was a sign of uncertainty. 
On February 1,1960, four black college students had sat in at a lunch counter in 
Greensboro, North Carolina, defying Jim Crow segregationist laws. Their act had ignited one 
of the largest black protest movements. They not only acted on impulsive defiance but also on 
the basis of suppressed resentment that preceded the development of an ideological rationale 
for protest. The 'sit in' soon spread all over North Carolina and by mid April of the same 
year reached the remaining southern States (3). 
The emergence of a protest movement among black college students; not only actualised 
the interracial tensions that had long been stifled in the South, but also generated a new 
momentum for self-realisation among black people. The aim of lunch counter desegregation 
certainly did not cover the range of black aspirations, nor did the sit in tactic fully express the 
latent emotions of southern black people. In Algeria, the Association of Ulemas set raising 
native Algerian consciousness as one of its goals. Non- violent direct action was a starting 
point for the emergence of a new political consciousness. The sit ins were a surprise to many 
observers who were aware of the restrictive rules and rigid conservatism that characterised 
southern black institutions. They occurred just a few years after the publication of sociologist 
E. Franklin Frazier's Black Bourgeoisie which described black college students as politically 
impassive, instilled with middle class values and determined to achieve material success. Other 
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observers saw the sit ins movement not as a signal for a fundamental shift in these attitudes 
and values but an attempt to overcome the barriers that still separated black students from their 
white middle class counterparts, through tactics that were not challenging the then prevailing 
American values. So, rather than representing a rejection of the main stream of American life, 
like the Association appeared to be to the French establishment, the sit ins were viewed as an 
outgrowth of racial assimilation and as an expression of the desire for further assimilation (4). 
As they won influence, some student leaders felt the need to create a protest organization 
that would help to expand black militancy rather than restrain or control it. They were aware 
that the sit in tactic had generated a notion that such ideas should not come from the pre- 
existing ideologies but from the intellectual awakening that had begun on the southern black 
campuses. Accordingly the students created the Student National Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC) in April 1960 in Raleigh, North Carolina. 
The founding conference was called by Ella Baker, executive director of Southern Chris- 
tian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The initiating role of SCLC might have implied the will 
to control the southern black struggle by Martin Luther King and the black ministers associated 
with him, but Baker wanted the students to remain independent of any control and resisted 
efforts to subvert their autonomy (5). One of the largest delegations at the rally conference 
and the one that would subsequently provide SNCC with some leaders such as Marion Barry, 
Diane Nash, John Lewis and James Lawson was the Nashville student group. It shared a com- 
mitment not simply to desegregation but also to non-violence and to the Christian ideal of the 
beloved community (6). 
Unlike the elitist Association of the Ulemas in Algeria which from its beginning had 
defined its major aims and role, SNCC for a long time would be facing the issue of whether it 
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should be primarily a medium of communication and coordination among protest groups or an 
initiator of protest activities and civil projects. Ella Baker's notion of collegial leadership had 
spawned among students a strong opposition to any hierarchy of authority such as existed in 
other Civil Rights organizations. Despite being uncertain of their role and generally conven- 
tional in their political orientation at that time, SNCC grew to be a framework for full-time 
organizers and protesters. 
The students were closely associated with the Civil Rights movement of the 1960's. 
They got involved in freedom rides, the McComb Mississippi project as well as initiating the 
drive for voter registration and the Albany movement later on taken by SCLC. A shift in their 
role was noticeable by 1962, it marked the beginning of SNCC's transition from a coordinator 
of campus protest activities to one as the vanguard of a broadly based mass struggle in the 
deep South. But the ambivalence as regards the role stemmed from the fact that SNCC was an 
outgrowth of a movement which was already in motion. Its nature was shaped by it for a long 
period. On the other hand the Association of Ulemas was created to answer the need to purify 
Islam from obscurantism but also the need for a native national and ethnic consciousness as 
well as to counterweigh the political action of assimilationists. The Ulemas, at the start, did 
not belong or were not associated with any social, political or religious groupings. 
When SNCC held its fourth general conference on April 12,1963, an important transition 
had been completed. SNCC's field staff, particularly in south west Georgia, continued the 
drive for voter registration and in Mississippi was involved in a food distribution programme. 
Despite opposition it gained the confidence of many local black people. They had adapted to 
the conditions of the South and begun to articulate new ideas with which to sustain their fight: 
the use of local churches and black newspapers to communicate with the residents, as the Ule- 
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mas did in Algeria. They also developed personal relations by working with youth groups for 
the campaign 'one man, one vote' (7). 
SNCC, at that particular period, grew impatient and became critical of the Kennedy 
administration. They believed that the Federal Government was a force that could be trusted to 
act on their behalf if it acknowledged the priority of social justice over political expediency. 
Again their attitude was opposite to that of the Ulemas in Algeria who had never believed that 
the French government would be of any help to their cause. The reason behind this belief was 
the support of the French to the marabouts (obscurantist interpreters of Islam). SNCC disap- 
pointment stemmed from the caution and the slow pace by which civil rights legislation was 
enacted. However, like the Ulemas, as regards French establishment, the tone of their criticism 
was still moderate in order not to undermine their association with the dominant national Civil 
Rights coalition as it was epitomized by John Lewis's speech at the March on Washington (8). 
At, that time SNCC preoccupations and the principal sources of their insights were the com- 
munity organising activities in the deep South. SNCC had been an organization of non-violent 
activists seeking to appeal to the nation's conscience. This was fundamentally different to the 
Ulemas who on the one hand even if they had never advocated violence had also never 
rejected it and on the other hand they had never believed that Algerians were part and parcel of 
a French nation. The essence of their action was to fight the idea that the Algerian ethos could 
be absorbed within a French whole. They endeavoured to regenerate the idea that Algerians 
were totally different and alien to any values the French defended. They were Muslims assimi- 
lated and familiar with a Middle Eastern culture, Arabism. Their action covertly had sowed 
the seeds for nationalism and the idea of a nation and above all the rejection of Algerians 
belonging to the French nation. SNCC was becoming a structure within which organizers were 
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seeking to mobilize black people in order to force the Federal Government into using its power 
to achieve civil rights goals. This new mood was characterised by the launch of the Missis- 
sippi Summer Project, a massive invasion of Mississippi by northern white student volunteers 
during the summer of 1964. The project was designed to create a confrontation between state 
and federal authorities and thereby to prevent the intimidation and violence that had hindered 
previous Civil Rightswork in Mississippi (9). 
The plans for the Summer Project reflected both SNCC's past development as a protest 
group and its emergence as a framework for radical community organizers. It tested its 
integrationist orientation by seeking to mobilize white liberal support outside the South. It was 
a mixture of idealism and realism that prompted this project. Their belief in the efficacy of the 
strategy of appealing to powerful institutions through individual commitment and sacrifice was 
combined with a growing awareness that new black controlled institutions were necessary both 
in Mississippi and in the nation (10). This spawned, firstly, the creation in April 1964 of the 
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) which was designed as a vehicle to challenge 
the regular party at a national Democratic Convention and secondly, the launch of the freedom 
schools in order to fill an intellectual and creative vacuum 
for young blacks and to get them to 
articulate their own desires, demands and questions. 
The intention of this tactic was similar to 
the belief of the Ulemas in Algeria that the need for non-controlled institutions by the estab- 
lishment was vital in the process of raising consciousness. Education was one of the Ulemas 
priorities. Its aim went beyond 
SNCC's goals and was more compatible with Malcolm X's 
beliefs that school not only should develop the intellectual and creative fields but also ought to 
be a means to reveal the historical background of a community in order to help it define its 
role within the political context and to set 
its political, social and economic claims and priori- 
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ties. 
The MFDP was defeated in Atlantic City where the convention of the Democratic Party 
was held. Not only was the defeat sour, it was the dismissive way by which they were 
defeated that embittered SNCC workers. Disappointment was very intense among some 
veterans who saw the challenge as a test of their strategy of appealing to the Federal Govern- 
ment. The legalist approach to seek a share in power failed (11). It only strengthened the 
need for racial power. SNCC started to look beyond their own experience for ideological 
insights. An expected turn in the search of new ideas occurred in the fall of 1964 where 
SNCC accepted the invitation of the entertainer/singer Harry Belafonte to send a delegation to 
Africa. The most significant episode of their stay in Africa was an unexpected encounter in 
Nairobi (Kenya) with Malcolm X. 
Malcolm X's Pan-African perspective and his awareness of the need for black self- 
defence and racial pride appealed to SNCC. Then on February 21,1965 the developing ties 
were severed by Malcolm X's assassination in New York. John Lewis commented that Mal- 
colm "more than any other single personality" had been "able to articulate the aspirations, 
bitterness and frustrations of the Negro people forming a living link between Africa and the 
Civil Rights movement" (12). 
The trip to Africa, their contact with Malcolm X led SNCC to become aware of the inter- 
national implication of its struggle. The enthusiasm 
for African revolutionary ideas echoed the 
need for the Ulema in Algeria to put their struggle within a 
broader context; the Nahda, the 
Islamic renaissance so that the political action would have depth but above all it stopped being 
confined within certain boundaries, 
Algeria. This perspective linked the struggle to other peo- 
ples in other parts of the world. 
It would bring a new ideological insight and above all a new 
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strength by mitigating and even erasing the sense of isolation. This new need was tempered 
by difficulties; exhaustion after the summer's effort, attacks from liberals who were beginning 
to doubt whether SNCC militants would continue to play useful roles as the shock troops of 
the Civil Rights movement or would instead become the spearhead of a new assault on con- 
ventional liberalism. But more important was the question mark that hung over SNCC's 
future. 
Like the Ulemas in Algeria when they initiated and successfully launched the idea of the 
Muslim Congress in 1936 and therefore became a political force as important as the other pol- 
itical formations, SNCC emerged as a serious competitor to the NAACP and SCLC for domi- 
nance within the civil rights movement. It had demonstrated its increasing effectiveness espe- 
cially by launching and leading the Summer Project. However the project revealed structural 
and political problems inherent to SNCC; attempts to mobilize black communities under indi- 
genous leadership without specialised skills while relying also on northern support. These con- 
tradictions were alarming and the racial composition of the movement and the steady increase 
in the proportion of whites on the staff in 1963 and 1964 concerned many, who doubted 
whether local black leadership could 
develop in the presence of large numbers of whites (13). 
On the agenda was the need to bring about some changes to the structure and the free- 
wheeling style that characterised the organization. 
Consequently, on February 10,1965 in 
Atlanta, the field staff achieved their main objective, they made themselves members of the 
Coordinating Committee, and in effect become SNCC's official policy-making body (14). 
At the beginning of 1965, few SNCC workers would have surmised that Alabama would 
become the focus of their activities. Compared to projects in Mississippi and Georgia, SNCC 
activities in Alabama 
had generated little publicity. Martin Luther King's announcement of a 
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major voting rights campaign in Selma early in 1965 was met with mixed feelings among 
SNCC's Alabama staff. They knew that King's effort would help their own voter registration 
work by attracting nationwide publicity and perhaps prompting federal intervention against 
white Alabama authorities. 
However, the Alabama campaign during March 1965 contributed to the further disillu- 
sionment of SNCC staff, despite the fact that the Selma campaign was a success for the protest 
strategy. The crucial confrontation between Alabama's black people and obstinate state 
officials contributed to a favourable climate of public opinion outside the South and to a subse- 
quent passage of President Johnson's voting rights proposals. Not only did King's persever- 
ence interfere with SNCC's long range efforts to develop self-sufficient local black leadership 
but they also disliked his passive attitude in confronting state violence. It also comforted them 
in their belief that appeals to the national conscience were useless and doubted whether they 
were worth the sacrifices (15). 
By that time, SNCC was having an identity crisis. The Civil Rights movement, a gather- 
ing of many organizations including SNCC, was dominated by the charismatic figure of Martin 
Luther King of SCLC. They were frustrated by the conciliatory attitude of Dr King and the 
slow pace with which the Federal 
Government was introducing the legislation required as 
regards black people's condition 
in the United States (16). They were disappointed by the lack 
of credit given to them and the way the whole movement, and especially King, picked up the 
fruits and glory while they had toiled hard to pave the way as in Alabama (17). They were 
afraid to be outnumbered in a way which might dilute the fundamental basis of the organiza- 
tion from that of young black activists to a mixed race aggregate dominated by young white 
middle class liberals. They were afraid to stop being a black organization. By losing their 
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racial identity they would lose the faith of black people especially in the South where 
white/black relationships were still distant and distinct. They were afraid of losing this racial 
legitimacy to speak out for their community as well as the initiative to act because their actions 
might be perceived as bold enough to jeopardize settled institutions be they in the South or in 
the North. So by 1965 SNCC had become a kind of a lethargic body of young activists seek- 
ing new ideological alternatives to conventional liberalism. 
In 1966, Stokely Carmichael was elected new chairman of SNCC. His election was the 
expression of the hope that SNCC could awaken Afro- political consciousness as an initial step 
towards building a new social order. The slogan to the new thrust came during the Mississippi 
March, a protest against the shooting of James Meredith who had begun a walk across Missis. 
sippi on June 5 to prove that black residents could exercise their rights without fear (18): Black 
Power -a shortened version of 
'black power for black people'. Its sense was firstly anti. 
integrationist, it was an ideological weapon to dispute King's popularity and thereby expressing 
the black anger, discontent and disillusionment that could not be conveyed through King's 
more moderate rhetoric. Secondly, the slogan was separatist, it demanded that black Ameri- 
cans should organize themselves 
independently of whites as they had done in SNCC in order 
to speak from a position of strength (19). The black power slogan was both a means of 
appealing to unhappy black 
individuals and a suggestion of their still only partially formulated 
goals. 
SNCC reached the same conclusions as the Ulemas in Algeria and Malcolm X in the 
United States. In order to formulate claims one step ought to be taken within the community, 
a union between the different political 
forces. As they no longer believed in joining in the 
American mainstream they de facto rejected the idea of a multi-racial nation dominated by 
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WASPs. Like the Ulemas in Algeria, they expressed their fear of being absorbed by trying to 
ignite a momentum that would generate racial consciousness by starting to be exclusive. 
Carmichael crystallised the unarticulated feelings of many other black people, especially 
in northern urban centres, whose hopes were raised but not fulfilled by the Civil Rights move- 
ment. Only after he attracted national attention as an advocate of black power did he begin to 
conceptualise it. His argument was based on the belief that black power was a logical out- 
growth of the southern struggle, and was a valid response to the conditions facing black people 
in America. Most of what Carmichael wrote then was not new. It followed the trend of 
thought established by Martin Delany, Marcus Garvey and Malcolm X. 
During the summer of 1966, he published two essays, Towards Black Liberation, in the 
Massachussetts Review (20) and, What We Want, in The NewYork Review of Books (21). 
He argued for the cultural and political autonomy of black community (22). Where Malcolm 
X had been faced with hostility and indifference the SNCC leader was successful in presenting 
the issue of racial self-determination (23). In Algeria Ben Badis did not tie up culture and pol- 
itics but he knew that the one could not exclude the other. Carmichael's thought was 
forthright, Ben Badis's was disguised. However both were aiming at a more united and a 
more conscious community. 
On the economic front, Carmichael called for a cooperative effort among black people. 
This concept was not new and assumed that the economy was still open to new enterprises be 
they individual or collective. This assumption was unrealistic in an era where the huge com- 
mercial corporations had a virtual monopoly on the market. 
The need for 'psychological equality' and black consciousness was also stressed. 
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Only black people can convey the revolutionary idea that black people are able to do 
things themselves. Only they can help create in the community an aroused and continu- 
ing black consciousness that will provide the basis for political strength (24). 
Tackling the issue of potential allies, he did not preclude the possibility of interracial alli- 
ances. He was looking for an important section of the white population which might become 
an ally of blacks. He thought poor whites might play this role, yet he wrote "poor whites 
everywhere are becoming more hostile - not less - partly because they see the nation's attention 
focused on black poverty and nobody coming to them" (25). Middle class young white 
activists, he suggested, could assume the task of organising poor whites but they preferred to 
go to black communities rather than mobilize whites to achieve progressive social change (26). 
Carmichael was attempting to carve the path for a more united, a more strongly-bound 
black community which would be proud of its ethnic and cultural distinctiveness. He was try- 
ing to revitalize black people's capacity to resist a complete absorption like many ethnic com- 
munities had done before. Once the community was organized it could set its own institutions 
be they economic, political or educational in order to look for sharing power. At the least he 
wanted black people to influence and be in a position to be able to lobby the policy-making 
bodies in the United States. He wanted the black community to become American in a multi- 
racial nation. Its distinction would not hide a disguised aim to separate or gain autonomy as 
Ben Badis in Algeria thought but would allow it to come out strong enough to join the race for 
power. By raising the Algerian consciousness Ben Badis wanted to reject any French/Western 
values. His main aim was to stress the difference and the incompatibility between the Algerian 
ethos and that of France. The tactics of SNCC in the United States and the Ulemas in Algeria 
were similar but their aims were opposite. 
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Carmichael's most developed statement on Black Power failed to provide a workable and 
radical set of ideas. Co-authored by political scientist Charles V. Hamilton, Black Power: The 
Politics Of Liberation In America (1967), drew its essence from third world nationalist move- 
ments. The book proposed that Afro-Americans could escape their 'colonised' status in Amer- 
ican society by undergoing a process of 'political modernisation' of which the awakening of 
racial consciousness was the first stage. The book did not rule out the prevailing political sys- 
tem. 
Carmichael's political views, like those of other SNCC workers, were changing during 
1967. He retained, at least in his writing in 1966 and 1967, a transitory belief in interracial 
conditions and conventional types of political activity. Belief which was not shared by other 
SNCC workers who proposed that all links with white people had to be severed and that racial 
ideas were the main aim of their struggle. The change was political (27). Although oppres. 
sion of black people had race and class dimensions SNCC was drifting towards a political per- 
spective that emphasised race rather than class and third world alliances rather than coalitions 
with poor whites. As alienation mounted, SNCC knew that black people in the United States 
were more receptive to arguments reflecting the overwhelming psychological importance of 
racial identity. SNCC was less and less concerned with the class dimension because poor 
whites were as much trapped by their own racism as blacks with theirs. 
Harold Cruse, the black social critic, who was basically sympathetic to the racial cons- 
ciousness emphasis of SNCC's rhetoric warned that 
"black skin chauvinism" would be politi- 
cally unproductive in the United States. He charged that the Black Power theorists evaded the 
issue of which "(social) class is going to wield this power". Cruse believed that the failure to 
give a distinctive emphasis to cultural matters was the weakness of interracial movements. He 
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dismissed the fact that contemporary black militants proposed "to change, not the white world 
outside, but the black world inside by reforming it into something else politically and economi- 
cally" (28). 
Similarly, Robert Allen's A Guide to Black Power in America, described the process 
through which black militancy was being subverted by the American corporate order. He 
noted that Carmichael "never moved beyond ambiguity", sometimes speaking as "a reformer, 
who only wanted to adjust the social system and make it work better" and sometimes as a 
revolutionary. "On other occasions he managed to give the remarkable impression of being at 
once a reformer and a revolutionary" (29). 
The debate over the meaning of Black Power' would continue after 1966, but neither 
Carmichael nor SNCC would determine its outcome. By bravely injecting the Black Power 
slogan into an explosive context of racial conflicts, SNCC launched a new era of political dis- 
cussion. However, the strength and weakness of the Black Power slogan lay in its ambiguity 
or at least in its vagueness and indefiniteness. It stemmed from a nationalist urge but which 
did not tackle any of the nationalist dilemnas. It avoided complications by the simple 
expedient of leaving undefined the kind of power that might salvage black people's aspirations 
in America. The main weakness and the cause of failure of Carmichael's emergence as a 
leader was his inability to provide consistent, coherent ideological framework over several 
years. He wavered between different concepts, taking one stand one year, taking another stand 
another year, and sometimes taking two different stances in almost the same year (1967-1968) 
(30). This contrasted with the attitude of the Ulemas in Algeria. They stuck to and developed 
the same ideological points over and over. They were moderate in challenging French policy 
in Algeria but were consistent in their analysis of the situation the Algerian people were in. 
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They hammered their message till a self-conscious feeling of identity was created. Once they 
achieved this goal, they sowed the seeds for rebellion. The role played by religion in the revo- 
lution of 1954 was very important because it was the cement that united culturally the ideologi- 
cally different elements of the Algerian community. It enhanced the sense of brotherhood. Of 
course, the colonial context in which they were operating made the Ulemas task relatively 
easier if compared with any black organization or movement in the United States of America. 
The ethnic, cultural and historical bonds of Algerians were obvious but they needed to be re- 
asserted and rekindled through Islam. The claim of differenciation in Algeria was equated with 
a natural right (31). 
The ideology of Algerian Ulemas was founded upon religion. Islam is a religion that not 
only deals with moral and spiritual aspects of life but also with the structuring and organization 
of society. The reason for the Ulemas involvement, apart of course from the obvious one 
which was colonization, stemmed from the substance of Islam that did not dismiss the tem- 
poral. Their involvement was not radical, their claims were not overtly threatening France's 
supremacy over Algeria. They wanted to maintain and to strengthen 'Algerianity', for 
independence was not their ultimate goal. 
Unlike Malcolm X in the United States and the Ulemas in Algeria, the new militants in 
the United States were looking for an ideology apart from religion. SNCC wavered between 
different ideological concepts but failed to topple King's non-violent policy and more impor- 
tantly to offer an alternative that could swing the support and adhesion of the whole black 
community (32). A new organization: the Black Panther Party was willing to do so. 
The Black Panther Party was formed in Oakland, California in October 1966 by two 
young men: Huey P. Newton then twenty 
five and Bobby Seale, five years older. The more 
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articulate and more dominant figure of the couple was Newton. His roots were "lower class, 
working class" (33). His family moved from Louisiana where he was born, the youngest of 
seven children, to California. He had been a student for two years at Merrit College in Oak- 
land where he met Seale. Newton wanted to be a lawyer and Seale an actor. Newton dropped 
out from his course convinced that he had no future as a lawyer. Seale spent almost four years 
in the army (34). He then drifted from one job to another without getting far in his chosen 
career. 
When a Soul Student Advisory Council was formed by some of their younger friends at 
Merritt College in order to demand a 'black curriculum', they both got involved. However, 
soon they realised that they had to form an organization whose nature would embrace politics. 
It would be especially resistant to police harassment (35). They called it the Black Panther 
Party for Self-Defence. The reference to the panther could be explained by the animal's nature 
to be aggressive and harmful only when it is attacked. The name of the organization was later 
shortened to the Black Panther Party. Both Newton and Seale emulated the Community Alert 
Patrol which was formed by the black community following the Watts riot. CAP's function 
was to protect members of the black community from police harrassment. Its role, firstly, was 
to observe and report on the conduct of the police officers when they stopped black people for 
'investigations'. Secondly, CAP would also inform the black person under 'arrest' of his legal 
rights. 
The panther founders, in their determination to instill a sense of security within the black 
community, developed further the idea of CAP: they instituted armed patrols. It was legal and 
the panthers made sure they were always within the confines of the law. Whenever an arrest 
was made by the police the Panthers would be on the scene with rifles and shotguns as well as 
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law books from which they could quote the section of the code being violated by the police. 
These patrols were successful. Not only incidents of police harrassment decreased but 
also the black community was impressed, especially the young. The organization grew 
steadily. Seale became chairman and Newton minister of defence. Unlike SNCC and CORE, 
the Panthers were not a middle class group. The bulk of the membership came from the 
ghetto. However, the number of middle class members increased within the leadership which 
came to represent a blending of educated and unlettered people. 
The Panthers appeared initially to be just another self-appointed local band of black mili- 
tants in an urban ghetto. But they proved to be far more that this. The conversion of Eldridge 
Cleaver to their cause in early 1967 meant that their aim was to gain national prominence and 
audience as well as to attract prominent figures renowned for anti- establishment stands. 
Cleaver, author of Soul on Ice, while working for Ramparts Magazine was impressed by the 
manner in which Newton interracted with a policeman in Ramparts office in daring him to 
shoot him. Besides Cleaver they managed to win over well known figures such as H. Rapp 
Brown and Stokely Carmichael of SNCC, though only for a short period. In three years they 
said to have set up thirty chapters, the biggest 
in the Oakland- San Francisco area and Chicago 
(36). The Black Panthers developed into an influential organization. They entered into coali- 
tion with the white based Peace and Freedom Party (E. Cleaver led the party for the 1968 
presidential elections). It became a source of 
inspiration and insight for black student circles 
(37). 
The attraction stemmed from a new approach to meet the needs of the black community. 
The basis was an ideology that not only antagonized the establishment but was completely 
different from anything that had been developed so far in the 1950's and 1960's. The ideology 
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was partially revealed by the official ten points platform and programme adopted in October 
1966. The claims embraced such areas as freedom, power, employment and liberation of pris- 
oners. The most nationalistic claim was point ten asking for land, bread, housing, education, 
clothing, justice and peace, and a United Nations supervised plebiscite to determine the black 
people's national destiny. This programme was of great significance because it represented the 
first concrete attempt to develop the idea of Black Power. However the full Black Panther 
ideology emerged in the pages of its official organ, The Black Panther, published weekly in 
Berkeley, California and more specifically in articles, speeches and interviews of its main 
leaders. Thus in an interview with Robert L. Allen, Bobby Seale explained the party's politi- 
cal philosophy: 
We tried to establish an organization that would articulate the basic desires and needs of 
the people and in turn try to organize black people into having some kind of power posi- 
tion so they can deal with the power structure. The party realises that the white power 
structure's real power is its military force; is its police force. And we can see that our 
black communities are being occupied by foreign troops. Our politics comes from our 
hungry stomachs and our, crushed heads and the vicious service revolver at a cop's side 
which is used to tear our flesh, and from the knowledge that black people are drafted to 
fight in wars, killing other coloured people who've never done a damn thing to us. So 
how do we face these cops in the black community? We have to face them exactly how 
they come down on us. They come down with guns and force. We must organize our- 
selves and put a shotgun in every black man's home. Our political stand is that politics 
is war without bloodshed, and war is politics with bloodshed (38). 
When the Muslim Algerian clergy came into prominence on the Algerian political scene, 
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their philosophy was based on their religious text to which they wanted to bring back purity at 
the time when distortion of Islam was the credo of religious personalities and orders allied to 
France. Their move symbolised a renaissance as well as a demarcation from those French 
allies. Their ideology was clear. They followed the message of God as it was revealed in the 
Koran to enhance the significance not only of the disparity between Algerians and French but 
also to raise people's consciousness. The Black Panthers, on the contrary, could be identified 
as a militant left wing group. The above quote of Bobby Seale illustrated well the sources of 
their philosophy; they were Malcolm X, Mao Tse Tung, Regis Debray, Fanon and Che 
Guevara. It was a kind of hybrid peculiar mixture, a marxist amalgamation. They seemed to 
have extracted or blended features from doctrines developed by those personalities in order to 
make them suit their goals with their particular 'nationalist' characteristics. 
The main task of the Black Panthers was the defence of the black community. Then their 
next concern was the national liberation of the 
"black colony" in the "white mother country" 
(39). The white mother country of the Panthers was America. The idea was new and went 
further than any other nationalist organization did before. It was more pragmatic. They ack- 
nowledged the African roots but strongly rejected or opposed any 
Back To Africa claim even 
in a mitigated way in the form of cultural nationalism because "(the latter) is basically a prob- 
lem of having the wrong political perspective... in other words they (cultural nationalists) feel 
that the African culture will automatically bring political 
freedom" (40), as Newton put it. He 
explained that, 
we believe it is important for us to recognize our origins and to identify with the revolu- 
tionary black people of Africa and people of colour throughtout the world. But as far as 
returning per se to the ancient customs, we don't see any necessity in this (41). 
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The shift was important. Their stand dismissed the just civil rights as inadequate. It 
went further, it became a claim for a national right in the United States of America. Their 
approach, their political perspective had the ingredients of a third world movement whose legi- 
timacy stemmed from the national right. They identified with a land, found pride and insight 
in their heritage. Without being cultural racialists like the Ulemas in Algeria, their approach 
was similar in that the cultural, ethnic disparity was only a foundation that would generate a 
more aware community which in turn would be more responsive to political messages and 
more active in the political field in order to ask that the prevailing system or political partisan 
consensus needed to be changed. Though the Ulemas in Algeria just paved the way by reviv- 
ing a nationalist and ethnic pride that led to more radical organizations such as the Party of the 
Algerian People to capitalise on their efforts. In America the Black Panthers wanted to do 
both by leading the struggle as a vanguard and a mass party in agreement with their Marxist 
doctrine. 
Unlike other 'nationalist' movements in the United States of America, the Black Panthers 
considered that in order to liberate the 'black colony' a social revolution by both black people 
and radical whites had to be launched. The 
idea was not new. SNCC for instance had worked 
on it to later drop it. The Panthers were aware that 
if they had to achieve their major aim, the 
establishment of socialism or at 
least an egalitarian society they would have to destroy capital- 
ism and racism (42). The Black Panthers were looking for the help of a part of the white 
community. The closeness between the two communities and the numerical advantage that 
some whites could bring were 
behind this assessment. 
There must be a revolution in the white mother country, led by white radicals and poor 
whites, and national liberation in the black and third world colony here in America. We 
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can't triumph in the colony alone because that is just like cutting one finger off a 
hand.... No, when we deal with this monster we deal with it totally (43). 
So the black nationalist revolution initially would go hand in hand or would be part and 
parcel of a wider action led by black and white peoples to achieve social revolution. In this 
perspective, the particularity of the Black Panthers became obvious, they were not a separatist 
or even a secessionist organization. In a shift, starting in 1969, the Black Panthers went 
further than any black militant organization had dared to go. In order to realize their political 
aim they broadened their appeal to a larger social strata and lifted it up to embrace the white 
community. In a significant reconsideration of their position, Newton seemed to call upon all 
the people not only the black people but white people as well to break the shackles of oppres- 
sion and exploitation. 
The Black Panther Party is the people's party. We are fundamentally in one thing, that 
is, freeing all people from all forms of slavery in order that every man will be his own 
master. The destruction of capitalism must be achieved by the seizure of the means of 
production by all members of the working class..... This naturally included black people 
(44). 
This populist appeal broke with any nationalist tradition. It just emphasised that the 
nationalist side of the Panthers gave way to the Marxist one. Newton seemed to shift from a 
previous statement he made the same year in January when the notion of people was still 
equated with the black community alone (45). The Black Panthers had remained a purely 
black organization because they felt that black/white unity should be attempted only when 
some degree of black unity had been achieved (46). But Newton also tried to avoid the tacti- 
cal error of involving whites so as not to feel that they were losing their identity as SNCC did 
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at one stage. Their cautious activity helped them to find a way to overcome this restriction. 
In July 1969, in Oakland California, they organized a National Conference for a United Front 
Against Fascism as an outcome of which were created Local National Committees to Combat 
Fascism. It had been reported that 85 to 90 percent of those attending the conference were 
white (47). The creation of these National Committees was the opportunity offered to admit 
those who were stopped from joining the Panthers officially, especially as these Committees 
were regarded as part of the Panthers structure "(they were).... the political organising bureau of 
the Black Panther Party" (48). At the conference itself Bobby Seale hinted that these bureaus 
could be used as a basis for a new party created on the model of the Liberation Front in Africa 
or Latin America whose social spectrum would include all the social components of the Ameri- 
can nation (49). 
This shift was caused by a reconsideration of the notion of power. Initially, it stemmed 
from a Maoist concept that politics was war without bloodshed and war was politics with 
bloodshed. It implied that the political arena in order to operate had to be the stage for battles 
between different forces. However, black people in America lacked power in the areas that 
were more likely to be decisive in politics: the economic and military fields let alone the leg- 
islative. Black people lacked strength in that they did not own land and they could not 
represent industrial or financial pressure groups 
because they did not have money or assets. 
Even if they did, they were part of a system that was dominated by whites and their influence 
could only be minimal and not of a great significance. 
The shift was practical. The Panthers 
became gradually aware that their call for self-defence groups and armed black people was not 
realistic (50). The power they were 
looking for would have stemmed from united armed com- 
munities with the potential to be harmful to economic targets in order to meet claims stated 
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and to reach a balance between the "economically powerful" and those "who are potentially 
destructive" (51). However, in this case the balance was difficult to reach for the economically 
powerful were not only the military powerful but also provided the human basis that operated 
the State. So, it was no surprise that state agencies such as CIA and FBI met the challenge of 
the Black Panthers with ruthlessness and effectiveness and therefore playing a part in the prac- 
tical shift worked out by the Black Panthers leadership in 1969. 
Like the Ulemas in Algeria, the Panthers did not depart from their original aim which 
was the welfare and the improvement of the condition of the community to which they 
belonged. The Ulemas in Algeria did not feel the need to call upon the French because the 
circumstances favoured their appeal. Algerians were numerically more important, their appeal 
wrapped in religious tones could only be accepted and understood by Muslims but more impor- 
tantly they rejected bitterly the idea of assimilation and integration in order to preserve the 
Arab-Islamic character of Algerians. The Black Panthers were realistic enough to broaden 
their appeal from a restricted ethnic group to a larger 'rainbow' audience not only because the 
essence of their Marxist ideology drove them to but also because the circumstances dictated it. 
Black people, even united, were a minority. The Panthers changed from a largely black organ- 
ization to a black revolutionary one, and in turn became a black organization with white 
appendage. The Black Panthers tried to reconcile two attitudes: being in the vanguard of the 
social as well as nationalist revolution. 
Their openers to other movements and groups was triggered as well by the resignation of 
Stokely Carmichael. Field Marshall, then Prime Minister in February in 1968, Carmichael had 
come from SNCC which he had made an all black organization. He had always been suspi- 
cious of the notion of coalition with whites so it was not surprising that he broke off from the 
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Panthers in July 1969 because he did not believe in a black and white social revolution. It was 
a bitter separation: each of the sides had harsh words to say towards the other. He charged 
them with being "dogmatic, dishonest, vicious and in collusion with whites" then he added, 
"... any premature (alliance) with white radicals has led to complete subversion of blacks by the 
whites through their direct or indirect control of the black organization" (52). Eldridge 
answered, "you cats in SNCC" have got a "paranoid fear of whites" because they struggled to 
get the control of their organization (53). But at the end the issue was the collision of two 
different assessments of what black militancy should be, pure and simply black nationalism 
that completely rejected the white support or a more articulate and multi-social orientated black 
nationalism that tied up the fates of black people and white people together. Yet, the member- 
ship of the Panthers was totally black and they could only be judged according to the credibil- 
ity of their programme. It was precisely in this area that they were ideologically vulnerable. 
The idea they projected forward for the realisation of a control for a black people's des- 
tiny was uncertain. The claim that came in the platform and programme of October 1966 to 
hold a United Nation supervised plebiscite was either ludicrous and without foundation or it 
showed the political immaturity of the organization to handle such a problem on which nearly 
all the nationalists stumbled; or it just proved that the Panthers were evading the issue because 
they had no practical solution to offer. It was impossible that the United Nations would hold 
such a plebiscite because, firstly, the United States government would never allow it as it 
would be an encroachment on United States sovereignty and a breach of international law. 
Secondly, the United States government, if it deigned to answer a request, could argue that the 
matter was internal and it was up to it to find the right solution. The plebiscite request implied 
that black people in the United States were 'colonized' on a geographical territory by another 
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people. It implied also that there was a legal dispute as regards the legitimacy of the rule 
borne by black people and imposed as the law of the land. Moreover, the proposal did not 
state how the Panthers wanted black voters to cast their vote and it assumed that the black 
nation had been clearly defined within the United States context. Thus, by evading the issue 
they brushed aside the conceptual definitions and practical solutions that might arise. This 
evasiveness could only be deliberate because perhaps the Black Panthers strategists considered 
any concrete stance premature. Had they been more assertive and clear, they would have had 
to define the way and spell out a programme to achieve self- determination. But they did not. 
They wavered between getting organized as a pre-condition to tackle the issue of the land that 
would be granted for a settlement (54), and a more vague stance that stressed unity and 
reiterated the similarity of their condition to colonised people. Newton did not go further than, 
our problem is unity at this point. We have to unify ourselves, we can handle the colony 
better than anyone else. We are colonised people. Many black communities are like 
decentralised colonies throughout this country (55). 
Bobby Seale tried to be less uncertain at the anti-fascist conference in Oakland in July 
1969 when he stated: 
We are not saying that self-determination of the black people in the black communities is 
not correct. It is necessary. But we are not saying that black people are a nation because 
they have the same economic oppression that they are subjected to; because they have 
number two, a basic psychological make-up in how they react to that environment they 
exist in; third, because they describe what's happening; because black people in the com- 
munity, understanding genocide, that language, psychological make-up, economic condi- 
tions and the (4) geographical location that black people exist in, generally defined as 
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ghettoes. The geographical location defines, with all those four points, black people as a 
nation, defines Mexican-American people as a nation where they are. Whether, they are 
split or divided, because we are colonised, because the third world people are colonised. 
That's what defines a nation. We are not basing it on racism. We understand national- 
ism in terms of what a nation is, and we understand internationalism (56). 
Cleaver suggested that there was or could be a black nation in the United States of Amer- 
ica as well as a Mexican-American nation even if they were made of an assemblage of scat- 
tered ghettoes. Bobby Seale did not define the socio-political features that would make the 
black community coherent as Ben Badis did in 1936 when he answered Abbas who was at that 
period in favour of a complete assimilation to France (57). The Algerian nation was Muslim, 
identified itself with an Arab civilization, dwelt on a sizeable geographical territory in North 
Africa and had historical memories. The ghetto could not be a practical substitute for a terri- 
tory even if the umbilical link that existed between a people and a land was dismissed for the 
simple reason that those geographical locations would be pockets of lands within the huge ter- 
ritory of the United States. They would resemble those so-called free states within South 
Africa, a parody squashed under the economic and military might of the United States. 
Shrewd enough, Huey P. Newton in August 1969 corrected this above assumption and 
referred to black people in the United States as "a national minority" and more importantly 
used the phrase, "ethnic minority" instead of the word nation to describe the black community. 
He retreated from a rigid position to a more conciliatory one in redefining the concept that 
would shape the black community's fate. He called upon "the freedom to structure the com- 
munity in order to determine its institutions" (58). 
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This shift was accompanied by another one. Newton's reassessment of the concept of 
what 'being colonised' meant, enhanced further the new stance as regards the concept of 
'nation'. He stated in a 'Message on the Peace Movement': 
At one time I thought that only blacks were colonized. But I think we have to change 
our rhetoric to an extent because the whole American people have been colonized, if you 
view exploitation as a colonized effect, now they're exploited (59). 
Newton came to equate colonization with exploitation. In this view the whole American 
people not only were exploited but they were at 
the same time colonized. It was a larger, 
broader social and ethnic basis which was undergoing colonization. As this new stance 
embraced the whole American population it took any substance and content away from the 
concept of 'internal American colony'. If 'colonization' meant 'exploitation' the former term 
was useless all along. The concept of exploitation far from making the concept of internal 
colony distinct and more inclusive just engulfed it entirely. Furthermore, the Black Panthers 
seemed to move away from any nationalists claim and preferred to adopt a more appropriate 
doctrine in agreement with their Marxist belief that the struggle ought to be founded on a class 
struggle regardless of skin colour. 
The new line stemmed from an awareness that enclaves and ghettoes might be used for 
strategy but they might not be a foundation 
for nationhood. Newton was aware that even a 
separate black America of five or six states could never survive if it was to be surrounded by 
capitalistic white America: 
We also take into consideration the fact that if blacks at this very minute were able to 
secede the union, and say have five states or six states, it would be impossible to function 
in freedom side by side with a capitalistic imperialistic country (60). 
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This awareness that these states might be isolated and made inoperative was always 
present. It was a tactical withdrawal. The Panthers were looking ahead in attempting to strive 
to bring about changes to the prevailing system of the mother country. They could no longer 
commit or confine themselves to claiming a pure black nationalist demand, for unlike other 
black militant organizations they identified the United States of America as a fatherland. This 
acknowledgement had changed the nature of their struggle from a nationalist struggle to a 
social one. The emphasis would be on bringing about alterations to the prevailing system. 
Furthermore, this shift helped them to avoid the sensitivity of the land's issue. Firstly, for stra- 
tegic reasons they realised that the United States government would never allow another seces- 
sion or grant a territory. If it did not do it with the original natives, there was no reason to 
believe that it would have behaved otherwise with the nationalist claim for a territory. 
Secondly, Newton evaded completely the issue by emphasising that the political agenda would 
take time to implement but in fact it was just a way to disguise and conceal their inability to 
find a solution to this issue. It reflected the conceptual difficulty the Black Panthers ideologists 
were facing to define clearly and convincingly their view. 
For instance Eldridge Cleaver attempted to tackle the thorny issue of land and sovereignty 
in The Land Question and Black Liberation (61). At the beginning of his article he nearly 
came close to defining the problem; 
people long ago would have readily identified themselves with another sovereignty had a 
viable one existed (62) 
He believed that no viable alternative had ever existed. He dismissed Garvey's Back To 
Africa drive as impossible (63). He sympathized with Elijah Muhammed for knowing that "he 
had to deal with Afro-America's land hunger" (64), and that Stokely Carmichael did not even 
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attempt to deal with it directly (65). Yet he carried on asserting that Afro-America had to start 
to function as a nation to assume its sovereignty, and to demand that that sovereignty be recog- 
nized by other nations of the world. He wrote, 
Black Power must be viewed as a projection of sovereignty, an embryonic sovereignty 
that black people can focus on and through which they can make distinctions between 
themselves and others, between themselves and their enemies - in short between the white 
mother country of America and the black colony dispersed throughout the continent on 
absentee-owned land, making Afro-America a decentralised colony. Black Power says to 
black people that it is possible for them to build a national organization on somebody 
elses land (66). 
The notion of sovereignty implied a quality, a particularity and a specifity of power 
which was not controlled by another state organism. Sovereignty could only be an objective 
reality with a territory. When in the 1930's Abbas talked about the non-existence of the 
Algerian nation not only Ben Badis answered by defining the features of the Algerian nation 
e 
(67) but other members of the clergy tackled the writing of the history of Algeria stressing of 
course the Arab-Islamic affiliation and the glorification of the past. They dealt with the past as 
a memory of national pride (68). 
The implication of the Ulemas action was to rekindle the feeling that Algerians had 
always defended the right to control their 
land. They were covertly driving the Algerian peo- 
ple to recover their sovereignty over the 
land by revealing the past and fighting French pro- 
paganda that taught that Algerians forefathers were the Gauls. The action of the Ulemas was 
easier because the strong cultural 
discrepancies between Algerians and Europeans helped the 
message to pass through. 
However, they did not just address themselves to the Algerian 
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people, they managed to create a momentum in the political arena whose basis was a united 
political action of all Algerian political organizations in order to appear as a functioning nation 
talking with the same voice (69). Cleaver wrote about a decentralized colony, he meant 
perhaps the sum of the ghettoes in the main American cities, such as New York, Chicago.... and 
which were separated by hundreds of miles. The concept of an embryonic sovereignty needed 
clarification and development. He then moved to compare black people's condition to that of 
early Zionists. It was an inappropriate parallel. The cornerstone of his argument was that the 
Jewish Zionists did not have a territorial base and were not sure where it would be when they 
dreamt of a homeland. However, the Jewish Zionists were at least aware that they could not 
set up a national homeland in their ghettoes. If black nationalists in the United States were 
prepared to set up a nation in Africa or elsewhere, the comparison with Zionism might have 
been useful though it might have led inevitably towards a Back To Africa kind of action which 
the Black Panthers rejected. Furthermore, in an interview Cleaver was questioned about a plan 
adopted in March 1968 by a National Black 
Government Conference for the creation of a state 
called 'New Africa' which would be made up of five southern states. "Do you think that's a 
viable plan? ", he was asked. 
"I don't have any sympathy with that approach, but the Black 
panthers feel that it's a proposal black people should be polled on" (70). From Cleaver's arti- 
cle and interview, it was very 
hard to understand where his sympathies would go. 
This inconsistency in the argument reflected the ambiguity and fragility of their ideology 
which was becoming increasingly 
left wing. Like Malcolm X, the Black Panthers moved away 
from a purely nationalist revolution towards a social one. In this perspective they were totally 
different in their outlook from the Ulemas in Algeria. The Ulemas were very consistent in 
their argument and policy. They kept hammering away their message for a purification of 
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Islam and for an affiliation to Arab civilization. All the time they focused on enhancing the 
differences that divided culturally Algerians and French. They endeavoured to raise the 
people's consciousness with an uncompromising mood. Of course, the circumstances were 
different between Algeria and the French colonization and black people in the United States of 
America. The Ulemas task was facilitated by the fact that Islam was the bedrock of the 
Algerian identity. They had only to build on it. The Black Panthers were facing resistance not 
only from white but also from black people. By adding socialism to their national militancy, 
they moved from a rigid and suffocating stance towards a more practical one that accepted 
whites as well as blacks . This was another difference between the Ulemas strategy and the 
Black panthers and which the circumstances dictated. The Ulemas concern was native Algeri- 
ans. They were sure and had faith in the strength in numbers of Algerians. They were 
exclusive unless there was a religious conversion to Islam. They were not interested in alli- 
ances and coalitions with Europeans but with their fellow native Algerians. The Black Pan- 
thers stance left them open and vulnerable to attacks and criticism from those who wanted a 
social revolution unstained with black nationalism, and those who wanted a pure black nation- 
alism not dependent for its ultimate success on white social revolution. Their eagerness to 
conceptualise their new stance in order to answer these attacks and criticism led them to be 
vague in attempting to satisfy both factions. 
The post Malcolm X political action that wanted to expand his thought, attempted to 
change black people from the the inside without bringing about a viable alternative to the 
power structure they were 'subject to. Both the Student National Coordinating Committee 
(SNCC), and the Black Panthers were and-capitalistic and and-imperialistic. They both 
believed, at some stage, in alliances with other oppressed minorities and potentially revolution- 
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ary segments of the white population. They both believed in anti-colonial struggle for self- 
determination. This contrasted with the attitude of the Ulemas who did not overtly challenge 
the French colonial system. Though they identified the plight of the Algerian natives, they still 
believed that the prevailing institutions would find a solution to it. They did not call on 
independence, but took a firm and tenacious stance as regards an 'ethnic liberation' from 
French values. They attacked fiercely and bitterly anyone who promoted an assimilation to 
France. They worked hard in increasing the Algerians capacity to resist the French way of life 
so that the Algerian community would keep its 'soul' and 'memory. Their fight thrusted them 
into politics. They knew that colonization was the source of the miserable condition of the 
Algerian people. But they were 'too' respectful of the law to denounce the sovereignty of 
France over Algeria. They agreed at the time of the Friends of The Manifesto on, perhaps, an 
autonomy under the French wings but they did not condemn the rule of the powerful. However 
they were aware that if they had to ally, they had to do it with their Algerian 'brothers' what- 
ever their political differences were in order to talk with the same voice. Unity that lacked the 
post Malcolm movement. The Ulemas, and especially, Ben Badis were the instigators of the 
first Algerian united front; The Muslim Congress of 1936. The self-determination SNCC and 
the Black Panthers had in mind, the economic and political control by blacks of black ghettoes 
and geographical areas of black majority 
in the South, was reminiscent of the old left-wing 
doctrine of self-determination in the black belt areas with a variation it included the northern 
black ghetto. 
The piety of the Algerian people encouraged the Association of the Ulemas to reiterate 
the same message and helped it to be accepted. As a religion Islam not only deals with the 
spiritual but also deals with the temporal in other words the ways a society ought to be struc- 
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tured. As the Ulemas had always advanced that they were apolitical, that only their action 
brushed off on the edges of politics. They did not feel the need or pressure to conceptualize 
an ideology. The ideological raw material existed already, they had only to capitalize and 
manipulate it to reach their aim. This was not the case for SNCC and the Black Panthers. 
Both found a great difficulty in identifying relationships between a purely national (or racial) 
analysis on one hand and a purely class analysis on the other hand. The sensitivity and the 
complexity of the fundamental issues such as revolution, land..., the resistance to change and 
acceptance by the majority of the white population, perhaps also their idealism in identifying 
with third world national and revolutionary movements led them to ambiguity. Slogans used 
by black militants, appeared to have a revolutionary sounding theme. They seemed to create a 
threat of a more intense revolt across the land while in reality they retreated to reforms of the 
kind wanted by the Ulemas in Algeria. But there was no doubt the action of these different 
organizations in Algeria and in the United States of America stirred up a psychological libera- 
tion from alienation and generated pride in heritage and ethos. 
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CHAPTER VI 
SEPARATION AS A NEGATION OF DOMINATION 
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Opposition to a system of domination, be it within the Algerian community under French 
power or within the black community in the United States of America, was a long standing 
phenomenon. The will to secede was on the one hand a denunciation of oppression and on the 
other hand a sanctification of a formal rupture with other existing nationalist organizations 
outlook. 
In the 1920's, a movement was constituted on the French metropolitan land. It sup- 
ported, defended and advocated a separatist policy. It gradually developed and later was 
rooted on Algerian soil. By crossing the Mediterranean, it changed. Its acronyms; the North 
African Star (NAS), at the beginning, Party of the Algerian People (PAP) then Movement for 
the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTDL) later, reflected distinct moments of Algerian 
nationalism. 
The evolution of this political trend of the pre-war independence movements was revealed 
through the choice of its acronyms. The North African Star (NAS) expanded its preoccupation 
with the North African horizon. It reflected the policy of a party born outside the national land 
and among North African immigrants who were mainly of Algerian origins. It was going to 
focus its concerns and energies to deal with the Algerian problem. The transfer and implemen. 
tation of the party in Algeria would only enhance this belief. The advent of the Party of the 
Algerian People (PAP) would be dominated by interests that were strictly Algerian. The refer- 
ence to the people would indicate clearly, not only the social component of the party and that 
mass action needed to to be undertaken. The party as the Movement for the Triumph of 
Democratic Liberties (MTDL) became a simple movement largely open to different political 
streams. Its concerns were not with the triumph of 
liberty but more modestly with democratic 
liberties. 'T'his was a sign of a drift towards a more moderate attitude as regards the action of 
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the party. However, throughout this evolution a constant feature remained: the national claim 
and the fierce opposition to colonial domination. The methods of the party were that of an 
action founded on the mobilisation of the people through meetings, demonstrations, strikes and 
social arrest. 
In Algeria, the belief in separation was limited to one organization. It was expressed in 
different tones without compromising the substance. It was very contemporary idea associated 
to the anti-colonial movement of the 1920's and 1930's. It had a longer history within the 
black community in the United States of America. 
The thought of separation was ever present, as if to counterweigh the integrationist trend. 
On January 4,1787, eighty black Bostonians petitioned the state legislature to provide 
sufficient funds to pay for their passage to and buy land in Africa (1). This idea portrayed a 
need to belong to a political entity of their own. In his book, The Condition, Elevation, Enuni. 
gration and Destiny of the Coloured People in the United States, Dr Martin R. Delany 
developed the idea by spelling out the aspiration for a nationhood "we are a nation within a 
nation". He confessed that his stance was a reaction to the refusal of whites to grant or accept 
full equality (2). He advocated mass emigration somewhere in central America ruling out 
Africa (3). Though he disagreed with Delany on the role of Africa, Bishop Henry McNeal 
Turner in the 1880's shared with him the vision of racial equality of all men. As social and 
political barrieres grew the equality of races became improbable in the United States. The 
practice of inequality in contrast to the credo and rhetoric of equality which were more indivi- 
dualistic, was racial and collective. So, if white Americans would not let black people perform 
to their highest and best abilities in the United States, then black people must establish their 
own nation and civilisation to 
bring respect and dignity to their race in a place where the 
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colour of the skin would not limit social' aspirations. This place could only be Africa. It 
would provide the national identity so much needed. 
However, this anti-American impulse expressed both by Delany and Turner seemed to be 
the consequence of frustration and despair rather than any inevitable allegiance to another 
country. Both were in favour of freedom and equality in the United States first. They were 
both torn by the ambivalent attitude stemming from a feeling of belonging rightly to the Amer- 
ican nation and the resentment generated by the rejection of black people by the majority of 
white Americans. Their call for separation did not arise from a deeply rooted traditional 
attachment to another soil or nation. It was more a defensive reaction to rejection than a 
natural identification. It was generated by the intransigent refusal of the United States to ack- 
nowledge their natural claim as Americans. 
W. E. B. DuBois articulated more fully and originally the ambivalence felt by black 
people who were Americans by birth, citizenship, political ideas, language and religion but 
were also strongly connected to black people outside America through Pan-Africanism (4). 
Feeling American and a Negro led him to join the Pan-African movement which was supposed 
to publicise the cause and interest of black people worldwide. In his autobiography, Dusk of 
Dawn, he articulated the idea that black people should be prepared for either full acceptance or 
rejection by the dominant white power. Then he warned that this was not a call for "racial 
segregation and even nationalism among Negroes". Echoing Delany and Turner he said that he 
was for "full Negro Rights and Negro Equality" but if these were not granted "an eventual 
emmigration should be foreseen" 
(5). Like many before him he was torn between two worlds, 
however in his disillusionment he advocated the settlement in one world and it tended to be 
Africa, where he settled later in his life (6). Yet, by inspiring such African leaders as Jomo 
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Kenyatta and especially Kwame Nkrumah through Pan- Africanism he managed through them 
to influence an emerging generation of black militants. 
The dual consciousness seemed to have been somewhat muted when Marcus Garvey, a 
West Indian, established The Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) on August 1, 
1914. The philosophy of Garvey's movement fully embraced blackness and rejected white 
America. He vigorously promoted racial solidarity. The UNIA's first manifesto called on 
"universal confraternity among the race" (7). This appeal was to be completed by awakening 
black consciousness. Black people must be familiar with their cultural, heritage and history, 
not only to confute the lies of a propaganda that pretended that the African was a man without 
history (8) but especially to find pride in his ancestry. This self-awareness and self-confidence 
would help black people to throw off white oppression and would make them ready for nation- 
hood. "The Negro needs a nation and a country of his own". Nationhood provided security 
for any people and it was for that ideal that UNIA strived (9). However. he suggested that the 
homeland would be in Africa while its constituency was in the United States or scattered 
around the world (10). Furthermore, Garvey did not define the kind of political vision he 
planned to implement. His appeal was limited and to a certain extent primitive in that it was 
more emotional than rational. His, main objective was the establishment of an international 
solidarity among peoples of African descent. 
Garvey set up and in agreement with a principle of economic independence, an extensive 
system of business enterprises (groceries, 
launderies, restaurants, hotels, printing plants and 
above all the Black Star Line of 
Ships). The launching of his business would have made him 
aware that he was operating within the white 
United States economy, but more importantly he 
seemed isolated because he 
did not even have the support of well established black business- 
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men (11). In 1923, the Federal Government charged him with using the mails to defraud in 
the sale of stock for his steamship line. He was convicted and sentenced to a five year term. 
He was pardoned two years later and then deported. He died in London in 1940 (12). 
Garvey had left his mark on the black world. He set up a standard by which most things 
were gauged. This was the standard of race first and other considerations later. Garvey was 
the instigator of the first and greatest black mass movement in American history (13) because 
he successfully voiced the hopes and resentments of black people. He gave them a sense of 
dignity and destiny and made them feel that they were human beings (14). However more 
importantly, Garvey managed to convey a message which focused on giving black people a 
consciousness for nationhood without being jailed, murdered or exiled . Despite its authenti. 
city, Garveyism failed to bring back black Americans to Africa. Undertaking this venture was 
a bold but fanciful move. It was attractive to many because it struck at the heart of the iden- 
tity crisis black people were undergoing. He not only offered them ethnological roots but also 
an escape or a hope of an escape from their alienation. It did not materialise physically but it 
shook up many psychologically 
by relating them to Africa. It was in this environment that the 
Lost Found Nation of Islam was established in the early 1930's. 
In 1930, a peddler appeared in the black community of Detroit. His name was Wallace 
D. or W. D. Fard. He was well accepted within the homes of black people who were ready to 
buy his silk and artifacts which were, according to him, similar to those worn by blacks in 
their homeland (15). His light skin colour and oriental features favoured the belief that he was 
Muslim. As his anti-white rhetoric became more and more virulent, he managed to make them 
familiar with the Koran. His doctrine was spelled out in one written text, Teaching for the 
Lost Found Nation of Islam in a Mathematical Way, and an orally transmitted text in two 
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parts, Secret Ritual of the Nation of Islam. In both of them, he emphasised his role as a 
saviour. He laid down the foundation for the glorification of their past and the duty to recover 
their religion (Islam), their language (Arabic) and their culture. He urged black people to live 
according to the law of Allah based on complete moral submission to Him but also on physical 
cleaness as conditions for their acceptance to Paradise - The Holy City of Mecca (16). 
Politically Fard's doctrine was nationalistic. His message was directed to a Nation - The 
Nation of Islam. The people who would feel part of this nation were no longer Americans 
since their allegiance should go to the Nation of Islam and the Muslim flag, and not to the 
American constitution and flag. Fard's influence was going to be decisive. As Fard disap- 
peared as mysteriously as he appeared around 1933/34, one of his lieutenants emerged as the 
new leader, his name was Elijah Poole (17). 
Fard came to be referred to as Allah, while Elijah now Muhammed became his 
Messenger or prophet. From Chicago he decided to reshape the organization. He decided to 
focus on developing its institutions such as temples, schools grocery stores, restaurants and 
farms. He was also determined to increase the membership. Though no official figure had 
been released, observers believed that membership was between 10.000 and 250.000 (18). 
But more importantly he expanded Fard's Message, he preached dignity and a conviction that 
black people were equal to white people. 
The development of the Algerian nationalist movement had a different origin. It was 
within the Algerian immigration to France that the kernel of the Algerian separatism sprouted. 
The causes were numerous. The most obvious and paradoxically the less talked about was 
undoubtedly the freedom of action, relatively greater 
in France where the civil liberties were 
more respected than in colonized Algeria. However, the deepest one stemmed from the 
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colonial dialectics: the colonial exploitation impelled a mass of landless peasants to leave the 
coutryside in order to seek jobs in cities and especially in the Metropolis. Proletarianised these 
peasants got in touch and were in contact with the more radical metropolitan proletarian class 
which helped them to get involved in forms of social struggle and develop a national consci- 
ence. 
The initial wave of immigration during the First World War was followed by another one 
which enlarged significantly the ranks of the foreign and the French born people (19). It was 
an Algerian colony uprooted without transition from its mountains and native countryside to 
the metropolitan plants. Unskilled, its imperfect knowledge of the French language and its 
relative isolation had made of this community an under- rated and rejected lumpen proletariat 
living at the periphery of the French social arena. It was this marginality which would sharpen 
its national awareness. An awareness which would become stronger once contact was esta. 
blished with the French Communist Party (FCP), which was particularly active and resolutely 
committed to the anti-colonialist struggle. It was the period when the French Communist 
party (FCP) supported Abdelkrim in his war of the Rif against the Spanish. It was also the 
period that witnessed the creation of the Intercolonial Union' in 1922 under the wing the FCP. 
It was an organization of immigrant workers in France coming from colonized countries. Its 
purpose was to coordinate the anti-colonialist struggle of nationals of different colonies (20). 
At last, it was the period where the Emir Khaled, thought to be a revolutionary leader by the 
FCP, was stirring up the patriotic fibre within the Algerin workers during his conferences in 
Paris in 1924 (21). 
It was in this political ferment that the North African Star (NAS) was born officially in 
1926 (22). Its dual preoccupation, social and national, was characterised by a proletarian 
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nationalism. The proletarian scheme (23) of NAS mixed the social claim and the international- 
ist perspective of the anti-imperialist struggle. The dominant national claim was the indepen- 
dence of North Africa (24). On the one hand this demand was going to determine the evolu- 
tion of the party and the other hand to make of it the main target for the repressive action of 
the colonial administration. 
The evolution of NAS was three fold. Firstly, a progressive shift from the French Com- 
munist Party occurred. NAS was part and parcel of the struggle to liberate the colonies but it 
was also the instrument of a collectivity that had its own features, values and specifity. The 
FCP became more concerned with its role than its action, more with its partisan stance than 
with its political support to Algeria and the 'International'. The paths parted for FCP believed 
that the anti-colonialist struggle was a fundamental element in the struggle for socialism and 
the liberation of the colonies remained a preliminary to an action that would oppose capitalism. 
This had generated a separation but not a rupture with communism. 
Secondly, the field of concern shrank to Algeria. In 1933 NAS adopted a programme 
that asked for the substitution of the Delegations Financieres by an Algerian parliament elected 
through the universal suffrage. It asked also for the suppression of all differences in jobs, 
status, and education between native Algerians and Europeans. However the main claim was 
the establishment of a free Algeria once democracy was restored. This state would have its 
national army, sovereign parliament and language. NAS projected the principle of a state set 
in the service of the majority. No social class would monopolize it. It would be that of the 
people and for the Algerians. This empirical populism, that characterised the Algerian nation- 
alism at its source, would never stop to manifest itself (25). 
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Thirdly, the emergence of Messall as a leader of the party. He was elected general secre- 
tary then chairperson of NAS in 1926. Self taught, influenced by the Turkish revolution and 
the Emir Khaled, he later broke his relationship with FCP members blaming them for their 
dogmatic urge to lead the Algerian workers and use them as a mass for matters concerning 
only the French. He was eloquent, warm, fluent in Arabic and French and energetic. So when 
he came to the fore his programme was already sketched: independence, renaissance of Islam 
and independent nationalist organization allied but not subject to the French revolutionary 
movement (26). 
The roots of the separatist movements within the Algerian community and the black com. 
munity were different. The black separatist credo was a consequence of the duality of the 
experience of the black people in the United States. They were, because of their racial charac. 
teristics, different from the typical Americans and were denied full participation in that society 
for this reason. While at the same time they were expected to meet all the responsibilities and 
duties of citizenship. It reflected a struggle against the negative self-image many black people 
had unconsciously developed and the sense of hopelessness that had persisted in the black 
community as a direct consequence of 
being treated as inferiors. 
The Algerian separatist movement was the result of the experience of the Algerian immi- 
grants in France. As workers they were 
in contact with an active radicalism whose spearhead 
was French communism. 
This new ideology for them helped to sharpen and develop their 
struggle firstly against capitalism and secondly against colonialism. 
As they drifted slowly but 
without a break 
in their ties with the French left the nationalists focused more and more on 
fighting colonialism. 
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The development and evolution of the two separatist movements seemed antithetical. The 
Algerians in France were sympathetic to and recipients of a left wing internationalist message 
because it condemned the exploitative nature of colonialism and preached brotherhood of work- 
ing people regardless of skin colour or creed. Islam was the essence of the Nation of Islam. 
Both Islam and communism despite their incompatible natures shared a feature: both advocated 
equality, freedom and justice. Though these concepts were subject to interpretation in agree- 
ment with the credo of either ideology, they both agreed on principles that would rid the world 
of domination, exploitation and alienation. That was the reason that made them both appeal- 
ing. 
Moreover these ideological foundations helped to buttress the need for identity. Black 
Muslims found in Islam a shelter that had not been 'pillaged' by the white man. Islam also 
attracted because it had opposed and even fought Christianity. It had also been a religion of 
protest and challenge. This religion provided them with a sense of belonging to a larger com- 
munity that was not restricted to earthly boundaries but that cut across communities and 
nations because its ultimate aim was to gather Mankind as brothers and sisters holding as a cri- 
terion for differenciation the faith in, belief in and submission to Allah. Islam provided roots 
for black believers in the United States and taught them solidarity. It lifted their general 
morale. It filled their emptiness. It gave a raison d'etre to those who were facing personal 
crises and were drifting aimlessly. As regards Algerians the identity was there it just had to be 
revealed again. In contact with this new 
ideological and social environment they used this 
identity as a dynamic to try to change the condition in Algeria. The help of the French left 
came as a catalyst for the whole movement but it was not the driving force. Both Islam and 
communism triggered a sense of pride 
in that both black people and Algerians not only 
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discovered their humanity in other words they were entitled to certain rights but they also 
discovered that they deserved dignity and respect. But more importantly they became aware 
that they had to take their faith upon their shoulders. 
In Nanterre (France) on March 11,1937 the Party of the Algerian People (PAP) was 
created under the leadership of Messali Hadj. The birth of this new party witnessed a breaka- 
way from the anterior political practices of NAS. "A party has been created.... this party has as 
an aim the improvement of the material, social and moral conditions of Algerians". This arti- 
cle of its constitution seemed almost banal and reproduced article two of NAS's constitution. 
However its vagueness concealed the real objective of the party, the liberation of Algeria (27). 
The words party and Algerians were prominent in the constitutive charter. The use of "party" 
meant that the time of associations was past, and that of "Algerians" showed that the North 
African perspective gave way to an Algerian national interest. Both represented more an out- 
come than a mutation. But the most important element was the official existence of a political 
party in Algeria when the conditions and the colonial goodwill allowed it. But this party went 
underground when it was subject to an 
interdiction by decree on September 26,1939, a deci- 
sion which was maintained until 1947 (28). 
The doctrinal line followed by NAS was found in the texts spread by PAP. The drift 
was clearly not towards radicalisation but rather towards a softening of its stance. The word 
independence continued to serve as the main attracting pole. The association with France was 
thus rejected. The evolution was not also limited to a simple geographical transfer. lt affected 
more deeply the social implementation. 
The acronym PAP was explicit. The notion of people 
expressed the will to gather the greatest number of 
Muslim Algerians regardless of their social 
strata (29). 
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The programme of the party upheld the fundamental dichotomy that opposed colonizers 
and colonized. It played down the contradiction between exploiters and exploited whatever 
their ethnic origin. It referred to state lands to be distributed to landless peasants (30). The 
programme indicated clearly the will to achieve the participation of natives through a particular 
conception of nationalisation perceived as the "appropriation by nationals of the means of pro- 
duction" (31). PAP marked a clear drift from the working ideology of NAS. It asserted expli- 
citly that the "action of the party will be neither race struggle nor class struggle" (32) in order 
to reassure* the most moderate elements of the Algerian nationalism. Moreover, the party 
softened it political claims because it was coveting the electorate for future elections (33). It 
stressed the rejection of assimilation and separation. This was an emphasis on a clear retreat 
from the most radical positions NAS had held. Moreover in order to insert itself within the 
Algerian context and to mobilize the native masses that were deeply attached to religion, PAP 
not only joined the position the Ulemas held but resorted to religious rhetoric to clarify its 
stance (34). It equally showed the will to move away 
from the Marxist analysis. The modera- 
tion could be explained also by the presence and scope of repression for besides the claims 
henceforth classical such as the abolition of the indigenat, code of forestry, of exceptional laws, 
introduction of democratic liberties and the free practice of the Muslim cult... PAP chose as 
principal watchword an 
Algerian parliament (35) elected through the use of the universal 
suffrage regardless of race or religion because 
it appeared to be the only valid means that 
remained in order to pursue 
its nationalist action within the lines of the law. When the word 
independence was uttered during a public meeting, five members of the leadership of the party 
were arrested on August 27,1937. 
Though the party grew in popularity due to police harass- 
ment PAP was officially disolved on 
September 26,1939 and went underground (36). 
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The party's stance became more radical. The watchword independence reappeared. PAP 
urged Algerians not to join the French army during World War II. It radicalised the stance of 
the Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty (FML) by calling on independence rather than an 
autonomist republic federalised to France (37). The ruthless action touched every political fac- 
tion, reformists and radicals alike knew arrests, jails or removals (38). Harshly affected, the 
party called an abstention and denounced the futility of the electoralist solution (39). It was 
supported in its appeal by the ex-FML which helped it to drag a large proportion of the popu- 
lation away from the ballot box. However, after the release of Ferhat Abbas on March 16, 
1946 PAP found itself isolated as an advocate of a boycott as regards the elections of the 
second Assemblee Constituante of June 1946. Despite this isolation it managed to convince an 
electorate sensitive to its arguments (40). But PAP was nevertheless aware that the need for a 
new strategy was necessary. It was facing the dilemma of either leaning towards a direct 
action or resuming a legalist approach. At the end the party decided to return to the law. It 
presented candidates for the legislatives elections under the label For the Triumph of the 
Democratic Liberties' in November 1946 announcing thus the new drive of the party. 
The party wavered between different stances without compromising the substance of its 
message, the liberation of Algeria. The period that lasted almost a decade was almost a period 
of groping the party's way forward. The party succeeded its implementation in Algeria and 
managed to have an audience. Once the French repression was threatening to marginalise it, 
the party decided for a tactical move to abide by the law. This drive was undoubtedly the 
reverse of the form of struggle undertaken by PAP and in which activism had often been the 
strategy. The long clandestine period would 
have only developed the contradictory tendancies 
stemming from this activism, on the one 
hand the aptitude for mobilization and mass action 
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and on the other hand the emergence of a faction within the party that believed in authoritari- 
anism. 
So, this second stage was gestative. The party was adapting itself to the new conditions 
at home. Its ambivalent action resulted from a dilemna of either moving towards a more radi- 
cal stance or a trouble-free one. Nonetheless a constant remained based on a claim that separa- 
tion from France was imperative. It was the means to achieve this goal which remained to be 
defined, either through a total rupture or through a scheme that would favour some kind of 
self-determination. The party decided at the end of this period to participate in the political life 
to avoid isolation and marginalisation. The party refused the withdrawal the Nation of Islam 
chose in the United States of America. 
Like Marcus Garvey before, the Nation of Islam fostered race consciousness and pride in 
being black. Its members believed that the black man had a destiny and the white man was 
the only obstacle between him and freedom, development and God. The religious nature of 
their organization had laid a theocratic foundation. The political source and authority was 
Allah whose message was spread by his prophet Elijah Muhammed. 
The first task of Muhammed was to formulate a set of mythological doctrines which were 
by their very nature beyond the rules of logic. A religious myth claimed an immunity from 
dispute. The Nation's eschatology served many purposes. Firstly, it aimed to free black peo- 
ple from the negative image cast on them 
by the dominant white society and which icd them to 
make of this image an objective truth. 
Its consequences were alienation and a sense of being 
despised. Secondly, it wanted to give the black man a sense of purpose. It wanted to present 
the black man with values that were worth 
being attached to. It wanted to project a future 
within which blackness would not 
be a hinderance. The discovery and knowledge of black 
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people's identity (religion, nation, God and self) were a necessity. They would reconcile black 
people with their racial identity and would help the creative individual and collective contribu- 
tion. 
This psychological and educational action was complemented by the definition of the 
enemy: the white man who was responsible for the hardships and sufferings experienced by 
black people. The second task of Muhammed was therefore to challenge the claim of moral 
and spiritual superiority, or the myth of white supremacy. The doctrines Muhammed taught 
wanted to create a more purposeful and a more utilatarian positive self- image. The aim was 
to reverse the mechanism ignited by white supremacists. 
Firstly, a theological redefinition had to be made. God was a black man embodied once 
by Master Fard Muhammed (41). He was not a spirit he was the supreme Black Man. He had 
chosen to reveal himself within his true people and would punish the white man for the evil he 
had created and done. The emphasis of this interpretation was always on the colour black 
which at the end came to be associated with supreme perfection (42). A part of this interpreta- 
tion was dedicated to the Original Man who was black and the creation of the devil personified 
by the white man. 
This argument served to answer a paradox. The Muslims refuted the thought that God 
could have created a 
bad thing. The caucasion race came to existence from the weakest part of 
the black man and which was a 
brown germ. The white man was the creation of Yacub, a 
black scientist who rebelled against Allah (43). However in the process of making his white 
creatures he took away their 
humanity. Elijah Muhammed enforced this idea when he stressed 
"The human beast - the serpent, the dragon, the devil and Satan - all mean one and the same; 
the people or race known as the white or caucasion race, sometimes called the European race" 
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(44). Then he added a year later in an article, "since by nature they were created liars and 
murderers, they are the enemies of truth and righteousness, and the enemies of those who seek 
the truth... " (45). The negative features attributed to the white men were untrue. However, 
they were part of a religious mythology that would come to justify and enhance the claim for 
separation. It explained the origins of black people. It determined the cause of black 
suffering, the white man who was an artificial race spoliated power that belonged to black peo- 
ple. It revealed the divine plan (46) which was executed to justify enslavement. It forecast 
Godly intervention to destroy white power. It was also the source according to which the 
Nation's politics was shaped. 
Religion was the ideological foundation of Muhammed's thought. Impregnated by Islam, 
Muhammed was going, even in a distorted way, to apply some of its concepts. The mythology 
had helped him to claim the existence of a great black nation. The legitimacy of his political 
thought would be provided by his self-proclamation as the Messenger of God. The intimate 
knowledge of Allah and the true religion had given him political authority to rule. He was the 
more able to confer justice because the emanation of 
his power stemmed from God. 
When PAP became The Movement for the Triumph of the Democratic Liberties (MTDL) 
in February 1947 (47), the doctrinal content of nationalism was defined in a brochure entitled, 
The Algerian Problem - General Considerations- and especially in the part dealing with the 
Guiding Principles of the Algerian Movement (48). The text revealed that nationalism was an 
answer to the colonial domination through the assertion of a national entity and the call for 
resistance. 
Nationalism found its complete legitimacy by rejecting colonization as an initial aggres- 
sion, in the will to 
liberate the occupied land from the foreign invader and in the efforts to 
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recover the national identity denied and distorted by the dominant power. Nationalism was a 
self- assertion in face of the negation of the self that constituted colonialism. The nation was 
revealed to itself by the knowledge of history. The cult of the past was kept alive in order to 
legitimate the claim of the captive nation to live free in the present and in the future. The 
features of the nation such as the will to live together and the common vision of the future 
were well stressed (49). For in front of the colonial power the nation could only be unani- 
mous. Nationalism in its unifying will brushed aside the notion of class struggle. The nation 
was henceforth stripped of any social content. Later the report of the central committee 
presented at the second congress of the MTDL in April 1953 underlined the "non- communist, 
non-materialistic features of the Algerian nationalism" (50). The rejection of communism was 
accompanied by the rejection of capitalism. 
The needed union would be founded on a freeing momentum that would lead the nation 
to liberation from the colonial yoke. The Algerian nationalism is a freeing nationalism 
and a reaction of an oppressed nation against imperialism therefore opposed to the Euro- 
pean nationalism, chauvinistic and imperialist, and whose belligerency had led to the sub. 
jugation of a people by other peoples (51). 
A clear cut distinction was thus made between the oppressive nationalism of certain 
European countries and the nationalism that freed (52), and drew its legitimacy from the 
natural rights and universal morale that condemned any oppression and believed "inadmissible 
that a man or a people could be dominated, oppressed by another man or another people" (53). 
It claimed filiation with the principle of the rights of peoples for self- determination. Principle 
and right consecrated historically 
by the independence of the former English colonies in North 
America, by the French Revolution of 1789, by the message of President Wilson in 1917, by 
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the Treaty of Peace of 1919, by the Atlantic Charter and that of the United Nations. 
These references were meant to put Algerian nationalism in the realm of a historical per- 
spective in other words in the line of the general norms governing the international community. 
Nationalism called upon the world to witness the impossible dialogue with the dominant 
power. For the claim of national existence implied that of the international one which implied 
in its turn the vocation of an individual to universalism. This would explain the rejection of 
racism (54) and of any religious fanaticism (55). The double rejection was going to justify the 
stance taken as regards the status of the European minority which was destined to live in an 
Algeria free from the colonial yoke, "... In agreement with the prevailing principles in many 
countries.... these foreigners of European origin will have the Algerian nationality .... they will 
feel children of the Algerian fatherland and will act as such" (56). 
The best guarantee that could be given to this minority, which would choose to integrate 
or not to the national community, would be the respect of the democratic principle in the name 
of which the future regime of the independent Algeria was defined. Democracy, the main cri- 
terion of the standard of civilization, was claimed as a principle for struggle and as a principle 
of socio-economic organization represented 
by the Social and Democratic Republic mentioned 
in the MTDL programme which was elaborated during the congress of April 1953 (57). How- 
ever the lines of this democratic project were only sketched and the generality of the aim could 
not lift the ambiguity attached to the etymological acceptance of 
Democracy perceived as the 
government of the people 
(58). Without announcing the revenge of a majority dominated for a 
long time by a minority, this project appeared mainly as the reflection of the reversed picture 
of the colonial system. It presented 
itself in general as the antithesis of colonialism. 
-249- 
The substance of the kind of nationalism preached by the Black Muslims was different. 
Politically the objective was expressed in terms of a homeland and post apocalyptic Black 
Nation. While the former might lie within the realm of a possibility, the post apocalyptic 
Black Nation was related to wishful thinking and transcendental human experience. This 
stance was justified by the explanation that the American institutions had been created for the 
enjoyment of the white man. The basic American charters and documents were the legal 
weapon that gave a legitimacy to unjust human conditions black people put up with for centu- 
ries. 
Like the Algerians, the Nation's political objective in the long run was separation. The 
idea of separation was embedded in the black experience in the United States. Black people 
did not volunteer to immigrate. They were brought up to be slaves. When the young Ameri- 
can nation was set up it did not include them. From the start they were excluded, yet when 
the time had come to defend the bedrock of democracy against sedition, expansionism or fas- 
cism they were called upon to fulfill their duty as full citizens. The irony was that constitu- 
tionally many black people were not enjoying their rights as full citizens and yet they were 
expected to 
behave as such. The implication of this perception was that they were full 
members of a body called a Nation, conscious of its unity and consequently as subjects they 
were entitled to its protection. Like the Algerian nationalism, the idea of separation was meant 
to bring about self-assertion by shaping a new loyalty through which black people could 
renounce the American State and 
Nation because both failed in their obligations towards them. 
"We are not and can not be American citizens, since we are not American by nature and by 
race" (59) Elijah Muhammed commented. 
Separation would be the answer to rejection and 
negation of the self for 
black people by embracing the Nation's ideology, they would rise up 
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vigorous, assertive and, above all, themselves. 
However, while Algerians found their inspiration in a concept of nationalism that claimed 
a universal call, black Muslims rejected any reference to the white world. While Algerians 
thought of themselves as a specific entity of a whole called the universe, the black Muslims 
perceived their nationalism as a confronting one in a world divided into black/good and 
white/evil. Any connection or reference to a contribution made by whites wherever they were 
to the Greatness of Man would be a blasphemy. While the Algerians welcolmed any values 
that had heightened the spirit to be free from the shackles of oppression regardless of whom 
created or initiated them, the Black Muslims were more selective and rejected any white value. 
While the Algerians wanted to be inclusive, the Black Muslims were exclusive. Algerians 
seemed to adhere to the concept of democracy as defined by Westerners, though they remained 
vague in their definition, the Black 
Muslims through their post apocalyptic vision of the world 
were expecting to gain a hegemonic ascendency on whites when God would decide to destroy 
the Christian world. They therefore refused any participation in any political action since they 
were waiting for doomsday. On the other hand, while denouncing the American government 
as unjust and corrupt, they were asking 
in their point seven of the programme and position at 
the back of every issue of Muhammed Speaks (60), not only for equal justice but for equal 
opportunities by respecting the 
United States law thus seeming to acknowledge the American 
democratic process. The ambivalent stance reflected a concern to appear to deal with earthly 
problems in order either to 
increase membership since there was more consensus on integration 
than separation within the black community or to avoid 
further marginalisadon. The Algerians 
by accepting the concept of democracy would 
justify their rejection of racism and religious 
fanaticism which the Nation of Islam encouraged. The Nation even forbade inter-racial mar- 
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riages. It was easy for the Algerians to promote democracy, as the government of the people 
and knowing also that it was in a way the domination of a minority by a majority, so if the 
democratic rule was applied they would rule their country since they were the more sizable 
community (9 to 1 in favour). The context led to two different attitudes. 
This was enhanced by the Algerian nationalists when they became involved within the 
political process defined by the colonial power. They resorted to the ultimate means, war, 
because the electoralist experience failed but they had always chosen the legal way before the 
violent one. MTDL had a resounding victory 
in the municipal elections of October 1947 but 
failures occurred when electoral frauds were organized following the legislative elections of 
1948 and 1951 (61). Apparently the subterfuge was used to nip the nationalist violence in the 
bud (62). The 'elections of Naegelen', named after the governor of the time would be hen. 
ceforth a current practice and would contribute to make hollow the political status of Algeria 
defined in 1947 (63) and which was welcolmed unreservedly by MTDL. 
The failure of the electoral experience stressed the fundamental contradiction between a 
radical nationalist scheme that demanded national independence and refused any assimilationist 
compromise, and a reformist political practice respectful of the legal path. This failure in the 
eyes of nationalists not only proved the futility of the vote within the colonial context but more 
fundamentally the rigidity of the colonial system and its impossible transformation through 
legal methods or channels. Moreover, alongside the electoral fraud, the represive drive of the 
police did not stop (64). 
The Algerians came to take a final decisive and radical stance only because their hopes in 
the institutional system were betrayed. The 
Nation of Islam on the contrary rejected and 
dismissed the prevailing political system in the United States at the time. They did not 
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participate in local or national politics applying faithfully Muhammed's religious teachings. As 
the nation was not a political force to reckon with but just an organization, disciplined and rhe- 
torically aggressive, they tried to conciliate their desire to improve black peoples condition with 
their political claims. Either they had to go underground and be violent, this was not a practi- 
cal solution knowing the might of the United States government. Or they had to be less dog- 
matic, less rigid and use the means available, the first of which was the American political sys- 
tem. The participation would not have compromised their basic or long term goal of separa- 
tion but would have helped them to bridge the gap firstly with other black organizations and 
secondly they would have appeared to be more active and therefore more concerned. But they 
were adamant and clung to their withdrawal. 
Malcolm X was realistic enough to split up with 
this body that chose to be marginal, and was unable to be pragmatic in order to look for other 
ways to get politically involved. 
The Nation did not create any process (65) through which 
they would have put forward policies dealing with issues that would have gathered a consensus 
within the black community and among 
black organizations. 
The Nation's stagnation stemmed from the authoritarian nature of the Nation's internal 
structure. It did not allow any constructive and 
democratic debate on issues. Elijah was like a 
theocratic ruler. He led by divine right and great authority (66). The structure reflected the 
ideological belief that "the Nation of Islam is a nation within a nation" and as such it ought to 
have its own governing body (67) embodied by Muhammed. This contrasted with the nature 
of a party which invited debate and 
dialogue but more fundamentally provided for the election 
of the leadership. For 
instance when MTDL was torn between partisans who wanted to remain 
underground and those who 
favoured legalism, the congress of 1947 opted for legalism while 
deciding on the creation of a para-military organization which would pursue the clandestine 
- 253 - 
action, satisfying partially those who favoured it, in parallel with the legal action of MTDL. 
That was the reason the party was referred to sometimes as PAP - MTDL in order to underline 
the double plan that defined its action. This functional dualism reflected also the disarray and 
uncertainty in view of the choice they had to make at that time between lawfulness and 
violence (68). But the party was not immune from authoritarianism. The double action 
reflected the growing division between on the one hand the old leadership of the party that 
advocated lawful action (69) and that wanted to increase the hierarchisation of the party. The 
party's structure was based on three levels: a national congress (which defined the party policy 
and elected the president of the party and the central committee), a central committee (supreme 
body of the party between the conferences of the congress) and the political bureau (composed 
of 8 to 12 members elected by the central committee; it was responsible for carrying out the 
decisions of the central committee. Its function was to elect the general secretary of the party). 
The election by the same body of the central committee and the chairman of the party would 
favour the preeminence of the latter and the submission of the party to the cult of its leader. 
The new structure of the party needed full-timers appointed to the organization in order ini- 
tially to smooth its functioning, but this bureaucratisation would just widen the gap between 
the leadership and the basis. On the other hand, a faction within MTDL was claiming a demo- 
cratisation of the structure of the party and emphasised the necessity of the notion of collective 
leadership. Thus, at least MTDL as a party was open to challenge either on policies or per- 
sonalities (70). A process that was 
inconceivable within the stucture of the Nation of Islam. 
The withdrawal, the animosity and the sclerosis of the nation reinforced their marginalisation 
as regards the black movement of the 
1960's. Their persistent attacks on integrationists 
emphasised the factionalism of this movement and 
did not help their cause either within the 
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black community or in connection with the government. 
Alienated by the white world, the Nation of Islam turned its venom towards the black 
middle class which accepted the values and the political rule of the prevailing power. No 
matter how much education he had, every day things keep reminding him.... (that) he can't 
escape the stigma the white man has saddled him with" (71), Malcolm commented when he 
was still a member of the Nation. This black middle class represented by and large the 
integrationist leadership. By attacking them the Muslims were defending their political stance, 
that was separation and which was according to them a valid, sound alternative; and whose 
outcome remained however a 'mystery'. The attacks were meant to attract and swing the opin- 
ion of a large number of black people from different strata and which generally shared the 
integrationists ideal. The Nation emphasised the political deadlock black people found them- 
selves in due to their number. For a democracy could be seen as the political system by which 
a majority of people, of opinion, held power at the expense of a minority or even minorities of 
people or opinion. It could be perceived as an oppressive system as well. 
Integration was only part of the solution of the problems of black people because firstly, 
the ways and means were part of a process defined by whites and which had proven to be 
regressive and impermeable as regards black people. For instance the Federal Government did 
not protect black people against violations of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
amendments to the Constitution. 
Secondly, integration meant the reliance upon white political 
and economic help, 'if not 
initiative, for black people's advancement and community improve- 
ments. It had stifled black people's ability to do anything for themselves without relying on 
white people's support as 
Malcolm X once said; 
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Messenger Muhammed has taught us how we eventually became like the beggar Lazarus 
of the Bible (Luke 16: 20): Our condition became very sore. We sat here amid the rubb- 
ish of the Western world, at the feet of the rich white Christians.... begging for the crumbs 
(in other words Civil Rights) and token integration (72). 
Integration meant also the dilution of the black community within the white one, and 
there was a fear that the black people would embrace totally the American white ethos and 
therefore would be lost forever. This perception was linked to the apocalyptic idea that the 
Christian world was a failure and there would be a redemption for black people if they came 
back to their original religion therefore values. There was a doubt that integration would bring 
about equality. The chasm between white and black peoples' conditions had generated an ine- 
quality of conduct in civil and economic areas. Middle class integrationists tended to focus on 
the inequality of conduct but a distinction existed between integration as a means and integra- 
tion as an end. As the former, it might open doors to opportunities but as the latter it would 
not solve the overall quality of life and 
human dignity. The consequence was an unclear and 
undefined perception of 
black people's collective image of their role and place within the 
American society. According to the Black Muslims black people should not be deceived by 
integration l ecause it would not bring about a true distribution of political power. 
You buy out the Negro leaders with 30 pieces of silver and get them to sell our people 
on accepting 'token integration'... When one uses a token on the bus or streetcar that 
token is a substitute for the real money. Token means 'a substitute', that takes the place 
of the real thing (73). 
The Nation of Islam's rejection of integration isolated it from the mainstream black politi. 
cäl thought and made impossible an unitary scheme. Of course, from the start Muhammed 
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wanted to reach as many black people as possible, "We are trying to reach all black Men, 
those in the colleges and those in jails", (74) because "one of the chief purposes of Islam is to 
bring about unity of our people" (75). This expression of a will to unite black people was 
never realised because the division between black Muslims and mainstream black politics was 
a fundamental one. The Muslims were separatists and condemned any link with whites. 
integrationists were seeking a recognition of their constitutional rights as Americans and they 
were ready and willing to accept any help from whites. The 
incompatibility of the goals gen- 
erated a dilemna for the Muslims, their political stance pushed them to smear integration yet 
they had to look for acceptance among the black people. The movement led by Martin Luther 
King triggered off a reaction by which black people were risking everything especially in the 
South in order to get fully involved in the American political arena which was an anathema to 
the black Muslims. It is important to point out that integrationalist ideals were accepted by the 
vast majority of black Americans. 
Condemning integration was condemning the belief, hopes 
and aspirations of the followers, activists and sympathizers of the most sizable movement of 
the period. Muhammed's definition of black unity meant 
his elevation as the supreme guide of 
the black community. He wanted to 
lead a congregation fully embracing his ideas (76). He 
wanted to take over simply through 
his divine wisdom and self-appointment as Messenger of 
God. So from the start Muhammed's political stance had tied him to a narrow view. He did 
not give himself room for political manoeuvres. 
Muhammed's ideology neutralized him. 
In Algeria, on the contrary, the pluralism of the national claim through different political 
formations had tried at different times to manifest itself within a unitary scheme. The first 
attempt was the creation of the 
Muslim Congress in 1936 (77). A gathering made of the Ule- 
mas, the Elected and the 
Algerian Communist Party (ACP) but without NAS at that time. The 
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congress failed because it was attacked on the left by NAS (78) and on the right by the 
Federation of Algeria's Mayors (79). Facing this double hostility the action of the Muslim 
Congress became inefficient and soon its membership scattered. Ben Badis refused its 
presidency, two of its other leaders Ferhat Abbas and Dr Benjelloul separated to found 
independent parties. The Muslim Congress died away after it generated great hope within the 
moderate faction of the Algerian nationalist movement (80). 
Other attempts to combine were going to follow the Muslim Congress but would be very 
limited or would remain at the level of a scheme (81). It was on March 14,1944 that the 
efforts were materialised in the creation of a large gathering representing Algerian nationalism, 
The Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty (FML) (82). It regrouped the Elected (83), PAP and 
the Ulemas (84). Drawing its inspiration from the Manifesto and above all its additive, the 
programme of FML (85) broke off with the assimilationist faction of the reformist wing. It 
claimed at 'the beginning the establishment of an "autonomous Algerian republic federalised to 
a renovated, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist French republic". This statement emphasised 
nationalist stances under the thrust of PAP whose drive was going to dominate FML especially 
from the congress held in March 1945 (86). As a consequence of this hardening, the ordi- 
nance of March 7,1944, a new version of the Blum-Viollette Bill, would be regarded as old. 
fashioned and no longer suitable. Within this same perspective the watchwords to boycott the 
French electoral college and the refusal to register on voting lists, were launched. A new 
impetus was given to the Algerian nationalist movement which at the end of the Second World 
War looked forward with optimism. The membership of FML grew larger and larger. For the 
first time in the history of Algerian nationalism a true political mobilisation was taking place. 
However, this evolution would worry the fierce defenders of the colonial order. As the 
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Congress of Algeria's Mayors was an answer to the Muslim Congress so were the bloody days 
of May 1945 to FML which was dissolved on May 14,1945 (87). 
FML and the events of May 1945 were going to deeply mark the evolution of Algerian 
nationalism especially the radical wing of the Algerian movement. The mystic of unity became 
stronger and stronger and violence emerged as the necessary answer to the colonialist violence. 
The possibility of an armed struggle started to become obvious to some militants. The creation 
within MTDL of an underground para-military organization - secret organization (SO) - 
stressed this evolution. But an opposite to 
SO was shaping too. Coming from the offices of 
the parties which traumatised by the violence of the colonial repression, would hide behind an 
inhibitive caution hoping to find a solution in the ballot box. 
From then on unity would be perceived strictly in the electoral field where the different 
parties deployed all their energies. 
The fraudulent elections of June 17,1951 were to prompt 
these parties to get involved in a unitary action. They created the Algerian Front for the 
Defence and Respect of Liberty (FDRL). It regrouped MTDL, DUAM, the Ulemas and ACP 
(88). The Front was preoccupied with electoralist ends. Among its main claims that appeared 
in its programme were the cancellation of the legislative elections of June 17.1951, the respect 
of the freedom to vote in the second college, the respect of 
the fundamental liberties and the 
freedom of political prisoners (89). The fraility of its programme was going to quickly reduce 
it to impotence and would lead to failure 
for contrary to gatherings realised so far each party 
and 'each political formation within the 
Front retained a great autonomy of action. 
Facing events this gathering would reveal a lack of unitary discipline. Municipal elec- 
tions of April/May 1953 were going to generate a 
bitter competition between the different 
nationalist parties which would quickly 
forget about their alliance freshly sealed. To unity 
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would succeed electoral rivalries and competition. MTDL learnt the lesson of this failure. 
The Algerian Front did not raise up to the popular hopes in the field of its programme 
and that of its activity. The spirit of the parties.... took most of the time over the spirit of 
the union that should always prevail in front of colonialism (90). 
New calls on unity would remain unanswered. ACP in November 1953 (91) like MTDL 
called on the creation of a new unitary structure (92). The central committee of MTDL 
launched the idea of an Algerian National Congress. A structure that would accept any politi- 
cal party, organization or personalities that had the rise of Algeria in their hearts (93). This 
call would generate no echo and would remain without fulfilment, all the more so that MTDL 
was going through a grave political crisis which would lead to its breaking up. Unity was 
remote and there was no more time for internal squabbles and division. 
The failure of these unifying experiences underlined the limits of a heterogeneous coali- 
tion torn by drives and preoccupations which were completely divergent and even contradic. 
tory. The National Front of Liberation (NFL) eventually drew the conclusion of this failure by 
basing its action on the experience of the underground action of PAP - MTDL. 
The experience of the underground action in Algeria denounced the illusion of legalism 
and showed at the same time the necessity and urgency of direct action in the form of an 
armed struggle. The reformist wing of nationalism had dismissed such action. However PAP 
MTDL had tackled it seriously. The underground period had acquainted militants with a 
marginal action and had prompted the 
issue of the armed struggle. The radical wing of 
Algerian nationalism had tried all the legal means and had participated in unitary schemes in 
order to draw the conclusion that 
in the context of colonized Algeria, violence became the uld- 
mate means. Nobody would know what would have happened had the Nation of Islam tried to 
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get involved in black politics and had tried to infiltrate and influence the most moderate wing. 
However, the idea of resorting to armed struggle in Algeria did not have the agreement of 
and was not the belief of all those within MTDL. Following the party conference held from 4 
to 6 April, 1953 in Algiers, a crisis developed between a faction of the party, which claimed 
communal control, and Messali, the then prevailing leader, who thought that the party was 
under his personal exclusive leadership and authority. Mutual accusations and exclusions fol- 
lowed to seal the division of the party to the concern of the core members. The crisis was the 
outcome of a dualism of leadership and opposed two factions mainly motivated by the taking 
and exercise of power within the party. Messali wanted to impose his authority on the party as 
a sacred leader (Zaim) whereas what were known as 'centralists' wanted to take over from 
hire. These two factions neutralized themselves and could not not make up their minds about a 
real and definitive choice between a legal action or an armed struggle. As the malaise grew 
and the electoral and parliamentary actions were not conclusive, the militants who went under- 
ground were more and more determined to act. They concealed less and less their impatience. 
The leadership was more and more driven back to the choice they dreaded and that they could 
no longer postpone. It was facing the task to operate deep mutations within the party that 
could even threaten it. The combination of these elements (impatience of some activists, scep. 
ticism vis-a-vis the legal action, necessity of a change of perspectives and methods of action) 
led to the division of the leadership and sanctioned the breaking up of the party. The failure 
was a failure of the legal action and of the partisan organization (94). 
The crisis that shook up the Nation of Islam occurred in 1963. Malcolm X. the eloquent 
and bright minister was silenced after 
he made a comment when J. F. Kennedy was assns. 
sinated. He took the opportunity to cut 
loose and be his own man only because he wanted to 
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get involved, to be more active and to be more pragmatic rather than waiting for separatist sal- 
vation. He was killed before he could develop completely his action and his thoughts. 
Muhammed on the other hand stuck to his ideas. Four years after the crisis he still believed 
that Allah would come to the rescue of his people and reiterated his message of separation fol- 
lowed by a territorial claim (95). 
This solution was thought to be the only one that could stop the plight of black people. 
The claim was based on two propositions: firstly, the whites took the land from the so-called 
Indians, a non-white people and therefore brothers, Muhammed referred to them as "our peo- 
ple" (96). Secondly, black people worked as slaves for 300 years and another 100 years as 
exploited therefore they had earned their share in the country (97). The territorial claim was 
repeated many times, the most explicit statement appeared in the Ten Points Programme and 
Position entitled, What Do The Muslims Want, point four (98). The claim for a territory was 
completed by the option he gave to whites to 
decide the place where the new nation might be. 
The' purchase of some land in St Claire County, Alabama amounting to 900 acres and that in 
Georgia and Michigan stretching over 1,000 acres (99), could not be conceived seriously as an 
attempt to set their nation there. 
However this was an indication that if the political claim was 
at' a stand still the economic 
drive was in motion. Over many years Muhammed advocated 
black self-help. For instance, in 1964 he called upon blacks to pool their resources together to 
build a black bank that would finance their projects (100). Also in 1968, he begged black 
farmers to strive towards self-sufficiency in order to be economically independent and finan- 
cially secure (101). As the citizens of 
the Nation could not congregate in an area and exist 
awaiting divine providence this 
lack of initiative in fact had helped white racism deter the 
black man's progress ever since Emancipation. Therefore, each black citizen must develop 
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skills and must put together those skills and resources for the common good of a stong pros- 
perous Nation under Allah. No one knew the extent and holdings of the Nation, although they 
definitely owned supermarkets, slaughter houses, dry cleaning plants, bakeries and varieties of 
stores. The Nation of Islam was more preoccupied by material prosperity at the end. The 
separatist claim was just a dream to rekindle solidarity and commitment to the nation. The 
Black Muslims compelled black people to take a fresh look at their cultural and political priori- 
ties and experienced the agony of reassessing those priorities in view of changing their cir- 
cumstances in America and in the world. Muhammed provided the ABC, firstly 'know your- 
self and your kind', secondly 'protect yourself' and thirdly 'do for yourself'. It was obvious 
that being a black Muslim had important implications for the believer himself but no less for 
the society to which Elijah Muhammed's Black Islam was a deliberately calculated response. 
No part of the Muslim doctrine was incidental. The Black Muslim programme was a patterned 
response to what was perceived as a deliberately planned white offensive aimed ultimately at 
the removal of black people or their re-enslavement. 
The black nationalism of Elijah Muhammed, despite ethnological falsehood, mysticism. 
political rigidity, isolationism and economic separation made a valuable contribution in ques- 
tioning the monopoly of power of the middle class leadership within the black community. It 
above all put forward the belief that black people had the capacity to redress themselves, 
recover their sense of human worth and were able to take their 
future in their own hands. 
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CONCLUSION 
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Nationalism in Algeria under French colonization and within the black community in the 
United States in the 1950's and 1960's stemmed from deep realities and an historical evolution. 
It was a movement of political consciousness favoured by a collective will to survive. It 
became a way to retain self-respect in the face of degradation. It was an effort to create the 
possibility for a better and more affluent life for future generations. People came out to 'fight' 
in order to win political rights, material benefits, to live better and in peace, fulfill their indivi. 
dual and collective capacities and to guarantee the future of their children. It was the daily 
sacrifices, hardships and humiliations that were the basis for political consciousness and suc- 
cessful resistance. Sometimes the courage it took to survive was infinitely greater than the sui- 
cidal impulse to fight when the odds were not in one's favour. As Sartre said, "Life begins on 
the other side of despair" (1). 
Algerians and black people in the United States of America had been coping with two 
systems, colonialism and capitalism, which were driven by an exploitative dynamic. The Euro- 
pean imperialist expansion was partly due to the need 
for new markets to allow the growth of 
the European economy. The United States not only owed its existence to this expansion but 
profited from it. The European drive 
in Africa helped the shipment then the enslavement in 
America of Africans who contributed significantly to the development of the American econ- 
omy and especially that of the 
South. Both systems were characterised by their capacity to 
impose their control on political institutions and economy. This power conferred privileges 
generally to whites who 
had arbitrarily been raised to a superior social position and who held 
their cultural affiliation as the only valid one. Both systems tried 
hard to stifle any claim for 
rights, be they political, economic or social, voiced either 
by individuals or organizations. 
However, in the end, the scope of the economic and social injustice combined with a travesty 
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and betrayal of democratic principles led to Algerian and Afro-American political actions 
whose main aim was to end any form of domination. The enactment of laws by France or the 
United States came either late to meet the needs of the period or were stripped of any sub- 
stance that would have made them effective and fair. 
The political action was disparate and undertaken by different political streams. One 
wing of the reformists was bound to a moderate claim. It thought equality of opportunity 
could lead to equality of attainment. Ferhat Abbas and Martin Luther King chose different 
strategies to reach that aim. In the context of colonized Algeria, Abbas thought or brought 
about different successive schemes; search for complete integration by denying the existence of 
the Algerian nation, asking for a form of autonomy or a federation with France. to find a solu" 
tion. These schemes were dismissed or disregarded. Martin Luther King used non-violent 
protest as a main strategy. It helped the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and Voting 
Rights Act in 1965 which were the highlights of the movement he led. He was well aware 
that the movement had no effective programme, plan or power for translating the national 
equality of the law into the social actuality of shared wealth and power. Torn between his own 
non-violent beliefs, a faith in liberal democracy and a marxian perception of the role of the 
state, he almost neutralized himself. Abbas, like King, shared the belief that evolution and 
emancipation would be achieved through the channels provided by the prevailing institutions. 
Justice and rights were not conferred easily but when they were they lost part of their sub- 
stance or they were slow to be implemented. As their expectations were not met, both King 
and Abbas grew disillusioned because the 
institutions and principles they believed in were put 
of a system that was influenced more 
by powerful business interests than by the search for jus. 
tice.: , 
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The impact of the action of King and Abbas was significant. They prompted the end of 
the view that a peaceful consensus prevailed in the Algerian colonial context and in American 
society. Their belief in the institutions made both of them all the more respectable not only to 
the dominant power structure but more importantly to their communities. Their moderate 
stance helped to unravel the reluctance and sometimes resistance of the power structure to 
apply practically those principles that were fundamental to French and American democracies. 
There was a paradox between a universal application of French and American constitutions and 
a restrictive interpretation of these institutions when they had to benefit non-white peoples. 
Their stance revealed that democratic principles could be overlooked when they did not serve 
the dominant powers. 
Those reformists who concentrated only on bringing pride, sense of worth and raised 
consciousness to their communities were limited in their actions. The limits stemmed not only 
from the political realities but also from the movements themselves. They were inadequately 
supported and geographically unbalanced. In the United States, Malcolm x was mainly esta. 
blished in the North East, SNCC in the East and the South and the Black Panthers in Califor. 
nia. In Algeria the Ulemas were mainly active 
in the east. This stream in Algeria was torn 
between different trends, conceptions and also personalities. They circumscribed their action 
within the prevailing political frameworks. They viewed independence as a distant outcome of 
a gradual and non-violent emancipation. 
They acted hard to defend and strengthen the cthnic 
identity and nationality even if it meant giving allegiance to the authority that controlled the 
political nationality. Malcolm 
X's programme, once he broke off from the Nation of Islam, 
was moderate. He sought the election of 
independent black candidates for public offices, voter 
registration drives, better 
housing conditions, and the establishment of commities for commun. 
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ity and neighbourhood self-defence and a cross-ethnical solidarity. 
The contributions of Malcolm X and Ben Badis were the psychological liberation from 
alienation of their mutual communities. They made their fellow individuals look freshly at 
themselves and at finding pride in their heritage. Malcolm X advocated that black people 
should' control their lives. Ben Badis saw the defence of identity as of a paramount impor- 
tance. -, Both were concerned with self-preservation. Malcolm emphasised those economic and 
political aspects that would improve the quality of life of black people and make life more 
than a daily struggle for survival ultimately and create a sense of self-fulfilment and achieve- 
merit. Ben Badis stressed the cultural side by defending fiercely the national identity which he 
thought was threatened by integration. It brought back pride and consequently played a role in 
the revolution of 1954. 
The post Malcolm X organizations, especially SNCC and the Black Panthers. tried to 
change black people from the 
inside. Both were anti- capitalists and anti-imperialists. They 
believed in possible alliances with potentially militants segments of the white population. They 
both favoured some kind of self-determination for black people, an economic and political con- 
trol by black people of black ghettoes and of geographical areas of black majority in the South. 
Their actions were limited because they found great difficulties in identifying their frameworks 
of analysis, whether these were national, racial, or class 
based. Their actions were character. 
ised by ambiguity caused by the sensitivity and complexity of the important issues such as 
land, ` revolution and coalitions they had tackled. 
The reformist wing has, whether in Algeria or in the Unites States of America. faced a 
difficult conciliation between claiming a right to be different and claiming to be equal to the 
dominant community, and between a denunciation of discriminatory measures and a protest of 
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loyalism. Slogans in the mouth of black militants seemed to create a threat of a more intense 
revolt across the land while in reality they retreated to reforms that would restructure the politi- 
cal, economic and social institutions. 
This wing besides psychologically freeing individuals from alienation in both communi. 
ties, Algerian/black, went further in the United States. The Black Panthers especially had crys- 
tallised the unformulated late thoughts of King and Malcolm X and shifted the issue of equal- 
ity to the ideological level. Equality would be potent and fair only if the American capitalist 
system changed. The disparity of race was put aside to emphasise the exploitative nature of 
capitalism not only as far as small ethnic minorities were concerned but also the white poor. 
The change would focus on being more caring, more egalitarian and fairer. The ruthlessness of 
Federal agencies, FBI especially, showed that the Black Panthers were felt to be a potential 
threat to the state in their appeal to the American people. 
The radical wing put forward the issue of independence or self- determination but had not 
evolved adequate means of gaining 
its objectives. In the United States of America, the Nation 
of Islam rejected any 
involvement in the Civil Rights Movement and utterly dismissed most 
American institutions. It confined itself to an ideological framework too charactcrised by 
dogma; rigidity and lack of constructive political action. However, despite ethnological false. 
hood; mysticism, political rigidity and isolationism, it put forward the belief that black people 
had the capacity to redress the situation, recover their sense of dignity and to design their own 
future. In Algeria, belief in legalism was met by fraudulent elections. It condemned them to 
failure and made forceful the idea of resorting to an armed struggle as the ultimate solution to 
emancipation. 
However the resort to armed struggle was not a decision taken by the party. 
The internal squabbles within PAP - MTDL about policies and personalities had had the sattle 
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stifling effect as the authoritarian and self-centred personality of Elijah Muhammed as regards 
the Nation of Islam in the United States of America. 
Patterns of political expressions emerged in both communities. They did not match per- 
fectly because of the different contexts in which the black community and the Algerian one 
lived. There was a sharp division into different political streams. Within these organizations, 
clashes of personalities were frequent and led in some cases to ruptures and consequently gave 
birth to new organizations and new ideas. SNCC was not completely happy with the leader- 
ship and ultimate goals of the Civil Rights Movement. Malcolm X broke off from the Nation 
of Islam to create his own organization. Abbas deserted the Elected to be the driving force of 
many political or unitary movements. There were also inter-organizational clashes. Martin 
Luther King's policy was criticised by Malcolm X. King had been the target of Carmichael 
then of SNCC who later entered into conflict with the Black Panthers on policies and personal- 
ities after his brief involvement with them. In Algeria, Abbas's 1936 dismissal of the Algerian 
nation was fiercely attacked by Ben Badis. Both these prominent personalities were disap- 
proved of by the radical PAP - MTDL because they were thought to be moderate. 
There was a disparity in perceiving the ways of opposing domination. Assimilation and 
complete integration were sought and advocated by a faction that believed in the justice and 
principles of western democracy. Equally important was the action laid by another faction that 
sought to raise consciousness, to develop and strengthen the black and Algerian communities 
resistance either by enforcing their moral abilities to find a pride in their heritage and race or 
by promoting self-defence as Malcolm X and the Black Panthers did. The radical faction 
thought that a complete rupture with dominant powers and societies was necessary to put an 
end to oppression either through legal, violent or divine means. Also there was a difference in 
- 270 - 
defining the role, status and future of individuals and communities between these discordant 
political expressions within both communities. There were those who thought and sometimes 
deeply believed that the place of the black and Algerian element were to be debated within or 
by keeping close ties with the American and French nations. There were those who without 
rejecting the belonging or association with the American and French nations thought that a 
specific attention, position and respect of ethnic differences should be granted within the Amer- 
ican and French context. Finally there were those who thought that only a complete breaking 
from the French and American nations would result in a true and just emancipation. 
Two factors were seminal in the evolution of black nationalism. Violence was a charac- 
teristic element of the American social life. It grew with the development of the country. It 
affected the black community in two ways. For decades whites had used it to degrade black 
people. It was inherent to slavery. It was an important weapon to deny black people the right 
to vote and a means to terrorize them through organizations like the Ku Klux Klan. In reality 
it had been a means to stop real emancipation, to make hollow any legislation affecting black 
people, a forceful tool to keep the racial stratification and the exclusion of black people. 
Violence had also been a significant factor on the political level. It had been a means to elim- 
inate charismatic black figures such as Malcolm X and Martin Luther King. It was used to 
wipe out many potential leaders of the 
black community. When the Black Panthers armed 
themselves to defend the community against racist violence, they were fought as an enemy, 
consequently some were killed, others 
imprisoned or lived in exile. The Black Panthers after 
this period ceased to be the potential organization that would have 
brought out a scheme that 
not only would have united 
black and white peoples for the same struggle but would have out- 
lined the ways to restructure the American social, economic and political institutions. Equally 
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significant was the fact that black people were a minority. This limited the struggle and the 
organizations of black people from the start. The claims had to be realistically circumscribed 
within the areas of political rights, economic and social equality. Democracy as the govern- 
ment of the people could only reflect the aspirations and interests of a majority. Desires of a 
minority or minorities would become secondary to the 'national interest'. Hopes of a minority 
or minorities would be realised if they did not threaten the 'national interest'. Also as a conse- 
quence of this fact of being a minority, the implementation of the organizations would be 
unbalanced geographically thus reducing the chances to develop into national ones. They 
would speak out only for a small faction of the community. Black people consequently would 
be lacking effective power in different institutions even if they had representatives as propor- 
tional as their number. 
The political expressions either in Algeria or in the United States of America within the 
black community reflected a multi-faced answer to finding a solution to emancipation and 
human dignity. Broad political trends reflected the similarity of the division of the opinion of 
both Algerian and black communities: both counted among their ranks integrationists, separa- 
tists and those who wavered in between. While Algerians won their independence on July 5, 
1962, after waging a war against France, black people in the United States won in the 1960's 
certain rights. Among these was the right to be fully recognized as American citizens through 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and their inaliable right to use the ballot through the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. While Algerians gained the right to determine their future by themselves, 
black people and the black struggle ceased to be the main internal issue in the United States. 
The loss of charismatic leaders such as Martin Luther King and Malcolm X, the governmental 
action that stifled the potential of black organizations after the death of King, the emergence of 
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a few black capitalists, and the war in Vietnam which monopolized the media headlines, sub- 
dued the issue of transforming the equality of opportunity into an equality of attainment after 
the 1960's. 
Nationalism; taken as an assertion of the rights, claims and aspirations of a given society 
or community in opposition to an authority, whatever its institutional form or objective, raised 
hopes and defined expectations of the Algerian community under French colonization and the 
black community in the United States of America in the late 1950's and the 1960's. Its main 
objective was the advancement of the political, economic and social conditions of both com- 
munities. The fact that the Algerians were a majority within colonized Algeria was an impor- 
tant element in their success in defeating French colonialism and achieving their main goal, 
independence. This factor favoured the development of a greater sense of destiny which was 
enhanced by deep ethnic and cultural roots. Once they embarked in fighting politically French 
domination, the choices for their progress became clear; either they would assimilate to France, 
or they would seek a kind of self-determination or autonomy without cutting ties with France, 
or they would separate, which they did at the end. On the contrary, black Americans were a 
minority scattered over a huge territory. The issue of their progress was limited to gaining pol- 
itical rights, fighting economic disparity and racialism within the confines of the United States 
of America. They identified with this country which was, and is, ruled by a white majority. 
They lacked the wider choice the Algerians had because of their small number and a territory 
that originally did not belong to them. Black Americans, despite the political gains of the 
1960's, have not completely achieved their aspirations: to be part of a more caring, tolerant, 
and egalitarian society. 
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